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 Summary of Thesis 
 
China is simply bigger and growing faster than any other country. The rapid growth of 
China during the past few decades has led to suggestions that China is exporting 
deflation, but many of studies of this idea have found no significant effect of China on 
trading countries’ price levels, mainly due to the small share of China in world GDP. 
This study will look at China’s impact not through trade shares, but by analysing the 
price effect directly. For actual competition, we use a model loosely related to the 
Bertrand model to find the Chinese price effect on Mexico’s export prices in the US 
market. China’s productivity has increased faster than any other country’s and we 
assume that the increased productivity as the main exogenous driver of China’s market 
expansion in the world market. The Chinese price effect is indeed statistically 
significant; after experimenting with various robustness tests, our regression results 
show that a 10% drop in Chinese price will cause Mexico to drop its price by around 
4% to 8%. We also found that China can influence Mexico’s price even if it has no 
direct exports to the USA; the mere threat of entry into the market is enough to 
constrain Mexico’s exporters’ pricing ambitions. We term this effect potential 
competition. The Chinese price effect for the set of potential products is present and is 
positive and statistically significant at around at 0.20 to 0.50. To compare the Chinese 
price effect in a relatively small market, we repeat the analysis on Singapore. We found 
that China influences Malaysia’s prices in the Singapore market and the results are 
comparable to those in the USA. One of the necessary conditions for China exporting 
deflation is its competitive price effect on other manufacturing producers’ prices; we 
tested for this and have found support for this condition. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
 
China’s influence can be felt more strongly than ever in the world today. Because of its 
increasing amount of interaction and growing role in the international market, there is 
ongoing interest in what the country has done, is doing and will do. The Chinese 
success story can be used as a learning curve for many of the newly emerging 
economies; however, none has quite attained the same success as China over the past 
few decades. China’s growth is unique because of the country’s sheer size and the speed 
of its success. China simply matters and is central; anything that happens there can be 
felt worldwide, particularly as far as the USA and Europe. There is a saying that ‘When 
America sneezes, the rest of the world gets a cold’, and China is beginning to take on 
this role. In only around three decades, China has managed to transform itself from a 
closed-door economy to currently the largest exporter of merchandise trade, the second 
largest economy and one of the largest recipients of Foreign Direct Investment inflows. 
Its productivity has been growing at a rate unprecedented among any of its rivals over 
the past few decades. The growth of China is inevitably going to create more 
opportunities for some economies, but at the same time it poses a threat to others. 
 
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy, and in particular its exports, since 1990 has 
led to suggestions that China has partially underpinned the late lamented ‘great 
moderation’ and, less charitably, that it has exported deflation (Kamin et al., 2004; 
Feyzioglu and Willard, 2008; Broda and Weinstein, 2010). If these suggestions are true, 
they arise not from China’s direct impact on the price indices of developed countries, 
because in 1980 Chinese exports accounted for only about 0.1% of OECD countries’ 
absorption and still less than 3% of OECD countries’ GDP in 2010. 1  Given the 
relatively small share of China’s exports in the OECD’s GDP, we do not expect cheaper 
Chinese products to have a significant direct impact on overall consumer prices in the 
OECD region. The Chinese influence has to rely on the competitive pressure that China 
exerts on other manufacturing producers’ prices – its competitive effect. That is, a 
necessary condition for China to be exporting deflation is that it has an effect on the 
prices charged by other exporters and producers.  
                                                 
 
1
 GDP data were obtained from World Development Indicators Online, UN Comtrade. 
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This thesis is primarily concerned with cheaper Chinese products and their influence on 
competitors’ pricing in the destination market. Our main approach is to focus on one 
market, namely the USA, and another middle-income supplier, Mexico. Based on the 
theory of comparative advantage, Mexico and China should produce fairly similar 
products for the US market. For consistent and robustness purposes, we will also look at 
the Chinese price effect in a relatively smaller economy like Singapore and compare 
results to the USA. We will also identify the different basket of products which China 
exports to the different countries and investigate whether China prices exports 
differently between a big and a relatively small market. However, in the USA, tariff 
preferences were given to Mexico and there was also some form of Non-Tariff Barriers 
(NTB) imposed on China. We have argued that tariffs played a very insignificant role in 
the determination of price as there is little variation in tariff schedules, our results will 
be more robust if we are to look at the Chinese price effect in an even more liberalized 
economy like Singapore. We can be more confident that the results obtained will be 
cleaner and more robust in a sense that it has purged the effects of trade barriers 
influencing price. We postulate that increased Chinese competition is largely in terms of 
prices, driven by the rapidly increasing productivity and scale in Chinese industry as 
producers started to catch up technologically with middle-income countries and 
absorbed large amounts of surplus labour from the hinterland and capital from the rest 
of the world. In principle, we see this advance in productivity and scale as the main 
exogenous driver of China’s market expansion and use a Bertrand-like model to gauge 
the Chinese price effect on the country’s competitors.  
 
Our main contribution is that the direct price effect of Chinese competition is clearly 
present and is stronger and better defined than any effect deriving from China’s share of 
the importer’s market; it applies to both the US and Singapore markets. The direct price 
effect of China is statistically significant after being subjected to several robustness 
tests. Our results suggest that a 10% reduction in China’s price will cause a 4% to 8% 
drop in the price level of its rivals. Our method for measuring the price effect of China 
directly is an alternative to the share approach, which has generally had little success. 
This thesis contains seven chapters and the rest of the introduction provides a little more 
detail for each chapter.   
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Chapter 2 of this thesis provides some history on China’s institutional and economic 
reforms since the 1980s, which paved the way for its growth. We offer stylised facts and 
discuss in greater detail the factors contributing to China’s growth. We reason that the 
growth in China’s Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is the main contributing factor and 
driving force for cheaper products. The abundant labour force (as a result of labour 
migration from rural to urban areas), capital accumulation and FDI inflows are the 
important factors contributing to increasing scale and productivity. Several studies have 
shown that China’s productivity growth has been faster than that of any other country 
(Asian Productivity Organization, 2011; Holz, 2006; Hu and Khan, 1997; Inter-
American Development Bank, 2010). In this chapter we highlight some of the important 
factors behind Chinese growth, in particular its exports, and justify the assertion that 
China’s emergence has been an unprecedented shock to the global economy. China’s 
export basket contains different types of products, ranging from hairpins to more 
sophisticated products like Apple’s iPod. Heterogeneity exists between products and 
this is usually reflected in the price, so there is a need to examine the data at product-
level in order to investigate the Chinese price effect.. By applying product effects, time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for within products.  
 
In Chapter 3, we explain the data sources and selection that we will use for our main 
regression analysis. Our study is data intensive and will make use of product-level data 
at the HS6 digit level and changes in unit price as an indicator of price changes. We use 
data at the Harmonised System 6 digit level (HS6) obtained from the UN Comtrade 
database,
2
 as this is the finest level of disaggregation that is harmonised internationally. 
For consistency purposes, we use data obtained from the importing country, the USA. 
In this chapter, we provide some stylised facts about both China and Mexico’s exports 
to the USA at the product level, and we find that the trade overlap between the two 
countries increases over time, during which China exports the majority of the product 
headings into the US market. There have been a few revisions to the HS classification 
since 1992 (HS92) and thus there might not be an exact match between every product 
when converted from the later HS systems to the earlier version. It is important that the 
products are coded correctly during the conversion so as to make sure that we are 
comparing the same individual products over time. We thus arrive at a set of ‘clean’ 
                                                 
 
2
 The data are obtained from UN Comtrade under the World Integrated Trade Solution System (WITS). 
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products that are free of classification issues. However, there is also the issue that the 
most dynamic sectors – that is, machinery and electronics – are the ones that have 
undergone most of the classification changes and we lose a great deal of information 
when using only the ‘clean’ sample set. Thus, we propose to use the full sample set and 
to repeat some of our estimates on a sample of ‘clean’ products.  
In Chapter 4, we use a model loosely related to the Bertrand model to find the Chinese 
price effect on Mexico’s price in the US market. The set of products that are in direct 
competition is referred to as the ‘common product’, and our sample period is from 1992 
to 2008. Our main objective is to find the direction and magnitude of the effects of  
changes in China’s price on Mexico’s price at the product level, which we term the 
Chinese price effect. Our main regression uses post-tariff prices, as we find little 
variation in the tariff data. The unit price is used as the indicator for price. As unit prices 
are very noisy, we need to remove outliers that might otherwise reflect errors of 
measurement and create bias and excess noise. The simple regression results show that 
the Chinese price effect is roughly around 0.5, meaning that when China reduces its 
price by 10%, Mexico will reduce its price by 5%.  
 
To correct for the endogeneity in our model (causation), we introduce the use of an 
Instrumental Variable (IV). China is not at the frontier of technological innovation and 
is playing catch-up to other countries; hence its rate of technological improvement will 
be much more likely to reflect local factors determining imitation rather than shifts in 
global technology that it shares with its trading partners. Thus we postulate that China’s 
increasing competitiveness is an exogenous shock and is quite independent of what 
Mexico does, therefore the most natural instrument for Chinese export prices would be 
factors causing output shocks at home; that is, a productivity shock. However, 
productivity data are not as finely specified as trade data and so we also need to 
consider a series of instruments based on trade data. The Chinese price effect increases 
slightly when we use IV regression. A second potential source of endogeneity is 
China’s share of imports into the USA, which will be affected by the price of Chinese 
exports relative to other exports, including those from Mexico. A natural instrument for 
this would be China’s share of other markets. The Chinese price effect varies only 
slightly even after inclusion of the other controls in our equation. One worry has been 
whether Chinese and Mexican export prices have common trends caused by a third 
17 
 
 
factor; to allow for this , we do an estimate in first differences with product fixed effects 
and still find that, while the Chinese price effect is lower at around 0.30, it remains 
positive and significant. We also conduct other robustness tests and our results show 
that the Chinese price effect is positive and significant in the range of around 0.30 to 
0.70.  
 
In Chapter 5, we believe that China can also influence Mexico’s price even if there is no 
direct competition involved. This chapter considers the potential competition of Chinese 
products where the threat of Chinese entry is identified by examining China’s exports to 
the rest of the world (ROW). Contestability is a measure of the extent to which a market 
is open to new entries. In contestable markets, the threat posed by the possibility of new 
firms entering the market is taken to be a key determinant of the behaviour of existing 
firms. This means that based on the contestable model, firms behave like perfect 
competitive markets to prevent rivals from entering the market. The concept of potential 
competition is commonly studied in the airline market, where low-cost airlines are able 
to gain a share of trade when the industry becomes more liberalised and competition 
increases. However, to our knowledge, not a great deal of research has been done on 
potential competition in the context of international trade. A study closely related to our 
work was conducted by Schiff and Chang (2003), which examined the impact of market 
presence and contestability on the price reaction of member and excluded countries 
when a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) was formed. However, they used tariff 
changes as an indicator of price competition, whereas we attempt to identify price 
changes directly. One of the problems arising when doing this exercise is to find the 
estimated Chinese prices for the set of products in potential competition, as there is no 
trade on these products reported by the USA. Thus we need to use China’s export prices 
to Japan, Korea and the ROW to get the predicted Chinese price in the USA. In 
potential competition, Mexico will be constrained to charge a lower price to keep China 
out of the market and gain a bigger share itself. We will use the logit model to find the 
propensity of China to enter the US market, which is independent of Mexican firms’ 
pricing decisions. The Chinese price effect for the set of potential products is relatively 
smaller than those in actual competition, but is positive and statistically significant at 
around 0.20-0.50. Our results suggest that the Chinese price effect in the USA is not 
significantly affected by the probability of China exporting to the US market. This 
raises the possibility that the methods used to estimate the probability to export are 
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responsible for the results. Another method that we use to measure the effects of 
potential competition is to examine the price for the period before and after China’s first 
entry, which we define as temporal competition. We find that there is an equal chance 
that Mexico’s firms will either engage in price competition or cooperate after Chinese 
entry. Unfortunately, we do not find any evidence of a difference in the characteristics 
of the products between the two groups. 
Chapter 6 is a case study that considers the Chinese price effect on Malaysia’s prices in 
the Singapore market. Initially our aim was to find the Chinese price effect in a much 
smaller economy like Brunei Darussalam, but that did not materialise due to data 
constraints. Singapore is a relatively smaller market compared to the USA and we might 
observe a different magnitude of the Chinese price effect in a small economy. Again we 
choose a developing country like Malaysia, one of the most important trading partners 
for Singapore. However, China has been gaining share in the Singapore market and we 
wanted to determine its influence on Malaysia’s products at the product level. This 
exercise was set up using the same methods as in Chapters 4 and 5. We wanted to find 
the Chinese price effect in a smaller market. We found that Malaysia will reduce its 
price by around 6% to 7% if the Chinese price falls by 10% for products that are in 
direct competition.  
Chapter 7 outlines the main conclusions. This thesis aims to find the influence of 
China’s exports on other competitors through price competition. We predict that China 
influences other competitors’ prices not only in products that are in direct competition, 
but also in products that China has the potential to export. Overall our results are 
positive: we find that China does influence its rivals’ price in the market. The results 
remain consistent after conducting various robustness tests: the Chinese price effect is 
still there and remains significant. Our message is that China influences its competitors’ 
prices and hence will affect the import price index and the overall price level in the 
destination market. The great moderation refers to a period of strong growth and low 
inflation in the world economy, but is followed by great volatility in financial and asset 
markets. If Chinese productivity growth persists, China will continue to produce 
products at competitive prices, which will help to stabilise other exporters’ prices as 
well.  
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 The China Shock 2.
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
China is currently the world’s second largest economy and its largest exporter in 
merchandise trade; it has also the world’s largest population, at about 1.34 billion 
(World Bank, 2012). In 2009, China became the world’s largest exporter of tradable 
goods. In 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy, 
with a nominal GDP estimated at around USD 5.9 trillion (World Bank, 2012).
1
 China 
has posted double-digit growth for the past three decades and its nominal GDP in 2010 
was about 31 times higher than in 1980. With a GDP per capita of just over USD 4000
2
 
in 2010, China is still many times smaller than the USA and just about half the size of 
Mexico (World Bank, 2012). Nevertheless, China’s per capita GDP is growing faster 
and at a greater scale than for any other country during its industrialisation stages 
(Dobbs et al., 2012). This relatively low income indicates that China is playing catch-up 
to other economies. Nevertheless, its extraordinary growth has made it one of the most 
important economies in the global market and it is providing a set of new opportunities 
and challenges for the rest of the world.  
 
After 1978, China experienced major political reform and the country started to 
transform itself from a centrally planned economy towards a more relaxed, state-
controlled system and a reformed economic system. These reforms improved its 
economic conditions and helped steer the country towards a stable economic growth 
path, accelerating productivity growth. In the early 1980s, China began reforms in the 
agricultural sector, under which collective agriculture was abolished; farmers gained 
more control of their own land and were allowed to sell their surplus in the market, 
which prompted them to work harder in order to get rich. The government also started 
to relax its control over small-scale enterprises, paving the way for non-agricultural 
private enterprises to expand, thereby creating more job opportunities to cater to 
                                                 
 
1
 The data were obtained from World Bank Online Indicators. The GDP figures are listed in current US 
dollars and were converted from domestic currencies using single-year official exchange rates. 
2
 GDP per capita is at current prices, as obtained from the World Development Index (WDI), World 
Bank. 
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China’s abundant population, who were mostly engaged in the agricultural sector at that 
time. Rural to urban migration which was quite restricted before the transformation, 
also increased during that period because of the government’s more relaxed approach. 
Furthermore, China’s abundant labour began migrating away from the agricultural 
sector to find better job opportunities in factories, which provided a necessary start to 
the transformation of the Chinese economy into a manufacturing base (Maddison, 2007; 
Bromley and Yao, 2006). 
 
At the same time, China also began to open its borders to the outside world when the 
government adopted an export-led growth model to promote the development of the 
stagnant economy. In 1980, the Chinese government developed four special economic 
zones, which were all located along the coast for ease of transportation. The special 
zones were designated as governed by a more liberalised system to spearhead the 
export-oriented economy. These special zones were aimed at creating employment, 
transferring high-technology industries, attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
earning foreign reserves through exports and promoting economic and regional 
development (Yeung et al., 2009).  
 
The cheap, abundant labour within the country, together with the government’s aim to 
gradually privatise some of the previously state-owned monopolies, led to increased 
production efficiency in China. Many of the major state-owned enterprises are joint 
ventures and are mostly still controlled by the state. At the same time, China’s open-
door policy led to an influx of FDI, which has helped to build factories, created even 
more jobs, linked China to international markets and also led to transfers of technology. 
All of these factors have contributed to the increase in productivity within the country, 
which has made its growth strategy similar to that of Japan in the 1950s, focusing 
mainly on export-oriented growth with a current account surplus (Guo and N'Diaye, 
2009).  
 
China is one of the more successful stories for other developing countries to duplicate. 
Thus, in just three decades, it has transformed itself from a centrally planned economy 
to become one of the most important producers in the world today. We are interested in 
China because of its huge importance and the effect it has on other markets. 
 
21 
 
 
2.2 China Matters 
 
2.2.1 Comparison with Other Countries 
 
China’s economic transformation and growth happened at a rate and scale that are 
unprecedented for any other country in the historical data. As shown in Table 2.1, it 
took the UK about 155 years to double its GDP per capita (in PPP terms), while China 
did that in just 12 years (1983-2005). China embarked on its transformation path at a 
later stage compared to other developed countries, but the scale and the rate at which it 
has grown have made it the subject of global research. China’s growth is not a miracle 
but a resurrection, and China will again become the world’s biggest economy by the 
year 2015 (Maddison, 2007). 
 
Table 2.1: China Is Bigger and Growing Faster  
 
Date of Doubling Initial Population (millions) Years to Double GDP per capita* 
UK 1700-1855 9 155 
USA 1820-1873 10 53 
Germany 1830-1894 28 64 
Japan 1906-1939 47 33 
China 1983-1995 1023 12 
India 1989-2006 822 17 
*Time to increase GDP per capita (in PPP terms) from USD 1300 to USD 2600 
Source: Angus Maddison, University of Groningen, McKinsey Global Institute 2011 
 
Winters and Yusuf (2007) assert that using the current market price provides a better 
indicator than using prices in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) if we are looking 
at the impact of China on another country, as such international effects can be more 
accurately found via the international transfer of goods. PPP makes allowance for many 
untraded goods, especially services, which are cheaper in poorer countries. Using PPP is 
more appropriate if we are comparing welfare effects across countries, but, since we are 
dealing with international trade data to access the price effects of Chinese products, the 
current price is a better indicator.  
 
We measured China’s share in total world GDP to compare it with the other major 
economies as measured by the current market price. In 1980, China’s share in world 
GDP at current market prices was only around 1.7%; by 2010, it was the second largest 
economy in the world with a share of 9.3%. China’s share in world GDP has shown an 
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upward trend, especially since the 1990s, as demonstrated in Figure 2.1. China’s GDP 
had already surpassed the whole of the Latin America and Caribbean region
3
 
(developing countries) by 2000 and had overtaken Japan by 2010. We did not plot the 
GDP shares for the six East Asian Traders,
4
 as data for Taiwan (ROC) is not available 
from the World Bank, but individually each country comprises just a small percentage 
of world GDP. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: World GDP Share by Country (Current Prices) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators online  
 
 
 
2.2.2 China’s Export Shock  
 
We are more interested in China’s influence on other countries transmitted via its 
increasing role in international trade. In this thesis, we focus on China’s exports, 
although it has had an equally profound effect via its imports. We provide some facts on 
                                                 
 
3
 The Latin America region is a collection of 29 countries, and their share in world GDP has risen just slightly since the 1980s. 
4
 Six East Asian Traders refers to Taiwan (ROC), Hongkong (China), Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand. 
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China’s share in world merchandise goods from the 1950s. Figure 2.2 shows the global 
export shares of the major economies for every ten years since the 1940s. China was a 
very insignificant player in the world market before the 1990s, when its share in world 
merchandise goods was only around 1%, but that has now increased rapidly to around 
10.6% in 2010. The case of China is interesting in the sense that the country has 
managed to transform itself into the largest exporter of merchandise goods in such a 
short period of time. In 2009, China surpassed Germany to become the world’s largest 
exporter of tradable goods, with exports estimated at around USD 1.75 trillion. 
 
Figure 2.2: Share of World Exports 
 
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics (2011) 
 
From 1960 onwards, the exports of the six East Asian Traders grew dramatically, to a 
point where their combined export shares reached a peak of around 10% during the 
early 1990s, but they have remained rather stagnant since, with a 10.1% share in 2010. 
The 1990s also coincided with the rapid rise of Chinese exports, which led to questions 
about China displacing the exports of the other Asian countries (Greenaway et al., 
2008). In Figure 2.2, it is apparent that China’s export growth affected Japan and the six 
East Asian Traders more severely in the early 1990s. Japanese export growth started in 
the 1960s, with its export shares rising to about 10% in the early 1990s, but declined to 
only about 5% in 2010. This is not a surprise considering that many factories have been 
reallocated to developing countries, of which China has been the biggest recipient 
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because of its cheaper labour and also its adequate level of infrastructure. We have 
omitted the other developing countries from our analysis as they only constitute a very 
small portion of world exports. We can see a shift in the world export pattern towards 
the Asian region, propelled by Japan and the six East Asian Traders from the 1960s and 
most recently China from the early 1990s. Developed countries such as the USA, 
Germany and Japan, which used to be the main exporters in the world, have all seen 
their export shares decline over the past few decades. Thus, China is possibly the 
biggest export shock we have witnessed over the last 30 years and it is projected to 
grow still further. 
 
2.2.3 The US Market 
 
Instead of looking at China’s impact on the world economy as a whole, for the sake of 
concreteness we focus on the US market: our main proximate objective will be to 
identify the Chinese price effect in the USA. Being the world’s largest consumer, the 
USA imported about 12.8% of the world’s total exports of merchandised goods in 2010 
(World Bank, 2012). As of 2010, China was the USA’s biggest source of imports and 
second-largest trading partner. US bilateral trade with China started to increase after the 
two nations signed a bilateral trade agreement in July 1979, and provided for mutual 
most favoured nation (MFN) treatment starting from 1980. Thus, China was granted 
MFN status by the USA even before its official joining of the WTO in 2001. In Figure 
2.3, we plot the flow of US trade with China from 1980. That year, the USA maintained 
a trade surplus of around USD 2.6 billion with China, but experienced a deficit of 
around USD 300 million in 1983. However, it was not until 1986 that China’s exports 
started to enter the USA on a larger scale. The USA’s trade deficit with China has 
worsened since the mid-1980s and was estimated at more than USD 300 billion for 
2011.  
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Figure 2.3: US Merchandise Trade with China in USD Billions (1980-2011) 
 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade 
 
 
2.2.4 China’s Market Share in USA’s Total Imports  
 
China’s share in the US market was almost non-existent before the 1980s, but has 
increased dramatically since and by 2010 it had an amazing 20% market share of the 
USA’s total import basket. China overtook Canada to become the largest exporter to the 
USA in 2007. Its share of the US market even surpassed the entire EU-25 (17%) by 
2010. Thus Chinese market share has increased at the expense of other countries, 
especially from the 1990s onwards. The developed countries like Canada and the EU 
experienced a decline in market share from the 1970s onwards, a pattern that marked 
the increasing importance of the USA to the developing countries, such as the East 
Asian Traders and Japan. Japan’s share dropped significantly, from around 20% in the 
mid-1980s to only around 6% in 2010. There is an increasing trend in developing 
countries’ share of US imports over time. From the late 1990s onwards, the other 
emerging markets like Vietnam and Cambodia (not shown in Figure 2.4) also 
experienced an increase in market share in the USA; however, unlike China, these 
countries are small, with a less than 1% share. 
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Mexico is also a major exporter to the USA; its market share has also shown a major 
increase, from around 6% during the 1980s to only about 12% in 2010. However, 
Mexico’s share in the USA has not shown much increase, remaining relatively flat since 
1997. Mexico seems likely to be particularly vulnerable to Chinese competition, as both 
are middle-income countries exporting labour-intensive products and both are major 
suppliers to the USA. As in Figure 2.4, Chinese market share is increasing faster than 
any other country’s and overtook Mexico’s in 2003.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Market Share in the USA 
 
*Six East Asian Traders refers to Taiwan (ROC), Hong Kong (China), Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and 
Thailand 
 
The developed countries have probably lost for ever their comparative advantage in 
producing low-value-added manufacturing products. The newly emerging countries 
have significantly lower labour costs and can now meet global demand for many 
products like textiles, clothing and cheaper electronic products at a lower cost. 
However, many of these newly emerging countries are comparatively small; China is 
certainly the biggest shock. We again emphasise the importance of Chinese products in 
the USA, where about one fifth of US total imports are from China. 
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2.2.5 Importance of the US Market 
 
The proportion of China’s exports going to the USA is the ratio of ‘China’s exports to 
the USA’ to ‘China’s total exports’. China and Mexico’s exports to the USA are shown 
in Appendix 2.1. In 1980, China’s total exports worldwide were only worth around 
USD 17.51 billion, of which about 7% (USD 1.16 billion) were to the USA. By 2011, 
China’s exports to the US market were valued at USD 417.30 billion, comprising about 
24% of its total exports. Mexico, on the other hand, sends almost all of its exports to the 
USA. In 2011, 74% of Mexico’s total exports were to the USA, worth around USD 349 
million. The US market is thus a very important export destination for both countries, 
especially Mexico.   
 
2.3 How China Grew so Fast 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
 
China is simply bigger and growing faster than any other country. Its economic growth 
has been achieved by pursuing an export-led growth policy. There must be some factors 
that made Chinese products relatively cheaper and we seek to identify these. We argue 
that the main reason for Chinese export growth should be attributed to the increase in 
the productivity of the real factors of production. China’s abundant labour force and its 
reallocation to manufacturing industries, capital accumulation and FDI inflows are the 
important factors that have contributed to China’s export boom, but the sustained 
increase in productivity was the main engine for sustained growth in the Chinese 
economy (Hu and Khan, 1997).  
 
China’s economic reform began in the 1980’s when the government first allowed the 
farmers to trade in the market. The government aimed to expand the role of the private 
sector which further increased the domestic savings rate which was vital to spearhead 
China’s growth (Woo, 1994). The increase in small scale enterprise helped to absorb the 
labour surplus from the agriculture sector leading to a reallocation promoting efficiency. 
The increase in the supply of labour to the urban sector means that these people are 
willing to work for a relatively low wages; while at the same time increases the 
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efficiency for the agricultural sector. However rather than just increasing the quantity of 
workers, the Chinese government also focuses on improving the quality of labour 
mainly through education and training. The average level of education level for a person 
aged 15 years doubled from around 5 years in 1978 to more than 10 years by 2003 
(Maddison, 2007).  
 
In order to utilise its abundance of cheap labour, the Chinese government also 
implemented the Coastal Development Strategy, which allowed firms in coastal 
provinces to engage in export-processing contracts that had initially been confined only 
to special economic zones (Fukasaku and Wu, 1993; Fu, 2004). An increase in the 
number of workers can produce more output when they have more capital to work on. 
Hence in order to increase the output level, the country must invest heavily on 
machinery, better technology and infrastructure. Wood and Mayer (2011) attributed the 
rapid growth in the developing Asian countries mainly to the increasing labour 
participation rates and the accumulation of capital stock; with little progress in total 
factor productivity. Krugman (1994) further stressed that these developing countries 
will begin to slow down well before they catch up with the developed countries without 
such innovation and productivity gains. According to Krugman, economic growth is 
limited by simply increasing the physical inputs like labour and capital; there need to be 
increase in the output per unit of input (increase in productivity) in order to achieve 
sustainable growth. Other than just relying on domestic investments, the government 
provided financial incentives in order to attract more FDI, which is vital to promote the 
country’s export-led growth strategy. The massive inflow of FDI has helped in the 
transfer technological and managerial skills, which further increases efficiency.  
 
During the reforms, China invested heavily in capital stock; Hoekman et al. (2002) 
found that capital formation played a principal role in China's economic growth while 
there was nearly no technological progress from 1952 to 1980. Since the economic 
reformation, China has continued to grow since and studies have shown that the 
increasing Chinese productivity as the main contributing factor for growth (Gallagher 
and Porzecanski, 2008; Hu and Khan, 1997; Asian Productivity Organization, 2011; 
Holz, 2006). Before 1980, Hu and Khan (1997) found that capital accumulation alone 
accounted for about 65% of China’s growth, but its role has reduced significantly after 
the economic reformation. Post 1980, Hu and Khan (1997) found that the increased 
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Chinese productivity accounted for about 42% of China’s output growth while capital 
accumulation and labour made up the rest. Gallagher and Porzecanski (2008) also found 
that total factor productivity which was non existent before the reforms was growng at 
an annual rate of 3.8% post reform. The increasing Chinese productivity accounted for 
about 33% of the increase in China’s output for the period 1979 until 1994. China’s 
growth has been fuelled by factor accumulation but also an improvement in the quality 
of the workforce through education and training; this led to an improvement in the total 
factor productivity (TFP) as greater innovation and technological improvements are 
achieved by its people. It is the improvement TFP which has led to a positive output 
shock for China over the past few decades and increasing productivity is the vital factor 
for sustainable growth as stressed by Krugman (1994). 
 
As China’s exports continue to grow and the standard of living improves domestically, 
nominal wages are expected to increase, reflecting growth in the country’s productivity. 
In the following section, we identify some of the important factors contributing to the 
increased level of productivity in China is the driving force behind its position as the 
largest exporter in the world. Before we move on to discuss its productivity, we will 
first review some of the literature regarding China’s industrialisation.  
 
2.3.2 Drivers of Productivity Growth in China 
 
China’s institutional and economic reforms towards a market-oriented system paved the 
way for its export-oriented growth. One of the main factors contributing to its growth is 
the initial effort of the government to reallocate resources towards the manufacturing 
sector and also to privatise many of the previously state-owned enterprises. China’s 
total employment in the manufacturing sector for 2006 is estimated at 112.63 million, 
which is many times bigger than the 14.16 million in the USA (Lett and Banister, 
2009). Lett and Banister further stress that the drop in manufacturing employment from 
1996 to 2002
5
 was caused by the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Many workers 
were laid off during that period as private enterprises sought to become more efficient 
and productive. Privatisation, a method of reallocating assets and functions from the 
public sector to the private sector, is considered an important factor for economic 
                                                 
 
5 Refer to Appendix 2.3 for China’s manufacturing employment indicators. 
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growth. There are numerous studies considering the greater role of private-owned firms 
and their contribution to increasing productivity and efficiency in China (Naughton, 
1994; Rawski, 1994; Lardy, 1995; Jefferson and Su, 2006; Hu and Khan, 1997). The 
introduction and success of town and village enterprises (TVEs) are among the 
important features marking the start of Chinese industrialisation, driving competition 
and leading to efficiency. The role of private enterprises increased during the mid-1990s 
and began to really take off during that period. The share of private employment in 
China’s manufacturing sector (private plus state owned) increased from 4% in 1998 to 
56% in 2007 (Song et al., 2011). During this period, the gross industrial output of the 
private sector exceeded that of the state sector. The Chinese government was focused on 
efficiency and closed many enterprises that were making losses, at the same time as 
transferring ownership to the private sector. However many of China’s very large 
enterprises (China Unicom, China Construction Bank, China Mobile, ICBC and so on) 
are still very much controlled by the state, with minority private shareholdings. From 
1993 to 2005, it is estimated that state employment in the manufacturing sector fell from 
35 million to 6 million; and overall state employment in China also fell from 19% to 
only around 9% (Maddison, 2007). 
 
The Chinese government also set up Special Economic Zones (SZEs) which have a 
more liberalized environment to conduct economic activities. These SZEs serve as the 
focal points which facilitated investments both domestically and also from abroad. 
These zones enjoyed special privileges such as investment, pricing, taxation, housing, 
and labour and land management policies and they are designated to promote high and 
new technology sectors (Defever and Riaño, 2012). Export subsidies were provided, 
encouraging firms to export. Because of heavy government subsidies, a majority of the 
manufacturing firms in China export almost all of their products (Defever and Riaño, 
2012). China does not only rely on domestic investment but has also done very well in 
attracting FDI. It is now one of the top recipients of FDI in the world today, compared 
to the pre-1980s when FDI inflows were almost non-existent. China is the largest 
recipient of FDI among developing countries and is currently the third largest recipient 
of FDI overall, with an estimated value of USD 185 billion (World Bank, 2012). In 
1998 about 60% of FDI was directed to the manufacturing sector and half of that went 
to labour-intensive industries, which are characterised by low technology and high 
competition (Tseng and Zebregs, 2002). Tseng and Zebregs explain that FDI is the main 
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driver for China’s strong economic performance and that China’s case offers a learning 
experience for other developing countries.  
 
China’s political stability, liberalised investment regime and disguised ‘foreign 
investment’6 are the main reasons for it becoming the main destination for FDI (Lardy, 
1995). In the early stages of its development, China attracted investors mainly from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, but from the 1990s onwards foreign multinational corporations 
(MNCs) from Europe, the USA and Japan started to invest in China. Many of these FDI 
inflows are in the form of joint ventures, where foreign enterprises are allowed to gain 
access to the Chinese market in exchange for technology transfers. Two examples of 
such joint ventures in China are Shanghai Volkswagen car manufacturing and AMECO.  
 
Liu and Daly (2011) found that the manufacturing sector accounted for more than 60% 
of total FDI in China during the period 1997-2008. During the initial stages of reform, 
most of the FDI inflows are still concentrated in low-technology industries. However, 
there has been a shift in the flow of foreign investment towards the high-technology, 
capital-intensive sector, as demand for high-technology products rose after the 
economic downturn in 2008. In their paper, Liu and Daly (2011) used the example of 
the textile industry, where foreign investments fell from USD 2.11 billion in 2005 to 
USD 1.39 billion in 2009. FDI in the higher-technology sectors like the pharmaceutical 
industry increased by 43.9% in 2009, with a value of USD 0.95 billion. If FDI inflows 
are now directed towards higher-technology products, it will mean that China starts to 
produce more sophisticated products and will probably be gaining more market share in 
the near future.  
 
In order for China to increase its standard of living and to sustain its economic growth, 
it has to invest more on technological innovation; whether by adopting technologies 
from abroad or through its own innovations. Timmer et al. (2012b) stressed the 
important role collective indigenous R&D at the industry level as the main drivers for 
technological advancement leading to an increase in the total factor productivity in 
China. Although technology transfer adapted from FDI is important for a developing 
country, continued efforts into R&D by the host country are needed for sustainable 
                                                 
 
6 Because of tax incentives, money was sent overseas and then transferred back into China as ‘foreign investment’. 
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development. China’s 10th five year Development Plan, the country plans to achieve the 
goal of an “innovation economy” by the year 2015. During the 1990’s China started to 
invest on Research and Development (R&D), but majority of the R&D was controlled 
by the state.  By the year 2000, about 60% of the total R&D was conducted by the 
private sector (Timmer et al., 2012a). According to the World Bank Development 
Online Indicators, China’s R&D ratio to GDP rose to 1.7% in 2009; this is comparable 
to the UK (1.8%) but still lacks behind the leaders like South Korea (3.6%) and Japan 
(3.4%).  
 
FDI provides access to new technology, capital, R&D facilities and management know-
how for a host region, which in turn increases economic development. Borensztein et al. 
(1998) argue that FDI plays a more important role than domestic investment for the 
transfer of technology, contributing to growth. Graham and Krugman (1993), however, 
mention that the ratio of FDI contribution in developing countries is simply too small to 
play an important role in capital accumulation and income growth. The macroeconomic 
indicators in Appendix 2.3 show that the ratio of FDI to GDP in China increased from 
only around 0.2% in 1982 to 3.1% in 2010, which is quite a significant increase, but its 
contribution to GDP is still relatively small as compared to the fixed capital to GDP 
ratio (45% in 2010). For comparison purposes, the FDI to GDP ratios for the USA and 
Mexico are estimated at 1.6% and 1.9% respectively in 2010, which are relatively lower 
than that for China. There exists a higher proportion of investment in China and the 
positive spillover from FDI magnifies this effect. FDI can contribute to GDP and 
income growth through technological improvement and capital accumulation (Zhuang, 
2008). Capital accumulation as a percentage of GDP in China increased from 28% in 
1982 to 41% in 2010. Kuijs and Wang (2006) found that during 1993-2004, capital 
accumulation contributed 62% of China’s real GDP growth.  
 
Chinese wages are still very low compared to those in developed economies, and are 
lower than many other middle-income countries like Mexico and Taiwan. The OECD 
defines Hourly Compensation Costs (HCC) as ‘a wage measure intended to represent 
employers’ expenditure on the benefits granted to their employees as compensation for 
an hour of labour’. Compensation costs include wages and also employers’ contribution 
to benefits and social insurance. The Hourly Compensation Rate (HCR) is used as an 
indicator of the competitiveness of manufactured goods in world trade. The HCR for 
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China and a few other countries relative to the USA are tabulated in Table 2.2. 
Although China’s HCR doubled from 2002 to 2008, it was only about 4% of that in the 
USA in 2008. Among the 32 economies calculated by the Bureau of Labour Statistics 
(BLS), China has the lowest HCR. The HCR for Mexico is almost five times more 
expensive compared to China. The HCR in India for 2007 was around 3.6% of that of 
the USA, which is still slightly higher than China’s. 7  However, the BLS does not 
publish the HCR for Africa and also smaller emerging countries like Vietnam and 
Cambodia.  
 
Table 2.2: Indices of Hourly Compensation Costs (HCC) in Manufacturing (Index 
USA=100) 
Country or Area Mexico Taiwan Korea China 
1996 13.55 31.60 43.12 
 
1997 15.06 30.56 40.61 
 
1998 15.21 26.96 28.66 
 
1999 16.73 28.27 36.43 
 
2000 18.80 29.24 39.21 
 
2001 20.64 27.29 34.75 
 
2002 20.43 24.97 37.88 2.08 
2003 18.58 24.38 40.05 2.17 
2004 17.93 24.83 43.41 2.25 
2005 18.62 26.31 50.18 2.42 
2006 19.28 26.41 57.56 2.66 
2007 19.24 25.50 61.06 3.30 
2008 19.75 26.49 50.35 4.15 
2009 16.71 22.79 42.59 
 
2010 17.94 24.06 47.85 
 
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics  
 
As China continues to grow and wages set to rise, one has to wonder if China will lose 
its competitive edge to the newly emerging developing countries. During the initial 
stages of reform, the relatively low wage rate is made possible due to the migration of 
labour from the countryside, which has managed to hold wages down. However as long 
as productivity increases faster than factor prices, China will still maintain a cost advantage. 
                                                 
 
7 The BLS estimates for India include organized manufacturing only, whereas about 80% of employees are unorganized and earn 
less; this tends to overstate the HCC for India. 
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Naughton (2007) found that China’s labour productivity was increasing at a rate of around 
5.1% from 1978 to 2003 despite a reduction in the growth rate of labour input.   Timmer et 
al. (2012a) argue that the increase in productivity has led to the increase in the output per 
worker to increase threefold from 1980 to 2004. We agreed that factor accumulation and the 
relatively cheap labour has contributed to China’s GDP growth during the initial stages of 
reformation; however it is the reallocation of resources, technological innovation and the 
more efficient method of utilizing capital and labour that has led to China’s sustained 
growth. 
 
China’s growth was initiated by adopting an export-oriented development program; 
hence despite its large domestic market has a relatively high export to GDP ratio. Thus 
China has to rely foreign demand in order to maintain its GDP growth; with the USA 
being the largest consumer of Chinese products. There are some who believe that it is 
the undervalued Renminbi (RMB) that makes Chinese products so competitive in the 
international market (Goldstein and Lardy, 2006; Cheung et al., 2010). Figure 2.5 shows 
the exchange rate of the RMB to the US dollar for the period 1980-2010. The RMB is 
considered undervalued because it has changed by less than has cost (productivity). 
Since the economic reform of China in the 1980s, the Chinese government somehow 
controlled the value of the RMB to the USD, until 1994 when it unified its exchange 
rate system by abolishing the previous dual exchange rate system. China's RMB fell 
from around RMB 5.76 per unit dollar to around RMB 8.62 per unit dollar, a 
depreciation of about 50%. The Chinese nominal exchange rate in 2010 appreciated to 
around RMB 6.77 per USD. The exchange rate is clearly an important part of the story, 
but the RMB has not risen fast enough to offset the productivity gain in manufacturing. 
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Figure 2.5: China’s Exchange Rate (1980-2010) 
 
Source: USDA Economic Research Service (real exchange rates are derived by multiplying the nominal exchange 
rate by the ratio of US to China CPI) 
 
Theoretically speaking, an undervalued real exchange rate leads to inflation putting 
pressure on wages to rise. The real exchange rate is simply the nominal exchange rate 
after taking into account the difference in the inflation level between the two countries. 
Using data obtained from Banister (2007), Song et al. (2011) reiterate that wages have 
grown more slowly than output per worker in China.
8
 An undervalued RMB should lead 
to domestic inflation; however, the annual average inflation level in China has been 
quite similar to that of the USA since 1997, as shown in Appendix 2.2. In 2011, China’s 
inflation rate increased slightly to 5.4%, which is slightly higher than the 3.2% inflation 
in the USA. Chang and Hou (1997) argue that the Chinese inflation hike in 1994 was 
more of a structural rather than a monetary phenomenon, which is common among 
transitional economies. China’s exports are increasingly competitive in the international 
market because productivity is rising faster than input costs; that is, rural urban 
migration, FDI inflows and capital investments are some of the important factors 
contributing to increased efficiency and productivity in the country. It is unlikely that 
the undervalued RMB is the main contributor to the cheapness of Chinese products. 
Increased productivity in China should be the main cause that is making Chinese 
products competitive by pulling down the unit costs of production.  
 
                                                 
 
8
 The average annual wage rate in the urban manufacturing sector grew at a rate of 7.5%, while GDP per 
capita grew at 9% for the period 1992-2004. 
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2.3.3 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
 
As mentioned above, Chinese government reforms towards reallocation, privatisation 
and attracting FDI were critical in spearheading China’s export-oriented growth path, 
making the country the world’s largest exporter in tradable goods. Exporting firms self-
select into export markets and they tend to be bigger and more productive than non-
exporting firms, although exporting does not always increase productivity (Bernard and 
Jensen, 1999). We hypothesise that the positive spillover effects from FDI and the 
increasing competition from privatisation increase firms’ efficiency, leading to 
increasing Chinese productivity. Studies of the spillover effect of FDI in China include 
those conducted by Wei and Liu (2006) and Tian (2006). Using panel data at the firm 
level, both studies found a positive technology spillover effect of foreign investment in 
domestic firms. The pace at which both domestic and foreign firms started to enter the 
Chinese market led to increased efficiency in production. As China continues to grow 
and develop, it will experience an increase in the costs of the factors of production, 
which might be passed on to consumers, making Chinese products less competitive. 
However, as long as productivity increases faster than factor prices, this will help to 
reduce prices. Increasing Chinese productivity is the driving force for the surge in 
China’s exports (Hu and Khan, 1997). Hu and Khan further found that Chinese 
productivity increased at a rate of 3.9% annually for the period 1979–94. This is 
remarkable considering that the productivity growth for the Asian Tigers
9
 was around 
2% for the 1966–91 periods.  
 
In principle, we see increased productivity as the main exogenous driver of China’s 
market expansion. Productivity is defined as the total output that can be attained from 
the total inputs, where inputs are often classified into capital and labour. The most 
common method to determine productivity is to use Total Factor Productivity (TPF), 
which takes into account all the factors of production. TFP is the portion of the change 
in output not explained by the amount of inputs (capital and labour) used in the 
production function, and is often attributed to change in technological progress. This 
can be better explained in the Cobb Douglas function (2.1), where Y (output), L 
                                                 
 
9
 Asian Tigers refer to Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China 
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(labour) and K (capital) can be measured directly. The exponents   and   are the cost 
shares for labour and capital input respectively.  
 
                   (2.1a),         (     ) 
            ⁄        (2.1b) 
 
Technological progress and institutional and organisational changes are just some of the 
important factors that could have caused an increase in the production function. ‘TFP 
reflects the spill over externalities of some on-going research projects or it could simply 
reflect innovation and inspiration’ (Hulten, 2001, p.41). 
 
Other studies on the role of Asian productivity include those carried out by the Asian 
Productivity Organization (APO, Japan) focusing on productivity in the context of 
economic growth and development in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to calculate TFP, 
they defined output as GDP at current prices and factor inputs as labour, IT
10
 capital and 
non-IT capital. They calculated labour input as measured by total hours worked per 
worker, and developed their own harmonised estimates for comparing productive 
capital stocks and services, as many of the Asian countries do not have a common 
system of accounting. Their calculation for capital stocks basically follows the 
methodology used in the OECD Productivity Database (Schreyer et al., 2003). 
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) calculated their own sectoral employment estimates using 
National Bureau Statistics (NBS) data and found their estimates almost identical to the 
ones calculated by the APO. It is not our objective to try to calculate the Chinese 
productivity level ourselves, but we will reference the TFP as obtained from APO. 
 
According to the APO (2011), China’s productivity performance was increasing at a 
rate of 3.1% per year during the period from 1970 to 2006. This is outstanding 
considering that the growth rate for Taiwan (ROC) was estimated at around 1.6%, while 
those for Japan and Korea are both estimated at around 0.5% during the same period. 
The increasing TFP in China is the main engine of economic growth, followed by 
capital accumulation and IT capital (APO, 2011). The Chinese TFP as calculated by the 
                                                 
 
10
 IT capital is defined as a composite asset of IT hardware (computers and copying machines), communications equipment and 
computer software. 
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APO is comparable to the estimated average growth rate of 3.8% for the Chinese 
economy during the period 1978–2005 (Holz, 2006). Holz (2006) estimated the TFP for 
the Chinese economy from 1994-2005 according to 39 different sector classifications.  
 
Figure 2.6 shows the annual TFP index relative to its base year index in year 2000, for 
each of the four individual countries. The figure shows how the TFP for each individual 
country has grown since the 1980’s.  China's TFP was growing at a rate of around 4.5% 
from 1990-2008, while the TFP for Japan grew at a rate of just 0.5% over the same 
period. The TFP growth for Korea and Singapore is estimated at 1.6% and 1.1% 
respectively during the same period. The APO concludes that the rising level of TFP 
within China is most likely the most important stimulant for the surge of Chinese 
exports.  
 
Figure 2.6: Total Factor Productivity Relative to Base Year Index (2000 =1) 
Data obtained from Asian Productivity Organization (APO), 2011 and tabulated using own calculations 
 
The results published by APO also show that the manufacturing sector and the services 
sector are the main drivers for China’s economic growth, with a contribution share of 
around 48% and 41% respectively. The agricultural sector has very little contribution to 
China’s economic growth. 
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The Inter-American Development Bank (2010) has published TFP data for China and 
also the Latin American countries (LAC).
11
 The productivity catch up for each country 
relative to the USA since 1960 is shown in Figure 2.7. The figure depicts the change in 
the characteristics of the TFP for each typical country (relative to the USA), where the 
index is normalised to 1 by 1960).
12
 We can see that China’s productivity growth is 
indeed astonishing as compared to other countries. The Chinese TFP only started to 
climb during the early 1980s and this coincided with the period during which China first 
embarked on its economic reforms. The productivity level for the LAC (relative to the 
USA) remained quite stable until the debt crisis in the 1980s; similarly, the TFP for 
Mexico (relative to the USA) has dropped since the 1980s. As shown in Figure 2.7, 
China’s TFP relative to the USA in 2007 has increased by about 3.5 times since 1960, 
while Mexico’s TFP in 2007 has dropped to only about 0.69 relative to its 1960 value.  
 
Figure 2.7: Productivity Catch-Up (TFP Relative to the USA, 1960 Normalised to 
1) 
 Source: Data are from Daude and Fernandez Arias (Inter-American Development Bank, 2010) based on Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2006), World Bank (2008), Barro and Lee (2000) 
 
It is worth mentioning that although China’s TFP is growing fast, the country is playing 
catch-up technologically with middle-income and higher-income economies. We are not 
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 The TFP for each country is calculated relative to the USA. 
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comparing TFP across countries, but assessing a country’s productivity performance 
relative to the USA normalised to 1 in 1960. Using TFP data for each individual country 
as obtained from IADB, we found that China’s TFP ratio to the USA was only around 
16.7%, but that it rose to about 45% by 2007. China’s productivity is also catching up 
fast to Mexico; its TFP relative to Mexico was about 72% in 2007, compared to just 
17% in 1980. The TFP growth in China is the engine contributing to the Chinese shock. 
As Chinese TFP continues to increase relative to other countries, China will be able to 
counter rising domestic prices and keep its export prices competitive. In the context of 
international trade, the gains in China’s productivity growth might also affect the 
welfare of other countries through the terms of trade effect.  Using sectoral data from 
1995 to 2007,  Hsieh and Ossa (2011) found only a minimal spillover effect on the 
Chinese productivity growth to the Rest of the World (ROW). This further supports our 
hypothesis that China’s productivity growth is an exogenous shock and is unique to 
China alone. 
 
China’s growth is attributed to increasing TFP and also to a high rate of capital 
accumulation. According to Bosworth and Collins (2007), China can continue to sustain 
its growth by reallocating its labour force from the agricultural sector to the 
manufacturing and services sectors, thereby increasing efficiency and productivity. 
Bosworth and Collins (2007) further stress the remarkable performance of the Chinese 
industrial sector, where the average output per worker has increased by about 10% 
annually since 1993, which is attributed to increase in TFP and capital accumulation. 
  
In principle, we see the improvement in costs innovation, increasing productivity and 
scale as the main exogenous driver of China’s market expansion. Although productivity 
growth through cost innovation pushes down prices, it will also lead to an increase in 
product quality and hence an increase in Chinese price.  China’s growth has evolved 
from low price manufactures and has moved on to product diversification and quality 
upgrading. China seemed to have shifted production to more sophisticated products; 
however its exports are still perceived to be of lower quality as compared to the 
developed countries (Schott, 2008). Broda and Weinstein (2010) found a massive 
reduction in the price per unit quality of Chinese products during the period 1992 to 
2005; attributed mainly to product upgrading. However although Chinese products are 
getting more sophisticated, it is hard to quantify whether there is an improvement in the 
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quality of the same product over time simply by comparing their unit price. If we 
assume quality for the same product to be constant over time, this will be differenced out in 
our fixed effect regression. As in Iacovone et al. (2013), we define increasing productivity 
as a firm which is able to produce similar quality products at a lower price. We suggest that 
increased Chinese competition is largely in terms of prices conditional on quality, 
driven by cost innovation, increasing productivity and scale in Chinese industry as 
producers started to catch up technologically with middle-income countries and 
absorbed large amounts of surplus labour from the hinterland and capital from the rest 
of the world. 
 
2.4 China Exporting Deflation 
 
One of the main motivations for doing this thesis was the comment regarding China 
exporting deflation. Many have attributed to China the exporting of deflation to the 
world by flooding the market with its cheaper products (Roach, 2002; Yam, 2002; 
Becker and Edmund, 2003). These cheaper Chinese products have greatly benefited US 
consumers, especially those in the lower-income group, making them more affordable 
and giving them more choice (Broda and Romalis, 2009). Schott (2008) found Chinese 
exports to be relatively cheaper than those of the other developing countries and its 
relative price to be falling over time. Using disaggregated data at the HS10 digit level, 
Amiti and Freund (2010) found that China’s export price to the USA fell by an average 
of 1.5% annually for the period 1997-2005, while the USA’s import price from the 
ROW rose by an average of 0.4% during the same period. 
 
Although China is currently the world’s biggest exporter, its exports still accounted for 
less than 3% of OECD countries’ GDP in 2010. Looking at the US market, Chinese 
import penetration in the USA’s total consumption was also slightly less than 3% in 
2010. Thus we believe that the Chinese competitive effect arises not through its direct 
effect on price indices in the USA, but rather through its pressure on competitors 
exporting to the US market. Based on the theory of comparative advantage, the growth 
of Chinese exports will have less of an impact on developed countries, as they are 
producing different types of products. China as a labour-abundant country will be 
producing textiles and clothing, while a capital-intensive country like Japan will tend to 
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produce pharmaceutical products and computer chips. The theory would suggest that 
the intense competition between China and the other developing countries will tend to 
drive down prices and will benefit developed countries like Japan, those in the EU and 
the USA (Schott, 2008).  
 
We focus on the price effect of China on Mexico in the USA, the most important 
trading partner for both Mexico and China. Mexico is a developing country that shares a 
border with the USA and benefits from tariff exemptions after the signing of NAFTA in 
1994, although it was granted Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits even 
prior to that. Mexico and China could both be described as middle-income and labour-
intensive developing countries that export many of their products to the USA. The 
cheaper Chinese products are more likely to put pressure on developing countries like 
Mexico as both try to compete for market share in a third country like the USA. We 
make our case for using Chinese prices as the influential channel affecting other 
countries’ exports, as China has possibly been the biggest shock we have witnessed for 
the past few decades. Assuming that the same products are seen as close substitutes, the 
cheaper Chinese products will induce Mexico to drop its prices as well. We aim to find 
the percentage change in Mexico’s prices induced by a change in China’s prices in the 
USA. Mexican firms that cannot keep up with Chinese prices will lose market share and 
some will be forced to exit the market. The Mexican government has claimed that the 
maquiladoras have lost more than 200,000 jobs since 2001 as more factories have been 
relocated to China because of its relatively cheaper labour.  
 
2.4.1 Processing Trade in China 
 
China’s manufacturing sector is the biggest of any country in the world and it has 
always been China’s main export industry since the government started to adopt export-
oriented growth. China began by producing less sophisticated manufactures like 
textiles, footwear/headgear and leather and furs during its early stages of growth. 
However, it seems that China has now ventured into high-end manufacturing and is 
seen by many as a global factory, to which companies all over the world outsource their 
products. Although it might have appeared that China has shifted its production to more 
sophisticated products, it is still a labour-abundant country. However, as we are 
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investigating Chinese price effects on Mexico for a common set of products, the degree 
of a country’s value added in the final product does not matter too much. Rodrik (2006) 
asserts that Chinese exports are more sophisticated compared to the country’s own 
income level. However, a recent study has shown that developed countries still have 
control over many products, as China is mainly involved in the process of assembly due 
to its cheaper labour costs (Dedrick et al., 2010). Koopman et al. (2008) found that the 
domestic value added for Chinese exports is around 50% of the total value of the final 
product, and can be less than 20% for the more sophisticated products. Similarly, Kee 
and Tang (2012) also found that processing trade accounted for about 49% of China’s 
exports in 2006.  
 
This is especially true in manufactured products where many components are assembled 
together to form the final product. Many of the high-technology products are only 
assembled in China because of its low costs; due to this, the domestic content of the 
value added from processed trade has been very small. An example is Apple’s iPod 3G 
model, where Linden et al. (2009) estimate that the value added attributed to producers 
in China is only valued at USD 4, while it costs around USD 150 to produce. However, 
when the iPods are imported from China where they are assembled, the full USD 150 is 
recorded as an import from China. The iPod is only one product and it might not 
correctly represent the actual Chinese contribution in manufactured products, however.  
 
The World Input Output Database (WIOD) is a joint initiative by the OECD and WTO 
to help address the value added of a product by different producers globally using a 
world input-output table (Timmer et al., 2012a). It provides input and output tables 
covering 35 industries for the EU and 13 other countries, with data from 1995 onwards. 
Timmer et al. (2012b) found that the value added increases faster in emerging countries, 
especially China, as compared to more advanced countries. China’s value added 
increased threefold from 2002 to 2006, and had almost caught up with the USA’s by 
2007.
13
 China’s increased role in the global production chain has captured a larger share 
in the value-added content of domestic production. Most of China’s value-added 
production is exported to meet increased foreign demand. In the case of the iPod, 
China’s value added is clearly at the bottom end of the production chain; however, at 
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 The value added for Mexico has also more than doubled since 2002.  
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the more aggregate level China exports a relatively higher value added than any other 
country. 
 
Our study is more focused on the impacts of lower Chinese prices and their influence on 
competitors. China’s price effect can be felt by its competitors even though it does not 
contribute fully to the cost of the whole product. Since we are finding out the Chinese 
price effects on Mexico for products that are in direct competition, a country’s value 
added in the final product does not matter greatly. We are more interested in the prices 
of final products from China and their influence on other countries. 
 
2.4.2 Case for Using Data at the Product Level 
 
Thus far, we have identified and made the case that it is the unique increase in China’s 
productivity that has made Chinese products so competitive in the world market. All the 
macro data above show that China’s growth over the past few decades has generated a 
shock that is unprecedented in any other country during its heyday. However, we are 
confined by limited observations if we are to use macro-level data. Furthermore, by 
aggregating all the many products into an export basket, the average price of a basket of 
goods will be too crude to gauge the effect of Chinese products. China’s export basket 
consists of different products and there is heterogeneity between the different products; 
for example, hairclips and laptops are different and this can be indicated by their price. 
Fortunately, there exist international data recorded at a more disaggregated level, which 
can be obtained from UN Comtrade; we will discuss the sources and structure of our 
data in the next chapter. Nevertheless, our point is that if Chinese products are indeed 
cheaper and continue to be so, it will have an effect on other countries, most probably at 
the product level. Our hypothesis is that if electronic products are all similar, China's 
entry into the electronics market will cause a price drop in the electronics sector for the 
other countries producing electronics. However, the competitive pressure is stronger the 
closer the products are to each other. Electronic products in general are a greatly 
aggregated product and can be further disaggregated into finer classifications. A simple 
television exported by China will be very different to a more sophisticated LCD screen 
exported by Japan. At a more aggregated level, all electronics products will be classified 
within the same category but be very different from each other. Thus at the finer level of 
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product classification, less product heterogeneity exists, and this is especially important 
if we want to compare products between countries.  
 
According to Schott (2008), if product codes are defined at too aggregated a level, it 
will create a problem when we try to find the degree of competition between countries, 
as products that are actually different might be classified together in the same group: 
‘clocks and watches’, for example, might capture wristwatches, pocket watches, clocks 
and so on. On the other hand, even at the finer levels of aggregation, there still exists 
vertical differentiation of products: a wristwatch exported by Switzerland or Japan 
might be of a higher quality than a wristwatch exported by China. The heterogeneity 
between the different products is usually reflected in the difference in their prices. China 
and Mexico are middle-income countries and thus it is assumed that there will be a high 
degree of similarity for the same product exported by the two countries, as compared to 
the same product exported by a developed country like Japan. Our model is to compare 
changes in Chinese prices relative to Mexico’s prices, not to compare prices on level 
terms. 
 
China’s export basket consists of many different products and there exist individual 
product-specific effects across products. According to Schott (2008), product-level data 
provide a much finer picture, as there exists heterogeneity across products even in the 
same industry, and using product-level data allows us to evaluate this heterogeneity 
using unit values.  
 
In the next chapter, we will look at the level of disaggregation at which a ‘product’ is 
defined; it is important to get this definition correct, as we are looking at the Chinese 
price effect at the product level. Thus far, we have mentioned the growth of China and 
its threat to other countries. However, the rapid growth of China can nonetheless also 
provide potential opportunities for other developing countries, as China’s demand has 
been growing since 1990 (Lederman et al., 2009). While this should be noted, it is not 
the main focus of our study.  
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Appendices: Chapter 2 
 
Appendix 2.1: Proportion of China's Exports to USA 
 
China Export 
World 
China Export 
USA 
USA/World 
Mexico 
Export World 
Mexico 
Export 
USA 
USA/World 
Year 
(USD 
Billions) 
(USD 
Billions) 
Percentage 
(USD 
Billions) 
(USD 
Billions) 
Percentage 
1980 17.5 1.2 6.6 18.4 12.8 69.3 
1981 21.2 2.1 9.7 23.9 14.0 58.6 
1982 20.6 2.5 12.1 26.7 15.7 58.8 
1983 21.1 2.5 11.7 28.0 17.0 60.7 
1984 24.7 3.4 13.7 29.7 18.3 61.5 
1985 28.0 4.2 15.1 29.0 19.4 66.7 
1986 32.3 5.2 16.2 24.0 17.5 73.1 
1987 43.5 6.9 15.9 28.9 20.5 71.1 
1988 56.2 9.3 16.5 31.6 23.5 74.4 
1989 71.5 12.8 18.0 35.9 27.4 76.5 
1990 85.0 16.3 19.1 40.4 30.8 76.2 
1991 107.0 20.3 19.0 42.1 31.8 75.5 
1992 130.5 27.5 21.0 46.1 35.9 77.8 
1993 150.8 33.7 22.3 50.4 40.7 80.7 
1994 183.4 41.4 22.6 61.4 50.3 81.8 
1995 222.0 48.5 21.8 78.1 62.7 80.2 
1996 245.3 54.4 22.2 91.7 73.9 80.6 
1997 276.7 65.8 23.8 106.6 87.0 81.6 
1998 279.6 75.1 26.9 115.5 96.0 83.1 
1999 315.7 87.8 27.8 132.1 111.0 84.0 
2000 397.1 107.6 27.1 163.5 137.4 84.1 
2001 410.6 109.4 26.6 159.0 132.7 83.5 
2002 474.8 133.5 28.1 161.2 136.1 84.4 
2003 592.8 163.3 27.5 167.3 139.6 83.4 
2004 776.9 210.5 27.1 191.1 157.7 82.5 
2005 970.4 259.8 26.8 214.4 172.2 80.3 
2006 1171.2 305.8 26.1 250.6 199.5 79.6 
2007 1425.9 340.1 23.9 274.8 212.2 77.2 
2008 1629.8 356.3 21.9 291.0 216.8 74.5 
2009 1371.0 309.5 22.6 233.8 175.3 75.0 
2010 1748.2 383.0 21.9 308.3 227.9 73.9 
2011 1752.6 417.3 23.8 349.0 259.7 74.4 
*Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
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Appendix 2.2: Chinese Inflation 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
* Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as 
yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
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Appendix 2.3: China’s Stylised Data 
Country 
Code 
FDI Net 
Inflows 
(USD 
Billions 
Gross 
Fixed 
Capital 
(USD 
Billions) 
GDP current 
(USD 
Billions) 
FDI (% 
of 
GDP) 
Capital 
(% of 
GDP) 
GDP PPP 
p.c. 
(USD) 
Population 
(Billions) 
Labour 
Force 
(Millions) 
Manufacturing 
Employment 
(Millions) 
1982 0.43 57.37 203.18 0.21 28.24 585.02 1.01 
  
1983 0.64 66.03 228.46 0.28 28.90 639.48 1.02 
  
1984 1.26 76.68 257.43 0.49 29.79 727.08 1.04 
  
1985 1.66 90.88 306.67 0.54 29.64 814.07 1.05 
  
1986 1.88 91.01 297.83 0.63 30.56 872.64 1.07 
  
1987 2.31 85.17 270.37 0.86 31.50 958.37 1.08 
  
1988 3.19 96.75 309.52 1.03 31.26 1049.63 1.10 
  
1989 3.39 89.46 343.97 0.99 26.01 1076.04 1.12 
  
1990 3.49 92.31 356.94 0.98 25.86 1100.66 1.14 643.08 105.10 
1991 4.37 105.75 379.47 1.15 27.87 1185.63 1.15 656.39 108.75 
1992 11.16 133.65 422.66 2.64 31.62 1337.50 1.16 666.60 114.23 
1993 27.52 165.92 440.50 6.25 37.67 1507.32 1.18 673.54 122.37 
1994 33.79 200.87 559.23 6.04 35.92 1685.62 1.19 681.39 119.26 
1995 35.85 250.10 728.01 4.92 34.35 1849.15 1.20 687.75 124.85 
1996 40.18 289.24 856.09 4.69 33.79 2012.86 1.22 695.30 126.08 
1997 44.24 313.22 952.65 4.64 32.88 2177.65 1.23 702.37 108.13 
1998 43.75 345.07 1019.46 4.29 33.85 2325.09 1.24 708.82 106.04 
1999 38.75 368.76 1083.28 3.58 34.04 2480.23 1.25 716.43 103.89 
2000 38.40 408.83 1198.47 3.20 34.11 2667.47 1.26 724.48 102.02 
2001 44.24 456.13 1324.81 3.34 34.43 2867.96 1.27 732.25 101.08 
2002 49.31 527.15 1453.83 3.39 36.26 3108.05 1.28 741.52 100.68 
2003 47.08 646.25 1640.96 2.87 39.38 3397.63 1.29 749.94 102.54 
2004 54.94 786.75 1931.64 2.84 40.73 3718.64 1.30 758.91 106.19 
2005 117.21 905.91 2256.90 5.19 40.14 4114.57 1.30 767.14 110.59 
2006 124.08 1103.09 2712.95 4.57 40.66 4611.30 1.31 775.31 112.63 
2007 160.05 1366.40 3494.06 4.58 39.11 5238.68 1.32 782.45 97.01 
2008 175.15 1844.24 4521.83 3.87 40.79 5712.25 1.32 786.79 99.01 
2009 114.21 2293.99 4991.26 2.29 45.96 6206.26 1.33 793.88 
 
2010 185.08 2693.56 5926.61 3.12 45.45 6816.29 1.34 799.83 
 
Source: Data obtained from World Development Indicators  
* Manufacturing employment obtained from Banister and Cook (2011), and is the year-end total manufacturing 
employment in China. 
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 Data Description and Issues 3.
 
Our study focuses on one market, which is the USA, and another middle-income 
supplier, which is Mexico. The main idea is that Chinese competitive pressure occurs 
through its effect on other producers’ prices, namely those of Mexico, and less so 
through its direct impact on the price index in the developed market, namely the USA. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, competition is better identified at the product 
level and hence we need to provide a clear definition of a ‘product’. This section of the 
thesis will provide more detailed information and stylised facts regarding China and 
Mexico’s export structure in the US market at the product level. As we hypothesise that 
competition occurs largely through product pricing, we also need to define the unit price 
of a product. In addition, we report possible problems with the data sources and provide 
some suggestions to correct these. 
 
3.1 Product Defined 
 
In this paper, a product is defined at the Harmonised System 6 digit (HS6) level using 
the HS92
1
 system. The Harmonised System (HS) is a standardised system for 
classifying and coding goods for international comparison purposes that has been 
developed by the World Customs Organization (WCO). The HS system is used by over 
200 countries and accounts for about 98% of total world trade (UN Comtrade). The HS 
system at the 6 digit level comprises approximately 5300 product descriptions, where 
the first 2 digits (HS2) represent the chapter in which products are classified, while the 
first 4 digits represent groupings within that chapter. An example of an HS6 product 
coded as 610462 is defined as women/girls’ trousers shorts, knitted cotton. The first 4 
digits (6104) are defined as women/girls' suits and the first 2 digits (61) represent 
articles of apparel and clothing. The HS6 digit system is the finest level of aggregation 
that is harmonised across countries. 
 
                                                 
 
1
There have been four HS revision, namely 1992 (HS92), 1996 (HS96), 2002 (HS2002) and 2007 (HS2007), since the HS system 
was introduced in 1988. 
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Each country usually has a more disaggregated level of classification domestically, 
which is then aggregated to the HS6 level to enable it to be used for international 
comparison purposes. One of the most common issues in comparing products between 
different countries at a more aggregated level is product heterogeneity, even if the 
products are classified under a specific code. A finer degree of classification is more 
likely to capture the different product-specific effects. The finest level of disaggregation 
for international comparison purposes is at the 6 digit level, and for this reason we 
define a product at the HS6 digit level. We use the HS6 digit level as our data are 
obtained from several sources (reporting countries) and because of the possible 
endogeneity issues
2
 involved in our model specification. The international trade data are 
obtained via Comtrade from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)
3
 online 
database. 
 
3.1.1 Data Source from Import Country 
 
This study will use the disaggregated trade data from the HS92 system at the 6 digit 
level as reported by the United States with China and Mexico as trading partners. 
Import data are generally thought to be more consistent, as the USA has a more reliable 
and efficient method for collecting and recording trade data compared to developing 
countries such as China and Mexico. Import data is also taken to be more reliable, as we 
would expect a developed country like the USA to be more vigilant in inspecting and 
ensuring duty collection on imports. Export data are recorded when products leave the 
border of the exporting country, hence there might be a timing difference between 
exporting countries regarding the time products arrive at the border of the market. 
Import and export data usually do not match, as exports are valued free on board (f.o.b.) 
while imports are usually reported cost including insurance and freight (c.i.f.). 
According to a study by Ferrantino et al. (2012), China’s reported exports to the USA 
are smaller than the USA’s reported imports from China. The Chinese authorities have 
reduced the Value Added Tariff (VAT) refund rates for many of their export products 
since 2003, and Ferrantino et al. (2012) found evidence that a reduction in the VAT 
                                                 
 
2
 Because of endogeneity in Chinese prices, we need to correct for it using Chinese prices to other 
markets. This is explained in detail when we proceed to our equation specification in the next chapter. 
3
 Available at: http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/ 
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rebate on exports increases the incentive to under-report at the Chinese border to avoid 
paying VAT.   
 
Mexico and China might have a slightly different system of classifying products at the 
finer level and this might generate a problem when data are converted to the more 
aggregated HS6 level, although in practice the system should not vary that much. By 
taking data from just one reporter (USA), we are more confident that the finer 
classification of products collected at the domestic level can then be aggregated into the 
same product category at the HS6 digit level. Another important reason for taking 
reported data from the USA is the different units of measurement on some products 
used by different countries. The unit price of an HS6 digit product is simply the value of 
total imports divided by their quantity. The different units of measurement from 
different sources affect a product’s unit price, but the USA has a standard unit of 
measurement for imported products. The USA has trade data available on the HS 
system starting from 1991, whereas China’s recorded data at the HS level started from 
1992. As we will be using China’s reported price as an instrument for analysing its price 
in the USA and other countries in later chapters, our study will make use of product-
level data available using the sample from 1992 to 2008. We stopped at 2008 as this 
was the latest year available when this research began.  
 
We note when using US reported data, there is also the concern of over-reporting at the 
US border, as multinationals try to avoid paying higher corporate income tax 
(Ferrantino and Wang, 2008; Ferrantino et al., 2012; Bernard et al., 2006). This is 
termed ‘transfer pricing’, which usually happens when two trading firms are controlled 
by a common authority, also known as a parent firm.  However we do not think it is 
likely to change much through time and hence will go into the fixed effects. As shown 
in Diewert et al. (2005), only a small portion of trade between China and the USA 
involves related parties and that it affects Mexico more than China hence enters the 
residuals. Furthermore the US law tries to control for this problem and hence we do not 
pursue it in this work. 
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3.2 Stylised Facts at the Product Level 
 
3.2.1 China’s Product Coverage by Heading 
 
Here we will look at the total number of product headings imported by the USA and 
those from both China and Mexico. Chinese exports to the USA have grown 
dramatically over the past few decades, in part due to the increased volume and also due 
to the export of new product headings. We provide some stylised facts on China and 
Mexico’s product coverage in the USA in Table 3.1. In the early 1990s, Mexico 
exported more products to the USA, but Chinese export headings had already exceeded 
those of Mexico by 1999. In 1992, China exported about 2794 out of a possible 4993 
products imported by the USA, with market coverage of around 56% of the US import 
basket. By 2006, China was exporting more than 4200 products and its coverage had 
increased to more than 88% of the total number of products imported by the USA. 
Mexico, on the other hand, exported about 3470 products to the US market in 2006, 
about 72% of the total product headings imported by the USA during that year. 
Mexico’s export variety has declined slightly since 2000, while China’s increased in 
every year until 2007. US total import variety also shows quite a substantial drop from 
2007. In part, the recorded decline in 2007 might be due to HS conversion problems, 
which we will discuss in greater detail in a later section.  
 
The common products in Table 3.1 summarise the total number of products that the 
USA imported from both China and Mexico for the period 1992-2008. The set of 
common products is the sample for our main focus, investigation of the Chinese price 
effect at the product level. China’s competitive pressure on Mexico is represented by the 
last column in Table 3.1, which is the ratio of common products to Mexico’s total 
product headings. This measures the ‘extent’ of the competition, not the ‘depth’. In 
1992, China competed in about 70% of Mexico’s product headings to the US market; by 
2008, the Chinese influence covered about 93% of Mexico’s product headings, almost 
all of the product headings that Mexico exported to the USA. As a share of China’s 
exports to the USA, the common products increased from 58% in 1992 to about 73% in 
the later 1990s and then declined a little. 
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Table 3.1: US Imports from China and Mexico by Product Heading 
Year 
US Total 
Import 
From 
China 
Ratio 
From 
Mexico 
Ratio 
Common 
 
China Influence 
 
Product 
Headings 
Product 
Headings 
(China/Total) 
Product 
Headings 
(Mexico/Total) 
Product 
Headings 
(Common/Mexico) 
1992 4993 2794 0.56 2888 0.58 2016 0.70 
1993 4994 2963 0.59 2990 0.60 2145 0.72 
1994 4991 3084 0.62 3112 0.62 2299 0.74 
1995 5000 3200 0.64 3394 0.68 2527 0.74 
1996 4934 3212 0.65 3479 0.71 2588 0.74 
1997 4931 3370 0.68 3522 0.71 2728 0.77 
1998 4936 3450 0.70 3519 0.71 2780 0.79 
1999 4936 3587 0.73 3552 0.72 2892 0.81 
2000 4921 3723 0.76 3538 0.72 2991 0.85 
2001 4926 3743 0.76 3475 0.71 2959 0.85 
2002 4852 3857 0.79 3452 0.71 3038 0.88 
2003 4847 3928 0.81 3427 0.71 3065 0.89 
2004 4842 4015 0.83 3456 0.71 3123 0.90 
2005 4841 4123 0.85 3484 0.72 3202 0.92 
2006 4848 4251 0.88 3469 0.72 3231 0.93 
2007 4583 4036 0.88 3346 0.73 3131 0.94 
2008 4585 4002 0.87 3340 0.73 3106 0.93 
Total 82960 61338 
 
57443 
 
47821 
 
*Data obtained from Comtrade based on own calculations 
 
It is noted that the product headings are not necessarily similar every year, as some 
products might exit the market while new products enter in a certain year. In actual 
competition, we identify Chinese competition on just the common set of products which 
both countries export to the USA. Chinese competition might lead to exit for certain 
Mexican firms; hence competition here is not just constrained to survivors. Altogether 
there are 4907 products which both China and Mexico exported to the USA for our 
sample period. As trade data is noisy, products can dropped in and out of the export 
basket due to missing data; we found more than 2800 products Mexico stopped 
exporting at least once but continued to be exported later. We also identified 538 
products which Mexico stopped exporting for 5 or more consecutive years due to 
Chinese competition. Iacovone et al. (2013) found that Mexican firms which exited the 
market are the smaller firms which could not keep up with Chinese competition, while 
larger firms which survived tend to be more productive. Although our sample takes into 
account the existing products by both countries; the study by Iacovone et al. (2013) 
shows that Chinese competition affects Mexico’s production and hence its pricing. 
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Besedeš and Prusa (2006) found that differentiated products (i.e. manufactures) tend to 
have a higher survival rate as compared to products which are homogeneous. As 
differentiated products involves higher research and investment costs before entering 
the market, it is usually be undertaken by the larger firms making them more 
competitive. China’s presence is especially felt in manufactured products which usually 
involves differentiated products. Our study does not take into account of Chinese 
competition on products where Mexico exited the market; and this might actually 
underestimate the extent of Chinese competition. 
 
3.2.2 Export Structure by Sector 
 
In order to get a better picture of China’s export patterns to the US market, we look at 
the disaggregated trade data available by sector. We categorise the economy into 15 
different sectors by a product’s first two digit coding (HS2), which is the standard 
disaggregation representing the chapter under which products are classified. This is 
shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Description of Sector 
Sector HS2 Description 
0 01-05 Animals  Animal Products 
1 06-15 Vegetable Products 
2 16-24 Foodstuffs 
3 25-27 Mineral Products 
4 28-38 Chemicals  Allied Industries 
5 39-40 Plastics / Rubbers 
6 41-43 Raw Hides, Skins, Leather,  Furs 
7 44-49 Wood and Wood Products 
8 50-63 Textiles 
9 64-67 Footwear / Headgear 
10 68-71 Stone / Glass 
11 72-83 Metals 
12 84-85 Machinery / Electrical 
13 86-89 Transport Equipment 
14 90-97 Miscellaneous Manufactured Products 
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3.2.3 China Coverage by Sector 
 
The total number of product headings as classified by their respective sectors for 1992 
and 2008 are shown in Table 3.3. China’s influence on Mexico is relatively weaker in 
the primary sectors like animals, vegetables and mineral products for both 1992 and 
2008. China’s influence over Mexico predominantly lies in the manufacturing sectors in 
2008, where it exports almost everything that Mexico exports, especially in the 
machinery, textiles, miscellaneous manufactures and footwear sectors. China’s 
influence on Mexico in the machinery sector grew from 78% (1992) to 98% (2008), 
where it exported 489 out of the possible 497 products that Mexico exported to the 
USA. In the textiles industry, China’s coverage increased from 77% (1992) to 97% 
(2008). In the plastics, footwear and miscellaneous sectors, China’s coverage was 100% 
of Mexico’s exports in 2008. If China’s influence is stronger in the manufacturing 
sectors, we postulate that Chinese competition occurs largely through the price channel 
at the product level.  
 
Table 3.3: Import Headings from China and Mexico - Coverage by Sector 
 
1992 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
Sector China Mexico Common China Influence China Mexico Common China Influence 
 
Product Headings 
 
(Common/Mexico) 
Product Headings 
 
(Common/Mexico) 
Animals (0) 56 62 34 0.55 72 76 41 0.54 
Vegetables (1) 119 139 64 0.46 188 179 129 0.72 
Foodstuffs (2) 83 88 61 0.69 113 114 88 0.77 
Minerals (3) 46 80 26 0.33 79 70 50 0.71 
Chemicals (4) 302 338 171 0.51 534 357 338 0.95 
Plastics (5) 70 112 62 0.55 183 166 166 1.00 
LF (6) 30 31 21 0.68 43 37 36 0.97 
Wood (7) 83 101 65 0.64 166 147 136 0.93 
Textiles (8) 497 409 315 0.77 675 532 518 0.97 
Footwear (9) 36 25 25 1.00 43 40 40 1.00 
Stone (10) 58 69 52 0.75 121 103 99 0.96 
Metals (11) 226 273 159 0.58 456 396 378 0.95 
Machinery (12) 358 372 290 0.78 590 497 489 0.98 
Transport (13) 24 40 18 0.45 83 79 67 0.85 
Misc (14) 120 100 86 0.86 257 218 217 1.00 
Total 2108 2239 1449 
 
3603 3011 2792 
 
*Data obtained from Comtrade based on own calculations 
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3.2.4 China’s Exports to the USA by Sector 
 
China exports many of the products in the manufacturing sectors, and we now look at 
its trade volume in the USA. China and Mexico’s exports to the USA at the product 
level are summarised for each sector for 1992 and 2008 in Table 3.4. China’s export 
volumes to the US market by sector for 1992 and 2008 are shown in Columns 1 and 2 
respectively. In 1992, China's biggest export sectors to the US market were the textiles, 
miscellaneous industry, machinery and footwear sectors, with a combined export value 
of more than USD 20 billion, comprising about 75% of China’s exports to the USA for 
that year.  
 
Table 3.4: China and Mexico, Export Structure to the USA 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) 
Sector 1992 2008 1992 2008 
 From China From China From Mexico From Mexico 
(USD Billions) (USD Billions) (USD Billions) (USD Billions) 
    Animals (0) 0.53 2.2 0.58 0.98 
Vegetables (1) 0.15 1.14 1.74 6.16 
Foodstuffs (2) 0.17 2.66 0.61 5.36 
Minerals (3) 0.66 3.01 5.23 43.1 
Chemicals (4) 0.55 10.2 0.77 2.77 
Plastics (5) 0.89 13.5 0.47 4.09 
LF (6) 1.68 8.01 0.15 0.16 
Wood (7) 0.42 8.15 0.51 1.49 
Textiles (8) 5.72 33.2 1.49 5.6 
Footwear (9) 4.31 18.1 0.26 0.3 
Stone (10) 0.51 7.74 0.75 5.34 
Metals (11) 0.91 25.9 1.35 9.68 
Machinery (12) 4.67 150 12.8 78.7 
Transport (13) 0.23 7.61 5.22 32.9 
Misc (14) 5.65 60.7 2.44 13.8 
Total 27.06 352.12 34.36 210.43 
*Data obtained from Comtrade based on own calculations 
 
By 2008, the machinery/electronics sector had clearly become the largest industry for 
Chinese exports. Chinese exports in machinery/electronics to the USA were only 
around USD 4.67 billion in 1992, but exports in this sector had increased tremendously 
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to USD 150 billion by 2008, the machinery/electronics sector alone making up 43% of 
China’s total exports to the US market. The miscellaneous and textiles industries are the 
next two largest industries for China to the USA in 2008, with export values of USD 61 
billion and USD 33 billion respectively. The share of the textile industry in China’s total 
exports declined to just 9% in 2008, as China’s exports are now more concentrated in 
the electronics and machinery sectors. Chinese exports seem to have evolved over time 
from the more labour-intensive manufacturing industry to the more sophisticated 
electronic/machinery products. The primary sectors made up only a very small 
proportion of China’s exports to the USA during the entire period from 1992 to 2008. 
 
Mexico’s total exports to the USA are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4. 
Mexico’s biggest export industry is also the machinery/electrical industry and this 
sector comprises about 37% of Mexico’s total exports to the USA in 2008. Mexico 
exported about USD 12.8 billion worth of machinery/electronics in 1992, increasing to 
USD 78.7 billion by 2008. The mineral product industry is Mexico’s second largest 
export sector, with exports of USD 43.1 billion, making up 20% of its exports, in 2008. 
Transport equipment is Mexico’s third largest export sector; it exported about USD 32.9 
billion worth of this product (16%) to the USA in 2008. Transport and mineral products 
are important industries in Mexico, as shown in Table 3.4; however, they only 
constituted a very small proportion of China’s total exports for 1992 and 2008.    
 
3.2.5 China’s Dominance in the US market  
 
We have shown that the Chinese influence is stronger for manufactures and that China’s 
export structure to the USA has evolved into more sophisticated manufactures like 
machinery/electronics. We now examine China’s importance in the US market as 
represented by its market shares. This will help us identify those sectors in which 
China’s influence is strongest or otherwise. The figures in Table 3.5 show the relative 
size of each export sector as represented by its share in US total imports. The sector 
share is calculated using US imports from China relative to US total imports at the 
sectoral level, using Equation (3.1) 
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               ⁄                      (3.1) 
 
Where    is China’s sectoral share in the USA,   
                    
 is US imports 
from China in sector k and   
               
 is the USA’s total imports from the world in 
sector k. As shown in Table 3.5, China’s presence is bigger for the machinery/electrical 
sector, which has a 0.29 share of US total imports in 2008. It is astonishing that the 
USA imported about 75% of its footwear from China in 2008. The other sectors in 
which China had a big market share in the USA in 2008 are leather and furs (0.68) and 
miscellaneous manufactures (0.40). The machinery/electronics sector is the USA’s 
largest import sector with total imports of USD 512 billion in 2008, where China has a 
0.29 share (USD 150 billion). China also has a incredible 0.40 share in the 
miscellaneous products sectors. The figures in Table 3.5 show the reliance of the US 
market on consumer products imported from China, which is assumed to be relatively 
cheaper. US total imports increased fourfold for the period 1992 to 2008, but US total 
imports from China increased by about 13 times during the same period. Chinese import 
share was insignificant for the primary sectors like animals and vegetable products over 
the entire period 1992-2008. Chinese export shares increased for almost all sectors in 
the US market over the period 1992-2008, although China was very insignificant in the 
primary sector. China’s influence in the USA has thus grown significantly, especially in 
the manufacturing sector.  
 
We also calculated the share of each sector relative to China’s shares in the USA’s total 
imports, as in Table 3.5; this method is quite similar to measuring the Revealed 
Comparative Advantage (RCA) for each sector. China’s market share was only around 
5% of US total imports in 1992, but had increased to about 17% in 2008. Although this 
index is rather sketchy, very loosely speaking a value greater than 1 indicates that 
China’s share in that particular is more than its overall market share in the USA. Thus 
an index greater than 1 would suggest that China has a comparative advantage in that 
sector. The results shown in Table 3.5 indicate that China’s advantage lies in the 
manufacturing sectors, where footwear/clothing, machinery, textiles, miscellaneous and 
leathers/furs all have a value greater than 1. The results also indicate that China does not 
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have an advantage in the primary sectors like vegetables, animals, minerals and 
transport. 
 
Table 3.5: China's Market Share in US Total Imports 
 1992 2008 
 
 
Sector 
US 
Total 
Imports 
US 
Import 
China 
Sector 
Share 
Sector 
Share/Tota
l Trade 
US Total 
Imports 
US 
Import 
China 
Sector 
Share 
Sector 
Share/Tota
l Trade 
 
USD 
Billions 
USD 
Billions 
Proportion Index 
USD 
Billions 
USD 
Billions 
Proportion Index 
Animals (0) 9.8 0.53 0.05 1.07 21.5 2.2 0.10 0.61 
Vegetables 
(1) 
9.94 0.15 0.02 0.30 35.1 1.14 0.03 0.19 
Foodstuffs (2) 13.8 0.17 0.01 0.24 45.1 2.66 0.06 0.35 
Minerals (3) 61.8 0.66 0.01 0.21 511 3.01 0.01 0.04 
Chemicals (4) 27.4 0.55 0.02 0.40 162 10.2 0.06 0.38 
Plastics (5) 14.2 0.89 0.06 1.24 59.4 13.5 0.23 1.36 
LF (6) 5.78 1.68 0.29 5.77 11.8 8.01 0.68 4.05 
Wood (7) 19.9 0.42 0.02 0.42 44.9 8.15 0.18 1.08 
Textiles (8) 38.6 5.72 0.15 2.94 101 33.2 0.33 1.96 
Footwear (9) 12.3 4.31 0.35 6.95 24.2 18.1 0.75 4.46 
Stone (10) 18 0.51 0.03 0.56 66.4 7.74 0.12 0.70 
Metals (11) 27.9 0.91 0.03 0.65 129 25.9 0.20 1.20 
Machinery 
(12) 
148 4.67 0.03 0.63 512 150 0.29 1.75 
Transport 
(13) 
87 0.23 0.00 0.05 224 7.61 0.03 0.20 
Misc (14) 42.2 5.65 0.13 2.66 153 60.7 0.40 2.37 
Total 536.62 27.05 0.05 
 
2100.4 352.12 0.17 
 
*Data obtained from Comtrade based on own calculations 
 
Although Mexico is also a major exporter to the USA, its dominance pales in 
comparison to China. Following Equation (3.1), we calculated Mexico’s market share in 
the US market for each individual sector; the results are tabulated in Table 3.6. In 1992, 
Mexico had a 0.18 share in the vegetable products sector, followed by the 
machinery/electronics sector (0.09) and mineral products (0.08). By 2008, Mexico still 
had a large share in primary sectors like vegetable products and foodstuffs, with a 
market share of 0.18 and 0.12 respectively. The manufacturing sector has also gained 
importance in the US market, especially machinery (0.15), transport equipment (0.15) 
and miscellaneous products (0.09). China and Mexico accounted for a combined 44% 
(machinery) and 49% (miscellaneous products) share of US total imports in 2008. 
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Loosely speaking, if we take results for the sector share relative to Mexico’s share of 
total trade as a rough indicator of comparative advantage, Mexico’s comparative 
advantage is also in the machinery/electronics sector, as well as in vegetables, 
foodstuffs and transportation equipment. Mexico, however, does not have an advantage 
in soft manufactures like textiles, plastics and miscellaneous manufactures. 
 
 
Table 3.6: Mexico's Market Share in US Total Imports 
 
 
1992 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 Sector 
US Total 
Imports 
US 
Import 
Mexico 
Share 
Sector 
Share/Tota
l Trade 
US Total 
Imports 
US 
Import 
Mexico 
Share 
Sector 
Share/Tota
l Trade 
 
USD 
Billions 
USD 
Billions 
Proportion Index 
USD 
Billions 
USD 
Billions 
Proportion Index 
Animals 
(0) 
9.8 0.58 0.06 0.94 21.5 0.98 0.05 0.50 
Vegetables 
(1) 
9.94 1.74 0.18 2.81 35.1 6.16 0.18 1.80 
Foodstuffs 
(2) 
13.8 0.61 0.04 0.62 45.1 5.36 0.12 1.20 
Minerals 
(3) 
61.8 5.23 0.08 1.25 511 43.1 0.08 0.80 
Chemicals 
(4) 
27.4 0.77 0.03 0.47 162 2.77 0.02 0.20 
Plastics (5) 14.2 0.47 0.03 0.47 59.4 4.09 0.07 0.70 
LF (6) 5.78 0.15 0.03 0.47 11.8 0.16 0.01 0.10 
Wood (7) 19.9 0.51 0.03 0.47 44.9 1.49 0.03 0.30 
Textiles 
(8) 
38.6 1.49 0.04 0.62 101 5.6 0.06 0.60 
Footwear 
(9) 
12.3 0.26 0.02 0.31 24.2 0.3 0.01 0.10 
Stone (10) 18 0.75 0.04 0.62 66.4 5.34 0.08 0.80 
Metals 
(11) 
27.9 1.35 0.05 0.78 129 9.68 0.08 0.80 
Machinery 
(12) 
148 12.8 0.09 1.41 512 78.7 0.15 1.50 
Transport 
(13) 
87 5.22 0.06 0.94 224 32.9 0.15 1.50 
Misc (14) 42.2 2.44 0.06 0.94 153 13.8 0.09 0.90 
Total 536.62 34.37 0.06 
 
2100.4 210.43 0.10 
 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
 
3.2.6 Classification of Important Products by Their Market Share in 
the USA 
 
In the previous sub-section we looked at the relative importance of each sector for 
China in the USA. Here, we identify the top ten US imports from China (by export 
volume) and their calculated product shares. Table 3.7 shows the top ten US imports 
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from China for 2008. The product share for each and every product is calculated using 
Equation (3.2) and ranked accordingly, and the top 10 product headings are shown in 
Table 3.7.  
 
    [
   
               
   
              ⁄ ]                         (3.2) 
 
where    
               
 is total US imports from China and    
              
is total US 
imports globally.  
 
Table 3.7: US top 10 Imports from China (2008) 
Rank Product Description 
Value (USD 
Billions) 
Product 
Product share 
(Imports from 
China/Total USA 
Imports) 
1 Digital computers with CPU and input-output units 20.24 847120 0.69 
2 Transmit-receive apparatus for radio, TV, etc. 12.39 852520 0.38 
3 Colour television receivers/monitors/projectors 11.84 852810 0.35 
4 Toys 9.62 950390 0.88 
5 Parts and accessories of data processing equipment 9.09 847330 0.49 
6 Video games used with a television receiver 8.37 950410 0.98 
7 Computer input or output units 6.96 847192 0.75 
8 Telephonic or telegraphic switching apparatus 6.87 851730 0.39 
9 Footwear, sole rubber, plastics uppers of leather 5.39 640399 0.71 
10 Printing machinery 4.73 844350 0.56 
* Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
 
The USA’s top imports from China at the HS6 product level are digital computers, with 
an import value of USD 20.24 billion and a Chinese market share of 0.69. The USA 
also imported about 88% of its toys and 98% of videos games used with a television 
receiver from China. In 1992, the USA’s top imports from China were mainly in the 
footwear and soft manufactures sectors. The top ten US imports from China for 1992 
are shown in Appendix 3.1.  
 
We have sought to classify products as we assume that Chinese competition varies by 
product heading. We might expect a stronger pressure for products in which China has a 
strong market presence. The market share for each product (HS6) is calculated using 
Equation (3.2), which is the ratio of US imports from China relative to its total imports 
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of the product. We classify products into four different groups according to their market 
share in the US market. The four groups are defined by product headings, which have 
market share (s) represented by s<0.1, 0.1≤s<0.2, 0.2≤s<0.5 and s≥0.5 respectively. In 
Table 3.8, we classify products by market share according to the four different groups. 
 
Table 3.8: Classification of US Imports from China by Product Share 
Product Headings 
 
Total s<0.10 
% of 
Total 
0.1≤s<0.2 
% of 
Total 
0.2≤s<0.5 
% of 
Total 
s≥0.5 
% of 
Total 
1992 2794 2077 74.34 282 10.09 315 11.27 120 4.29 
1993 2963 2162 72.97 312 10.53 331 11.17 158 5.33 
1994 3084 2244 72.76 327 10.60 349 11.32 164 5.32 
1995 3200 2342 73.19 311 9.72 382 11.94 165 5.16 
1996 3212 2320 72.23 321 9.99 378 11.77 193 6.01 
1997 3370 2382 70.68 355 10.53 433 12.85 200 5.93 
1998 3450 2421 70.17 369 10.70 441 12.78 219 6.35 
1999 3587 2470 68.86 402 11.21 460 12.82 255 7.11 
2000 3723 2537 68.14 421 11.31 501 13.46 264 7.09 
2001 3743 2473 66.07 466 12.45 504 13.47 300 8.01 
2002 3857 2443 63.34 492 12.76 568 14.73 354 9.18 
2003 3928 2377 60.51 507 12.91 627 15.96 417 10.62 
2004 4015 2325 57.91 535 13.33 696 17.33 459 11.43 
2005 4123 2178 52.83 601 14.58 839 20.35 505 12.25 
2006 4251 2132 50.15 619 14.56 899 21.15 601 14.14 
2007 4036 1917 47.50 626 15.51 898 22.25 595 14.74 
2008 4002 1808 45.18 595 14.87 941 23.51 658 16.44 
* s represents the Chinese share in total US imports  
* Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
In 1992, the USA imported a total of 2794 product headings from China, of which 74% 
of had a market share of less than 10%. By 2008, China’s total number of product 
headings in the USA had increased to 4002, out of which 1808 (45%) products had less 
than 10% of US market share. In other words, 55% of the Chinese products in the USA 
had a more than 10% share in 2008. The number of products with shares in the range of 
0.1≤s<0.2 increased from 10% in 1992 to about 15% in 2008. There were only about 4% 
of Chinese product headings with more than 50% of US market share in 1992, but by 
2008 the percentage had gone up to 16%. All these figures suggest the growing 
importance of Chinese exports to the US market. 
 
63 
 
 
We further split the lower band (those products with less than 10% US market share) 
into three different categories to better understand those products in which China has a 
weak market share. The lower-band groups are defined by products that have market 
share (s) represented by s<0.01, 0.01≤s<0.05 and 0.05≤s<0.1. In 1992, about 40% of 
those products in the lower band had a less than 1% share in the US market, but by 2008 
only 16% of China’s products had a less than 1% share in the USA. The exact figures 
and percentages for each lower-band category are shown in Appendix 3.2. 
 
Similarly, we also tabulated Mexico’s exports according to their market share in the US 
market; the results are shown in Table 3.9. In 1992, 77% of Mexico’s product headings 
had less than 10% of US market share and by 2008 there were still 73% of Mexico’s 
products with less than 10% of US market share. In 1992, about 9.6% of Mexico’s 
products had shares in the range of 0.1<s<0.2 and this percentage had increased slightly 
to 11.4% in 2008. Only 4% of Mexico’s products had a more than 50% share in the US 
market and this stayed the same from 1992-2008. The proportion of Mexico’s products 
with a significant share in the US market looks to have remained quite similar over time, 
whereas there is a greater ratio of Chinese products that have gained share rapidly 
 
Table 3.9: Mexico’s Exports to USA by Product Share 
Year Product Headings 
 
Total s<0.10 
% of 
Total 
0.1<s<0.2 
% of 
Total 
0.2<s<0.5 
% of 
Total 
s>0.5 
% of 
Total 
1992 2889 2226 77.05 278 9.62 265 9.17 119 4.12 
1993 2991 2298 76.83 304 10.16 273 9.13 115 3.84 
1994 3113 2396 76.97 308 9.89 285 9.16 123 3.95 
1995 3395 2589 76.26 352 10.37 302 8.90 151 4.45 
1996 3480 2576 74.02 384 11.03 364 10.46 155 4.45 
1997 3523 2574 73.06 395 11.21 384 10.90 169 4.80 
1998 3520 2558 72.67 404 11.48 389 11.05 168 4.77 
1999 3553 2590 72.90 388 10.92 404 11.37 170 4.78 
2000 3539 2529 71.46 413 11.67 432 12.21 164 4.63 
2001 3476 2472 71.12 426 12.26 408 11.74 169 4.86 
2002 3453 2494 72.23 397 11.50 416 12.05 145 4.20 
2003 3428 2494 72.75 414 12.08 379 11.06 140 4.08 
2004 3457 2521 72.92 406 11.74 384 11.11 145 4.19 
2005 3485 2552 73.23 396 11.36 392 11.25 144 4.13 
2006 3470 2532 72.97 391 11.27 401 11.56 145 4.18 
2007 3347 2449 73.17 375 11.20 389 11.62 133 3.97 
2008 3341 2429 72.70 382 11.43 394 11.79 135 4.04 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
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3.2.7 Export Similarity Index between China and Mexico in the USA  
 
The Export Similarity Index (ESI) is a method used to compare the trade structure 
between two countries to find the distinctive patterns of different products in the total 
exports of a country (Finger and Kreinin, 1979). The formula used to calculate the ESI 
can be calculated using Equation (3.3): 
 
    ∑     
  
  
   
⁄ 
    
  
  
   
⁄                  (3.3) 
 
where  
  
  
   
⁄  is the share of product i in country C’s total exports to market K, and 
  
  
   
⁄  is the share of product i in country M’s total exports to market K. The ESI 
will take a value of 0 if there is no similarity in products between the two countries and 
a value of 1 if there is complete similarity. One of the disadvantages is that the index 
will vary according to the level of disaggregation used, the index falling as the data is 
more finely disaggregated. We will be using data at the HS6 digit level and we will 
compare the ESI between China and Mexico for the period 1992-2008. For comparison 
purposes, we will also use Brazil and Canada as case studies. If the index rises over 
time, this indicates a greater degree of similarity between the two countries in the third 
market.  
 
The ESI between China and the other countries is tabulated in Table 3.10. Not 
surprisingly, the ESI is highest between China and Mexico, as compared to Canada and 
Brazil. The ESI between China and Mexico has shown an upward trend since 1992, 
which indicates a rising similarity between the products of the two countries. The ESI 
between China and Brazil has increased just slightly since 2000, but is still relatively 
smaller than Mexico. The degree of similarity between China and Canada was very low 
in 1992, but the ESI has increased over the years. Japan is a developed country 
producing sophisticated products; China’s similarity index with Japan seems to have 
risen considerably over the sample period. China and Mexico are both middle income 
countries and their export structures to the USA are mostly concentrated in 
manufactured products. 
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Table 3.10: Export Similarity Index between China and Other Countries 
 
ESI 
 
 
 
Year Mexico Brazil Canada Japan 
1992 19.45 15.15 9.83 13.39 
1993 18.93 15.36 9.42 14.68 
1994 20.04 14.97 10.82 16.40 
1995 21.32 14.43 12.34 19.11 
1996 22.30 14.42 12.74 19.92 
1997 23.79 13.56 13.12 20.82 
1998 25.32 14.27 14.12 22.32 
1999 25.82 14.35 14.47 23.83 
2000 26.36 16.03 15.42 25.54 
2001 26.10 16.72 15.42 23.36 
2002 26.91 17.32 15.18 24.25 
2003 25.69 17.54 14.88 23.53 
2004 25.98 17.31 15.52 24.36 
2005 28.24 18.49 16.17 25.00 
2006 28.30 17.42 16.73 24.07 
2007 28.93 16.32 16.90 22.81 
2008 29.59 13.08 15.86 23.42 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
 
This is an indication of China’s industrialisation and fast growth in keeping up with 
developed countries. Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2008) showed that China’s exports are 
relatively sophisticated, considering that it has a low GNP per capita and that Chinese 
products are also relatively cheaper. Schott (2008) found that China has a huge trade 
overlap with the OECD, but that the premium people are willing to pay for OECD 
products is a substantial one. The quality difference would make it hard to compare the 
same products between the two regions.  
 
3.3 Summary of Trade Data 
 
China’s competitive pressure on Mexico’s products has increased over the years as the 
total number of product headings that China exported to the USA has increased. As 
China grows, the set of common products with Mexico also expands. The more the 
common set of products that both countries export to the USA increases, the larger the 
influence that China has on Mexico. The trade overlap between these countries has 
increased over time; in 1992 China exported about 70% of the total product headings 
that Mexico exported to the USA, and this increased to about 93% by 2008. China’s 
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influence is even stronger in the manufactures sector; in 2008 China exported every 
product heading (100%) in the miscellaneous products and footwear sectors that Mexico 
exported. The machinery/electronics sector is the biggest export sector for both 
countries, where China’s influence covers 98% of what Mexico also exported to the 
USA. In terms of trade volume, common products constitute about 96% of Mexico’s 
total exports to the USA. 
 
Although China exported many of the product headings, we would expect less influence 
where it occupies a smaller share in the market. However, China is a huge exporter and 
many of its products have a big share in the US market. Thus, we assume that China’s 
wide product coverage together with its huge share in the market will have a 
competitive effect on Mexico. China’s comparative advantage lies mainly in the 
manufacturing sector, where it has evolved from soft manufactures to more 
sophisticated ones over time. Our study is based on this idea of price competition 
between countries at the disaggregated product level, where products are identified at 
the HS6 digit level. Although at the HS6 level products are still not as finely categorised 
as they should be, it is the most detailed description available for international 
comparison purposes. 
 
3.4 Data Issues 
3.4.1 The Problem of HS Revision 
 
The HS system started in 1988 and is revised every four to six years; amendments were 
introduced in 1992 (HS92), 1996 (HS96), 2002 (HS2002) and 2007 (HS2007). The 
‘native’ HS92, HS96, HS02 and HS07 classification involves only products that are 
recorded in the periods 1992-1995, 1996-2001, 2002-2006 and 2007-2008 respectively. 
Table 3.11 shows the different types of data sources from the various HS systems and 
their conversion to the earlier HS system. The HS92 classification data can only be 
found for the period 1992-1995, while those exports from 1996 onwards are collected 
on the new system, namely the HS96, HS02 and HS07 classifications, which are then 
converted back to HS92 by UN Comtrade. All conversions from later HS versions to 
earlier HS versions are done using direct conversion, which involves, for example, 
comparing the HS2007 code directly with the HS92 code. The direct conversion method 
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is more accurate as compared to cascading conversion, which uses the relationships 
between two subsequent versions of the HS
4
 (United Nations Statistics Division: United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009).  
 
As shown in Table 3.11, the number of product headings that China exported to the 
USA at the HS 6 digit level has increased since 1992, but there seemed to be a slight 
drop from 2007 onwards. We also found that the total number of product headings 
imported by the USA (from the world) dropped in 2007. One possible reason for the 
sudden drop in export headings could be the conversion from the HS07 system to HS92 
system. There exists a potential problem with reclassification, because there might not 
be an exact match between every product from the different HS systems. Before we 
proceed to the dynamics of China’s exports at the product level, therefore, we discuss 
the problems of HS revision.  
 
Table 3.11: China’s Export Headings to the USA (Various HS Revisions) 
Year HS 92 HS 96 HS 02 HS 07 
1992 2,794 (native) 
   
1993 2,963 (native) 
   
1994 3,084 (native) 
   
1995 3,200 (native) 
   
1996 3,212 (Converted from HS96) 3,279 (native) 
  
1997 3,370 (Converted from HS96) 3,444 (native) 
  
1998 3,450 (Converted from HS96) 3,528 (native) 
  
1999 3,587 (Converted from HS96) 3,656 (native) 
  
2000 3,723 (Converted from HS96) 3,818 (native) 
  
2001 3,743 (Converted from HS96) 3,835 (native) 
  
2002 3,857 (Converted from HS02) 3,943 (Converted from HS02) 4,038 (native) 
 
2003 3,928 (Converted from HS02) 4,021 (Converted from HS02) 4,122 (native) 
 
2004 4,015 (Converted from HS02) 4,117 (Converted from HS02) 4,220 (native) 
 
2005 4,123 (Converted from HS02) 4,231 (Converted from HS02) 4,333 (native) 
 
2006 4,251 (Converted from HS02) 4,364 (Converted from HS02) 4,466 (native) 
 
2007 4,036 (Converted from HS07) 4,124 (Converted from HS07) 4,225 (Converted from HS07) 4,325 (native) 
2008 4,002 (Converted from HS07) 4,091 (Converted from HS07) 4,191 (Converted from HS07) 4,286 (native) 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
 
The change in HS classification poses a problem for our study if we are interested in 
how the variation in Chinese prices affects the variation in Mexico's price at the product 
                                                 
 
4
 Cascading conversion from HS07 to HS92, (HS07 →HS02 → HS96 → HS92). 
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level over the period 1992-2008. We are worried that a dropped product might be a 
‘disguised’ one, as it might simply have been assigned a different code during 
conversion. Suppose that China exported ‘meat of reptiles’ in 2007 (HS07 system), but 
that the relevant authorities assigned it a different code during conversion from HS07 to 
HS92, say to ‘other frozen meats’. Although it is recorded that China no longer 
exported ‘meat of reptiles’ in 1996 (HS07 system), this could be misleading, as reptile 
meat could merely be mapped back to ‘other frozen meats’ in HS92.  
 
It is possible to do a conversion from a later HS system to an earlier HS system, but not 
the other way round; thus, not all product headings exported in 1992-1996 will appear 
in the HS96, HS02 and HS07 systems. Thus, in order to increase the number of 
observations in the sample, our study involves using the data reported by the USA at the 
HS92 6 digit level of aggregation. We are using the readily converted HS92 revision 
available from UN Comtrade in the WITS system, where the conversions have been 
developed by the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). UNSD provides both 
correlation and conversion tables between the different HS systems for inference 
purposes. Before the actual conversion, UNSD refers to the relationship between 
product codes in the different HS systems through the correlation tables; a product code 
in a newer HS system (e.g. HS07) might be correlated with more than one product code 
from an earlier HS system (e.g. HS92). The correlation tables as provided by UNSD 
provide four possible types of relationship between a product code at the current HS 
system and its previous HS system, from HS07 to HS92, namely (1) 1:1 relationship, 
(2) n:1 relationship, (3) 1:n relationship and (4) n:n relationship. The conversion tables 
as provided by UNSD then assign a product code in the newer HS to one and only 
subheading of the earlier HS version; UNSD does the conversions using either the 
Quantitative Method or the Retained Code Method. 
 
UNSD will assign a product code in the HS07 to one and only subheading of the earlier 
HS version. In Table 3.12, we provide some examples of a conversion from HS07 to 
HS92 using both the conversion and correlation tables. The correlation table shows that 
the product 051199 (HS07) has three correlates in the HS92 system; however, it cannot 
be assigned to all three subheadings during the conversion, but only to the subheading 
051199 (HS92). A similar explanation follows for product 071190 (HS07), which has 
many correlates (HS92); it will be assigned to one and only one subheading in the HS92.  
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Table 3.12: Conversion and Correlation Tables  
Conversion Table Correlation Table 
Assigned Code (HS07 →HS92) HS07 Relationship HS92 
840710→840710 840710 1:1 840710 
190490→190490 190490 n:1 190490 
190430→190490 190430 n:1 190490 
051199→051199 051199 1:n 050300 
  
1:n 050900 
  
1:n 051199 
071190→071190 071190 n:n 071110 
 
071190 n:n 071130 
 
071190 n:n ‘ex’071190 
*‘ex’ means that the product code in the HS92 is correlated with another code in the native HS system (HS07) 
 
For products with a 1:1 relationship, an HS07 product code is correlated with one and 
only one product code in the HS92 system. For products with an n:1 relationship, 
several product codes in the HS07 are correlated with just one product code in the 
HS92. Under a 1:n relationship, a product code in the HS07 system is correlated with 
several product codes in the HS92 system. Finally, for products with an n:n relationship, 
several product codes in the HS07 are correlated with several product codes in the 
current system, HS92. 
 
For all 1:1 and n:1 relationships, there is no problem matching the codes from the 
different HS systems, as a product code (HS07) is not split up; that is, it has only one 
correlate in the HS92 system. As shown in Table 3.12, product 840710 (HS07) has only 
one correlate in the HS92 and hence is assigned the same code, 840710 (HS92). In 
another example, both products 190490 (HS07) and 193430 (HS07) have just one 
correlate in the HS92 system and hence both products are assigned product code 190490 
(HS92) during the conversion. A product code in the current HS system (HS07) can be 
converted into one and only one subheading of the earlier HS version, meaning that it 
cannot be split. However, two product codes in the HS07 can be incorporated under the 
same product code (HS92) during the conversion. As has been said, UNSD does the 
conversions using either the Quantitative Method or the Retained Code Method; 
however, the final decision is taken by comparing product descriptions. Appendix 3.3, 
taken from a UNSD document, provides a more detailed example of how the conversion 
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from HS07 to HS92 is conducted by using the Quantitative Method and the Retained 
Code Method (Statistics Division: United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, 2009).  
 
Although there have been several HS revisions since the HS92 version, there seemed to 
be an apparent concordance issue for the HS07 version, since US total import headings 
from China started to drop after 2006. The USA imported a total of 4848 product 
headings in 2006, but these dropped to 4583 headings in 2007, a fall of 265 product 
headings imported. We need to investigate whether a product in the HS92 system was 
actually dropped or was contained in a different product code during the conversion. To 
do this, we compare product headings in the HS92 classification for the years 2006 and 
2007 to get a better understanding of whether products were actually dropped. As 
shown in Table 3.13, China’s export headings to the USA totalled 4252 in 2006 and 
4037 in 2007, a net reduction of 215 product headings. In the HS92 revision, there are a 
total of 382 product headings that China exported in 2006 but no longer exported in 
2007, which we term ‘dropped’ products. There are also 167 products emerging in 2007, 
which we call ‘new’ products.   
 
Table 3.13: New and Dropped Products between 2006 and 2007 (HS92) 
Under HS92 System Product Headings 
New Products in 2007 167 
Dropped Products in 2007 382 
Product Headings Exported in both 2006 and 2007 3869 
Total Headings in 2007 4036 
 
We need to classify those new and dropped product headings into four main 
classifications, namely 1:1, 1:n, n:1 and n:n, to check whether the headings have been 
dropped or have just undergone an HS revision and hence are contained in another 
heading. We first provide a breakdown of the new and dropped products, in Table 3.14. 
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Table 3.14: Breakdown of New and Dropped Products (HS92) 
Relationship 1:1 1:n n:1 n:n Total 
New Products in 2007 134 7 10 20 171 
Dropped Products in 2007 126 148 8 101 383 
Products Exported in both 2006 and 2007 3020 158 426 522 4126 
Total 3280 313 444 643 4680 
 
For those products with a 1:1 classification, there is no change in coding at the HS6 
digit level from HS07 to HS92, thus we assume that all 126 product headings that 
ceased to be recorded in the year 2007 are no longer being exported. Products in the n:1 
category do not pose a problem for identifying dropped products, since many product 
headings in the HS07 are merged into one HS92 heading. If the HS92 coding records 
zero trade, we know that there is no trade in any of the component HS07 categories. We 
will need to check for products in the other two categories, namely 1:n and n:n, by 
matching each dropped product heading with the concordance tables obtained from 
UNSD.  
 
The example in Table 3.15 provides some indication as to whether these products have 
actually been dropped or undergone some kind of reclassification. We make use of the 
product code 050300 (HS92) to better explain our checking process. China exported 
product 050300 to the USA every year since 1992, but the product was dropped in 2007. 
We want to check if it might be contained in another subheading under the HS92 system 
during the conversion. Product code 050300 is one of three correlates for the 
subheading 051199 (HS07). This product 051199 (HS07) when converted to HS92 is 
only assigned to the code 051199, using the retained code procedure. Under the HS92 
system, product 050300 is no longer used, as trade is added into 051199 in 2007 and 
hence it is considered a dropped product in 2007 (HS92). 
 
Table 3.15: Dropped Products  
HS07 HS92 Correlates Assigned Code (HS92) 
051199 050300 (1:n) 051199 
 
050900 (1:n) 
 
 
051199 (1:n) 
 
* 050300 - Horsehair  waste, whether or not put up as a layer with/without supporting mat 
* 050900 - Natural sponges of animal origin 
* 051199 - Animal products not elsewhere specified, dead animals, unfit for human consumption 
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However, there is no way of being certain whether product 050300 was actually 
dropped in 2007 or was contained under a different product, 051199.  We cannot rule 
out the dropped products, but we cannot rule them in either. The same rationale applies 
to products with an n:n relationship, where we cannot be certain whether a product has 
actually been dropped or is still contained in the export basket under a different product 
code. 
 
For dropped products with a 1:n relationship, there are 148 product headings in the 
HS92 system that China apparently stopped exporting to the US market in 2007. 
Although these headings do not appear in the export basket in 2007, they correlate with 
114 product headings in the HS07 system. We found that 102 out of the 114 headings 
were still exported by China to the US market in 2007 (HS92). For the n:n category, 
there were 101 dropped product headings in 2007 and these correlate with 220 headings 
in the HS07 system. In the HS92 system, we managed to find 73 out of these 220 
headings that were still in China’s export basket to the USA in 2007. For those headings 
for which correlates can be found in the export basket in 2007 under the HS92, we 
cannot be certain whether a product has actually been dropped. 
 
There are relatively fewer observations for ‘new’ products in 2007 under the n:n and 1:n 
categories; most of these products emerging in 2007 seem genuinely to be new products 
and not to reflect a change in classification. There are only seven new headings in the 
1:n system and we did not find any of their correlates (HS07) appearing in 2006, so we 
can confirm that these are China’s new exports to the USA. For the 20 new headings in 
the n:n category, we found only 2 headings out of the possible 32 correlates (HS07) 
appearing in China’s exports to the US market in 2006.  
 
The concordances as prepared by Comtrade are only approximate, however, so we 
repeated some of our estimates on a sample of ‘clean’ products that have had only 
unambiguous ‘one heading to one heading’ conversions (1:1) in all three of the 
classification changes since 1992. This is to be certain that the sample set contains 
products that have not undergone any HS revision changes. This is the sample set that 
falls into the 1:1 category type and has not undergone any HS changes for all three HS 
revisions. We termed this the clean sample set, and there will not be a classification 
issue using the product fixed effects for our regression analysis. 
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3.4.2 Clean and Mixed Products (1992-2008) 
 
The set of ‘mixed’ products refers to the set of ‘clean’ products plus the set of uncertain 
cases, and it provides us with more observations. However, for a small portion of 
products the concordances are only approximate, whereas the ‘clean’ sample does not 
have this problem. The conversion is direct and the set of clean products are those that 
have a 1:1 relationship, thus have not experienced a change in HS coding during each 
conversion. The following examples explain the procedure to derive the list of clean 
products from 1992 until 2008 at the HS6 digit level. The clean products for the periods 
1996-2001, 2002-2006 and 2007-2008 are those that have a 1:1 relationship during the 
conversion from HS96, HS02 and HS07 revisions respectively. Altogether, we managed 
to find 3664 clean products overall at the HS6 level. 
 
3.4.3 Problems Using the Clean Data Sample  
 
The main advantage of using only the clean set of data is that we can be certain that all 
the products are distinct for every period by their product code. As shown in Table 3.16, 
we still keep more than 70% of the total product headings exported by China and 
Mexico to the USA if we use the clean sample. The main disadvantage of using just the 
clean set of products is that we lose many observations, about 30% of the product 
headings.  
 
In terms of trade volume, the loss in data becomes more apparent, as indicated by the 
ratio of clean to total trade volume in Table 3.17. By looking at exports to the US 
market for the period 1992-2008, we lose about 50% of the total value of China’s 
exports to the USA if we use only the sample of clean products. 
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Table 3.16: Ratio of Clean Products to Total Product Headings (USA) 
 
China Product Headings 
 
Ratio Mexico Product Headings 
 
Ratio 
Year Total Clean (Clean/Total) Total Clean (Clean/Total) 
1992 2795 2044 0.73 2889 2128 0.74 
1993 2964 2150 0.73 2991 2197 0.73 
1994 3085 2246 0.73 3113 2298 0.74 
1995 3201 2320 0.72 3395 2496 0.74 
1996 3213 2336 0.73 3480 2577 0.74 
1997 3371 2466 0.73 3523 2601 0.74 
1998 3451 2518 0.73 3520 2614 0.74 
1999 3588 2614 0.73 3553 2635 0.74 
2000 3724 2704 0.73 3539 2625 0.74 
2001 3744 2728 0.73 3476 2580 0.74 
2002 3858 2840 0.74 3453 2579 0.75 
2003 3929 2908 0.74 3428 2562 0.75 
2004 4016 2971 0.74 3457 2576 0.75 
2005 4124 3059 0.74 3485 2607 0.75 
2006 4252 3144 0.74 3470 2590 0.75 
2007 4037 3152 0.78 3347 2603 0.78 
2008 4003 3122 0.78 3341 2589 0.77 
* Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
For Mexico, we lose about 30% of total export volume by using the clean sample. It is 
interesting to do the breakdown between clean and mixed products by sectoral 
classification (HS 2 digit level). The ratio of clean to total trade value by sector is 
shown in Appendix 3.4; we found that the classifications tend to change in the 
manufacturing sectors, which are often the most dynamic and most sensitive. Looking 
at US imports from China, we will lose a lot of data in the footwear and machinery 
sectors if we use only the clean sample for the sample period 1992-2008. We will lose 
about 76% of China’s exports in the machinery/electronics sector (the biggest for 
Chinese exports); about 78% of China’s total trade value in the footwear/headgear 
sector; and about 27% of the information in the miscellaneous sector as well. These are 
important exports for China and we should not drop them because the costs of making 
the clean sample the main sample are too high.  
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Table 3.17: Ratio of Clean Products to Total Trade  
 
China 
 
 
Mexico 
 
 
Period 
Total  Value 
(Billions) 
Clean 
(Billions) 
Ratio 
(Clean/Total) 
Total  Value 
(Billions) 
Clean 
(Billions) 
Ratio 
(Clean/Total) 
1992 27.1 15.8 0.58 34.4 25.4 0.74 
1993 33.4 19.1 0.57 39 29 0.74 
1994 41 22.9 0.56 48.4 36.2 0.75 
1995 48.1 26.1 0.54 60.2 45.5 0.76 
1996 54 28.8 0.53 71.4 53.3 0.75 
1997 65.3 34.3 0.53 83.9 62.6 0.75 
1998 74.4 38.3 0.51 92.2 66.6 0.72 
1999 86.8 45.1 0.52 106 76.6 0.72 
2000 106 55.7 0.53 132 93.8 0.71 
2001 108 57.5 0.53 127 89.2 0.70 
2002 132 69.1 0.52 130 93.7 0.72 
2003 161 82.4 0.51 134 97.5 0.73 
2004 208 102 0.49 151 108 0.72 
2005 257 127 0.49 166 119 0.72 
2006 302 150 0.50 193 138 0.72 
2007 336 170 0.51 205 141 0.69 
2008 352 179 0.51 210 144 0.69 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
 
3.4.4 Sample Data 
 
The HS classification problem arises because we are comparing products across 
different years that were recorded under three revised HS systems, then converted back 
to HS92 by UNSD. The loss in information is too big when using just the clean set of 
products, especially so in the manufacturing sectors; thus for majority of this thesis we 
will use the ‘mixed’ product set as obtained under the HS92 system for further analysis. 
However, for inference purposes we will also use the set of clean products to compare 
results between clean and mixed products. Our sample data is unbalanced panel data, as 
there exist some products that are dropped every year while new products are 
developed. With two key variables, Mexico and China’s unit prices, we are concerned 
with how the Chinese price affects Mexico’s price at the product level. By applying 
product effects, we can control for all possible characteristics of the products in the 
sample, provided that those characteristics are constant over time. In other words, we 
have got rid of all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between products. It is 
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important that products are classified correctly over time, as our sample consists of 
many different products with individual product-specific effects. 
 
We seek to identify the Chinese price effect using different samples; that is, the 
established product sample and also the balanced sample. The established sample can be 
referred to as the set of products that China exported to the USA continuously for five 
years or more. The balanced set of products contains the common products that are 
present for all years; although we lose many observations, it will be interesting to check 
the Chinese price effect for these samples. These two samples will be discussed in more 
detail in our next chapter, when we do the regression analysis. Another possible way to 
solve this HS classification problem is to take the native classification for the different 
HS systems and pool them together to get a larger sample. Thus, we will be using HS92 
data for the period 1992-1996, HS96 data for the period 1996-2001, HS02 data for the 
period 2002-2006 and HS07 data for the period 2007-2008. The trade-off is that we will 
have different product effects for each HS revision. This method will involve more 
changes compared to only using data obtained from the HS92 system and so we do not 
pursue it in this work. 
 
3.5 Dynamics of China’s Exports 
 
In the above section, we investigated and worked through the classification changes. We 
can now discuss China’s export dynamics more confidently. China’s dominance in the 
US market arises not only because its products are cheaper than those of its rivals, but 
also because of China’s size and its export of new varieties, as indicated by its trade 
volume and the number of product headings exported. Every year there are some new 
products that China started exporting to the US market, but there are also some products 
that it stopped exporting to the USA. Table 3.18 shows the total number of products that 
China started to export to the USA (new products) and also products that China stopped 
exporting to the USA (dropped products
5
) from 1992 to 2008. There are 444 new 
products that China exported to the US market in 1993 and 275 products that China 
exported in 1992 but did not export in 1993. The new products in 1993 totalled USD 
82.2 million, while the value of the dropped products in 1992 is USD 64.9 million.  
                                                 
 
5
 Dropped products are from the previous year. 
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Table 3.18: China’s New and Displaced Products in the USA (Mixed Products) 
 New Products Dropped Products from Previous Year 
Year Product Headings Millions (USD) Product Headings Millions (USD) 
1992 - - - - 
1993 444 82.20 275 64.90 
1994 399 48.60 278 51.10 
1995 419 90.40 303 105.00 
1996 352 80.30 340 92.90 
1997 423 68.00 265 51.50 
1998 349 91.60 269 39.40 
1999 383 203.00 246 17.70 
2000 375 168.00 239 209.00 
2001 275 74.60 255 39.60 
2002 342 50.10 228 109.00 
2003 277 64.10 206 50.70 
2004 275 236.00 188 30.30 
2005 274 79.80 166 73.20 
2006 259 199.00 131 52.90 
2007 167 533.00 382 11,700.00 
2008 123 52.40 157 71.50 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
 
Altogether there are 3928 dropped products for the period 1992-2008, which may drop 
in and out several times. Out of the dropped products, we found 1634 that dropped in 
and out five times or more during the period. By comparing product headings from one 
year to another, it can be seen that a product that is classified as new in 2000 might 
already have been exported a few years before. Similarly, a product that is classified as 
dropped in 1994 might reappear after a few years. However, these figures do provide us 
with a rough idea of the dynamics of Chinese exports.  
 
There seem to be an exceptionally high number of products that China stopped 
exporting to the US market in 2007, the value of which is estimated at around USD 
11,700 million. As discussed above, there was an HS revision for 2007 and it could be 
the different classification that gives rise to the large volume of dropped products. We 
found that 256 out of the 382 products are those that have undergone HS revision, with 
a value of around USD 11,600 million, which meant that China’s dropped products that 
are ‘clean’ are only valued at around USD 100 million. Here we focus solely on 
products that have undergone HS revision, as we can be sure that the clean products are 
dropped. 
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We categorised the dropped products in 2007 into 15 different sectors to pin down the 
extraordinarily high value for the dropped products in that year. As summarised in 
Table 3.19, we found that most of the Chinese exports that were dropped in 2007 were 
in the machinery/electrical and miscellaneous sectors. These two sectors accounted for 
95% of the total value of the dropped products. We can think of these sectors as 
consisting of complicated products in areas where technology changes quite fast. 
  
From our explanation above, some Chinese exports do drop in and out of the basket 
because they are dynamic and the most dynamic sectors are in manufactured products. 
We could also look at a longer period to get a better picture of how the export structure 
has evolved; by comparing the export structure between 1992 and 2008, we identified 
new and dropped products as shown in Appendix 3.5. In the mixed sample, there are 
1435 new products that China exported to the USA in 2008 as compared to 1992, out of 
which 1129 headings are clean products. For the mixed products, China dropped 227 
products in 2008, only 51 product headings of which are in the clean sample. The 
sectors that are the most dynamic are chemicals, textiles, metals and 
machinery/electronics.  
 
Table 3.19: China’s Dropped Products in 2007 by Sector (Mixed Products) 
Sector Product Headings Trade Value (USD Millions) 
Animals (0) 4 13.7 
Vegetables (1) 16 7.07 
Foodstuffs (2) 2 0.04 
Minerals (3) 5 7.22 
Chemicals (4) 43 47 
Plastics (5) 2 15.2 
LF (6) 9 1.57 
Wood (7) 17 298 
Textiles (8) 51 78.4 
Footwear (9) 6 25.1 
Stone (10) 4 0.25 
Metals (11) 24 41.3 
Machinery (12) 39 4,460.00 
Transport (13) 3 28.3 
Misc (14) 31 6,590.00 
Total 256 11,613.15 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides the motivation for investigating the Chinese price effect in the 
next chapter. China’s extraordinary export growth over the past few decades has been 
felt in most countries and its influence has been especially strong in the USA. Out of the 
major exporters to the USA, we find that China and Mexico have had an increasing 
share since the 1990s; and China is the only country whose import share in the USA is 
still rising from the early 2000s. The findings also show the importance of the US 
market to Chinese exporters, as well as the reliance of the USA on Chinese products. 
We also laid out the problems associated with the HS system when products are 
converted back to an earlier HS revision. There is the problem that products might not 
actually be dropped, just incorporated in another code during the conversion. Thus, we 
cannot rule out disappearance, but we cannot rule it in either. One way to solve the 
classification issue is to use the set of ‘clean’ products, as discussed above, but by doing 
so we lose a lot of data, usually on the more dynamic products. China and Mexico’s 
main exports are mainly in manufactured products, with the machinery/electronics 
sector being the largest for each country, hence we find a big trade overlap for these 
products between the two countries. This trade overlap is referred to as the common set 
of products and we will find the Chinese price effect on Mexico for the common 
products in the next chapter. 
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Appendices for Chapter 3 
 
Appendix 3.1: USA Top Ten Imports from China (1992) 
Product Description Value 
(USD 
Billions) 
Product China Shares 
(Import from 
China/Total 
USA Import) 
Sector 
Footwear, outer soles/uppers of rubber or 
plastic, ne 
1.07 640299 0.74 Footwear 
Footwear, sole rubber, plastics uppers of 
leather, ne 
1.02 640399 0.27 Footwear 
Toys 0.92 950390 0.65 Miscellaneous 
Pullovers, cardigans etc of material knit 0.81 611090 0.70 Textiles 
Dolls representing only human beings 0.57 950210 0.64 Miscellaneous 
Stuffed toys - animals or non-human creatures 0.55 950341 0.66 Miscellaneous 
Boots, sole rubber or plastic upper leather, nes 0.52 640391 0.30 Footwear 
Petroleum oils, oils from bituminous minerals, 
crude 
0.52 270900 0.01 Minerals 
Women, girls blouses  shirts, of silk, not knit 0.46 620610 0.76 Textiles 
Radio receivers, portable, with sound 
reproduce/recor 
0.46 852711 0.31 Machinery 
  
Appendix 3.2: Lower-Bound Classification by Product Share 
 Total 
Products 
(China) 
Headings  Headings  Headings  
  
s<0.01 % of Total 0.01≤s<0.05 % of Total 0.05≤s<0.1 % of Total 
1992 2794 1127 0.40 642 0.23 308 0.11 
1993 2963 1155 0.39 683 0.23 324 0.11 
1994 3084 1200 0.39 721 0.23 323 0.10 
1995 3200 1249 0.39 727 0.23 366 0.11 
1996 3212 1164 0.36 803 0.25 353 0.11 
1997 3370 1182 0.35 808 0.24 392 0.12 
1998 3450 1192 0.35 834 0.24 395 0.11 
1999 3587 1185 0.33 858 0.24 427 0.12 
2000 3723 1155 0.31 921 0.25 461 0.12 
2001 3743 1105 0.30 913 0.24 455 0.12 
2002 3857 1050 0.27 895 0.23 498 0.13 
2003 3928 1006 0.26 869 0.22 502 0.13 
2004 4015 957 0.24 878 0.22 490 0.12 
2005 4123 863 0.21 818 0.20 497 0.12 
2006 4251 798 0.19 814 0.19 520 0.12 
2007 4036 712 0.18 706 0.17 499 0.12 
2008 4002 653 0.16 679 0.17 476 0.12 
Total 61338 17753 
 
13569 
 
7286 
 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
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Appendix 3.3: Conversion from HS07 to HS92  
 
The following example as provided by a UNSD document will offer us a better 
understanding of how the conversion from HS07 to HS92 was done (Statistics Division: 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009). 
 
  Correlation Table  Conversion Table 
 HS07 HS92 (correlates) Import Shares (92-95) Assigned Code (HS92) 
Example 1 080550 080530 95.67 080530 
 
 
ex080590 4.33 
 
Example 2 070951 ‘ex’075951 
 
075951 
 070959 ‘ex’070951 98 
 
 
 
070952 2 079952 
*‘ex’ means that the product code in HS92 is correlated with another code in the native HS system (HS07) 
 
The Quantitative Method assigns an HS07 code to that heading in HS92 that accounted 
for 75% or more of the total trade of all the possible correlates in HS92. The correlation 
table shows that the product 080550 (HS07) under the n:n category is correlated with 
both 080530 (HS92) and 080590 (HS92), but can only be converted to one and only one 
product heading at the HS92 system. The two correlates, namely 080530 and 080590, 
accounted for 95.67% and 4.33% shares of total trade for the period 1992 to 1995. 
Finally, product code 080550 (HS07) is converted to 080530 (HS92), as this product 
code comprises more than 75% of total trade between the two correlates.  
 
However, there are cases when the Quantitative Method cannot be used, even if the 
code comprises more than 75% of trade value. This happens when the product code in 
HS92 is correlated with another code in the native HS system (HS07), represented by 
the designation ‘ex’. An example of when the Quantitative Method is not used is 
illustrated in Example 2, in which the code 079959 (HS07) is correlated with both 
‘ex’079951 (HS92) and 079952 (HS92). Product 079951 (HS92) accounted for 98% of 
total trade between the two correlates, but is not assigned because it is a correlate for its 
own code 070951 (HS07). As there can only be a unique solution during the conversion, 
product code 075951 (HS92) is reserved for its own code 075951 (HS07). Note that 
although a product code in the HS07 system can have many correlates, it can be 
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assigned to one and only one code in the HS92 system under Comtrade conversion 
methods. There are some cases where the Quantitative Method and the retained code do 
not apply, as the product description has changed; the UNSD does the final conversion 
by comparing product descriptions.  
Appendix 3.4: Ratio of Clean to Total Trade Value (By Sector) 
US Imports from China (1992-2008) 
Sector Total US Imports from China Clean Ratio 
 
USD Billions USD Billions Clean/Total 
Animals (0) 16.4 7.85 0.48 
Vegetables (1) 7.82 4.39 0.56 
Foodstuffs (2) 14.1 9.28 0.66 
Minerals (3) 19.7 18.6 0.94 
Chemicals (4) 50.4 33.8 0.67 
Plastics (5) 88.1 68.1 0.77 
LF (6) 77.5 76.5 0.99 
Wood (7) 53.7 33 0.61 
Textiles (8) 228 213 0.93 
Footwear (9) 193 43.4 0.22 
Stone (10) 59.7 49.1 0.82 
Metals (11) 138 102 0.74 
Machinery (12) 911 219 0.24 
Transport (13) 45.2 33.7 0.75 
Misc (14) 492 312 0.63 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
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Appendix 3.5: Comparing 2008 and 1992 (Longer Run) 
 
Product Headings 
 
Product Headings 
 
Sectors Mixed Products Clean Products 
 
 
New products in 
2008 
Dropped products 
in 2008 
New products in 
2008 
Dropped products 
in 2008 
Animals (0) 28 7 23 4 
Vegetables (1) 91 26 76 9 
Foodstuffs (2) 39 6 29 5 
Minerals (3) 44 5 38 3 
Chemicals (4) 286 31 225 12 
Plastics (5) 89 1 75 0 
LF (6) 10 9 2 0 
Wood (7) 71 15 31 1 
Textiles (8) 236 29 196 5 
Footwear (9) 0 6 0 0 
Stone (10) 48 5 37 3 
Metals (11) 207 18 144 3 
Machinery (12) 199 33 175 4 
Transport (13) 37 5 37 2 
Misc (14) 50 31 41 0 
Total 1435 227 1129 51 
*Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
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 Actual Competition 4.
 
 
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy, and in particular its exports, since the early 
1990s led to suggestions that China partially underpinned the late lamented ‘great 
moderation’ and, less charitably, that it has exported deflation globally (Kamin et al., 
2004; Feyzioglu and Willard, 2008; Broda and Weinstein, 2010). If these suggestions 
are true, they do not arise from China’s direct impact on the price indices of developed 
countries, because in 1980 Chinese exports accounted for only about 0.1% of OECD 
countries’ absorption. Although China’s exports have increased tremendously, its 
exports accounted for less than 3% of OECD countries’ GDP in 2010.1 Focusing on the 
US market, Chinese import penetration of the USA’s total consumption was slightly 
less than 3% in 2010. We postulate that the effect must rely on the competitive pressure 
that China exerted on other manufacturing producers’ prices – its competitive effect.  
 
Previous studies have investigated changes in China’s trade share to assess its 
competitive effect, although generally with little success. Here, we seek to identify price 
effects directly. We want to find the effects of China’s exports on Mexico in the USA 
through the price channel, as we believe that it is cheaper Chinese prices that have led to 
its dominance of global merchandise trade. This chapter investigates the effect of 
changes in China’s export prices on Mexico’s export prices in the US market. Mexico 
seems likely to be particularly vulnerable to Chinese competition, as both are middle-
income countries exporting labour-intensive products and both are major suppliers to 
the USA; moreover, despite enjoying preferences under NAFTA, Mexico has been 
losing market share in the US to China.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, our study uses disaggregated product-level data 
at the HS6 digit level (HS92), which is obtained from UN Comtrade. There are about 
5000 different products classified at the HS6 digit level and there exists heterogeneity 
across these products; that is, hairclips and laptops are different products. Hence it is 
important to investigate and study the Chinese competitive effect using product-level 
                                                 
 
1
 Data obtained from UN Comtrade and tabulated with own calculations. 
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data, which allows us to evaluate some of this heterogeneity using unit values. 
However, unit prices are noisy and are subject to measurement errors, therefore we need 
to identify the outliers in our sample. Our study focuses on the direct Chinese price 
effect on Mexico by using disaggregated product data at the Harmonised System 6 digit 
level (HS6), the finest level of product classification commonly used at the international 
level. Although there exist product classifications defined at a finer level, they are not 
harmonised internationally. This precludes our using them, as we need data sources 
from different countries as Instrumental Variables (IV) to correct for endogeneity in 
Chinese prices in later sections.  
 
Our study is based on the assumption that China can affect Mexico's prices based on the 
product headings that both countries export to the US market, termed here ‘actual 
competition’. A simple price model to investigate China’s direct price effect is derived, 
where our equation specification is closely related to the simple Bertrand model. 
China’s export profiles seem to be quite similar to Mexico’s and thus there is plenty of 
scope for price competition between the two countries. Theoretically, it is assumed that 
the increasing share of China’s exports in the US market is due to the cheaper Chinese 
products brought about by increasing Chinese productivity, which is exogenous to the 
behaviour of other markets. In this model, we make use of the final price (tariff-
inclusive price) for our main regression, where we want to find how China’s final price 
affects Mexico’s final price in the USA. Our results show that there is little variation in 
the tariff schedules for both countries, but this is not considered a major problem, as we 
are concerned with the use of final prices (tariff-inclusive prices) for our main 
regression.  
 
Our study is focused on actual competition in this chapter, where countries compete in 
terms of pricing on their common set of exports to a third country. We then proceed to 
select the sample data for our study and discuss the problems associated with it. A 
product is defined at the HS6 digit level and we will use the unit price as an indicator 
for price changes between countries. We discuss the problems associated with Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) pooled regression and provide the arguments for fixed effects (FE) 
regression in our panel data to get rid of the individual product-specific effects. The 
regression results for the different samples in our study are tabulated and analysed. To 
help correct for the endogeneity in Chinese prices, we introduce the use of Instrumental 
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Variables (IV). Our results show that the elasticity of Mexico's price with respect to 
China’s price is around 0.30 to 0.75 for our equation specification; that is, that a 1% 
reduction in China’s price will induce Mexico to reduce its price by 0.3% to 0.75%. 
 
4.1 Literature Review 
 
4.1.1  Literature on Chinese Competition (Quantity Effects) 
 
There are two main channels according to which Chinese competition can be assessed: 
quantitative effects and price effects on other countries. There are many studies looking 
at the effect of Chinese competition in displacing the market shares of other countries 
(Iranzo and Ma, 2006; Freund and Özden, 2009; Iacovone et al., 2013; Hanson and 
Robertson, 2010; Greenaway et al., 2008; Mattoo et al., 2012). As our focus is on price, 
we provide only a quick review of a few of these studies in this section.  
 
Greenaway et al. (2008) found that Chinese exports have displaced the demand for 
exports from other Asian countries; the displacement effect is stronger for more 
developed countries as compared to middle-income countries. Using disaggregated data 
at the HS4 digit level, Hanson and Robertson (2010) found an increasing export overlap 
between China and developing countries, but only a small effect on the demand for their 
exports. Freund and Özden (2009) used disaggregated data at the SITC 4 digit level 
from 1985 to 2004 to measure the changes in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) 
exports and Chinese exports in a third market (USA). Their results showed that Mexico 
is one of the countries that is affected the most by the surge in Chinese exports, 
especially in manufacturing goods, namely textiles, electronics and electrical 
appliances, and telecommunications equipment. Freund and Özden acknowledge that 
using more aggregated data will tend to overstate the Chinese effect, as different 
products might be classified under the same sector. Iacovone et al. (2013) matched 
international harmonised trade data with Mexican firm-level data to find Chinese 
competition on Mexican sales in both Mexico and the USA. Recognising the 
heterogeneity across firms, they found a negative effect of increasing Chinese market 
share on both sales in Mexico and on Mexico’s exports in the US market. 
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Mattoo et al. (2012) used changes in Chinese real exchange rate to investigate exports 
of other countries exporting to the destination market aggregated at the HS4 digit level. 
Their results showed that a 10% appreciation of the RMB will on average lead to a 
1.5% to 2% increase in the exports of its competitors. There is a higher degree of 
competition between China and the developing countries, hence the gradual 
appreciation of the RMB since 1994 has provided a boost for developing countries’ 
exports. The spillover effect from RMB fluctuation can get as high as 6% for countries 
with a high degree of competition with China.  
 
4.1.2 Literature on Price Competition  
 
The Chinese competitive effect will also affect other producers’ prices. Because of 
heterogeneity across products, studies are usually conducted at the disaggregated 
product level and the hypothesis is that an increase in China’s market share will tend to 
constrain the price charged by other producers. However, there are surprisingly few 
studies addressing price competition directly. China is large and its export growth and 
variety have resulted in a huge increase in the supply of low-priced goods, making 
products more affordable for everyone, especially lower-income groups. Some of the 
literature on the price effects of Chinese competition is outlined below.  
 
Kamin et al. (2004) related US sectoral import price indices to China’s market shares 
and found little evidence that the surge in Chinese exports led to a reduction in US 
prices. They found that Chinese products had a small effect on import prices, but a 
negligible one on the CPI, presumably due to China’s small share in the US 
consumption basket. Likewise, they did not find any correlation between China’s import 
shares and the US producer price index. In order to look at China’s effect on US import 
prices, they hypothesised that if China’s price is lower than others, then an increase in 
the share of Chinese exports in a particular sector will tend to constrain the import price 
of that particular sector, which they tested using US-reported data disaggregated by end-
use sector. They did not estimate further, but acknowledged that China could have 
affected the import price even if its shares remained unchanged, especially for 
homogeneous products. That is, the lower Chinese price could have pushed down other 
competitors' prices, leading to negligible changes in Chinese import shares, thereby 
underestimating the impact of Chinese exports on the US import price.  
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Auer and Fischer (2010) developed an alternative method to establish the causal effect 
of imports from nine low-income countries on the US price level. They recognised the 
endogeneity of import supply and included industry labour intensity as an instrument to 
correct for this issue. They argued that as labour-abundant countries grew, exports 
would be concentrated mainly in labour-intensive products. Thus, using IV regression, 
they found that a 1% increase in import penetration of low-income countries (including 
China) led to a 2%-3% reduction in US relative price in that particular sector.  
 
With a more direct parallel to our own work, Broda and Romalis (2009) reported a 
strong correlation between finely disaggregated US consumer goods prices and the 
change in Chinese trade over the period. Their analysis used till-level product data from 
US retail outlets matched with trade data at the HTSUSA 10 digit level, and so operated 
at a more disaggregated level than we are able to achieve. However, Broda and Romalis 
apparently do not separate the direct effect arising from sales of Chinese-produced 
goods from the competitive effect that we seek. They found that Chinese exports have 
risen most in non-durable low-quality products consumed mainly by low-income 
families, and attributed the fact that the inflation level for the poor had been 6 
percentage points lower than that for rich households over 1994-2005 in the cheaper 
Chinese products. They found that cheaper Chinese products benefited poorer 
households and made goods more affordable for them. A poorer household can now 
consume similarly coded but not identical products that are around 20% cheaper than 
the premium paid by the rich households. 
 
Broda and Weinstein (2010) considered the argument about China ‘exporting deflation’ 
directly in the case of Japan; they concluded strongly that China has not done so. They 
used finely detailed data at the 9 digit level for the period 1992-2005. Their results raise 
at least a couple of questions, however. First, they combine mainland China and Hong 
Kong into a single entity and admit that if they do not, the time profile of prices with 
which they seek to identify price effects looks quite different – it declines much more 
strongly through time. Second, their main test on existing export commodities involves 
asking whether China’s export price pattern differs from those of other exporters of the 
same (finely defined) product. They do not find a differing trend, although Chinese 
products are cheaper than those of the other exporters; this could merely reflect other 
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exporters following China’s pricing lead, the phenomenon that we are specifically 
investigating. They also include interesting results on the effects of quality and new 
products on Japanese cost of living indices, but these are not the subject of the current 
paper.  
 
Bugamelli et al. (2010) acknowledge that the rise of China is one of the most important 
shocks to global trade affecting Italy’s manufacturing sector, which is more oriented 
towards labour-intensive and low-technology manufactures. Using firm-level data from 
Italy, they found that increasing Chinese import penetration has caused a significant 
reduction in the prices of domestic firms. After controlling for the endogeneity in 
Chinese market shares, they found that Chinese pressure is more prevalent in less 
technologically advanced sectors like the textiles and leather industries. 
 
There are surprisingly few studies trying to measure the price effect directly for China; 
to our knowledge. Most of these studies trace tariff shocks on import and export prices 
as an indicator for price changes (Feenstra, 1989; Winters and Chang, 2000; Chang and 
Winters, 2002). Although these studies look at the effects of Chinese competition 
through tariff shocks on the price charged by other producers, few economists have 
addressed changes in Chinese prices directly. 
 
Using unit price data from 1974-1987, Feenstra (1989) found a pass-through rate of 
unity in the case of imported Japanese motorcycles in the US market, but only a 0.58 
pass-through rate
2
 for trucks, the difference reflecting varying levels of competition for 
the two products. During the early 1980s, the USA imposed a 25% tariff on Japanese 
compact trucks and a 45% declining tariff on Japanese heavyweight motorcycles to 
protect its domestic market. For compact trucks, the competition from US producers 
might have prevented Japan from passing the full amount of the tariff on to consumers 
and the USA accounted for a small share in total exports; also, the demand may have 
been a constraint. Thus, for every 10% increase in Japanese tariff, Japanese producers 
were willing to absorb about 4.2% of the burden while passing on only about 5.8% to 
US consumers, leading to a terms of trade gain for the USA. For motorcycles, the tariffs 
were applied to both Japanese imports and Japanese plants operating in the USA. Japan 
                                                 
 
2
 Pass through refers to the Japanese price response to increase in import tariffs 
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accounted for 90% of US market share for motorcycles, where the only domestic 
competition comes from Harley-Davidson (US produced). The whole burden of the 
price increase was therefore passed on completely to the consumer. Although this study 
looked at Japanese competition in the USA, it provides us with an approach for 
investigating Chinese price competition. 
 
Winters and Chang used a model closely related to the Bertrand competition model to 
investigate terms of trade changes when a trading block is formed. In separate studies 
done for MERCOSUR (2002) and the European Communities (2000), they found that 
‘non-member firms’3 export prices to the export market will be influenced not only by 
the tariffs that they face, but also by the tariffs that their rivals in member countries face, 
via the effect of the latter on the rivals’ prices. The tariff preference given to member 
countries will increase their competitiveness, and non-member countries can respond by 
reducing their price as well in order to make their products more competitive.  
 
In the Winters and Chang papers, the driver examined was preferential tariff reductions 
for members of trading blocs, which increased the competitive pressures on non-
member suppliers. Using data at the HS6 digit level, these researchers showed that the 
preferred countries tended to increase their pre-tariff prices while reducing their post-
tariff prices, and that, as a result, non-member countries, which experienced no tariff 
reduction, tended to decrease their prices. Non-member countries will tend to absorb 
some of the loss of competitiveness induced by the tariff cuts, with only a portion 
passed on to consumers. These studies measure direct price competition between rival 
suppliers. Preferential tariffs given to Mexico under NAFTA can also be seen as a 
control factor that we need to take into account in our model. Romalis (2007) found that 
Mexico’s exports to the USA are very responsive to the preferential tariff treatment 
Mexico received and that its market shares increased most in products for which tariffs 
were reduced the most. However, he found smaller effects on the price response in 
member and non-member countries of NAFTA.  
 
                                                 
 
3
 Countries which do not belong to the trading block; for MERCOSUR, the non-member country is the USA with Argentina 
(member) as the competitor to the Brazil market. In a separate study, they also investigated the price response of the non-members 
namely USA and Japan on the Spain joining the European Community. 
91 
 
 
The study that is closest to our own is a recent paper by(Fu et al., 2012; Fu et al., 2011), 
which examined the effects of Chinese exports on different groups of countries as 
measured by their real GDP (low-, middle- and high-income countries) using 
disaggregated trade data at the HS 8 digit data for US and EU market and HS 6 digit for 
Japan. These researchers hypothesised that China's surging exports will have different 
effects on goods with different technological intensity. In their model, prices are 
affected by Chinese prices, the shares of China's exports and the prices of other markets. 
They used a balanced dataset for the 1989-2006 period that covers only the top 300 
exports from China, where these are established Chinese exports for the whole 18 years. 
Their results indicate that Chinese exports affect mostly prices of low-income countries 
before the 1990s, but that it was the middle-income countries that were most affected 
after 1997. China’s exports also affect low-technology products in high-income 
countries, which they suggest implies that China's manufacturing has evolved from low-
cost products to more sophisticated products. 
 
4.2 Our Model 
 
4.2.1 Our Approach 
 
Our study focuses on one market, namely the USA, and on competition with one other 
middle-income supplier, namely Mexico. Our objective is to assess China’s price and its 
impact on Mexico’s price for the set of common products that both countries export to 
the USA. Here, we will measure the Chinese price effect directly by using changes in 
costs.
4
 In reality, there are many other countries exporting to the USA, and this of 
course raises concerns about the external validity of our results. However, without 
claiming that outcomes are identical, we would argue that understanding China-Mexico 
competition in those countries’ main market offers a good deal of insight into other 
markets and other competing suppliers. Our approach to investigating the effect of 
Chinese price competition is sparser than Fu et.al (2012), which looked at the Chinese 
price influence in the US, EU and Japan combined. They create balanced samples of 
products for each import market over the period 1989-2006 by looking at China’s top 
                                                 
 
4
 We argue that cheaper Chinese exports are brought about by the increase in Chinese productivity (lower 
costs), which is exogeneous of the other countries. 
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300 exports to the market and 2006 and keeping those products for which China and at 
least one country in each country group exported in each of the 18 years. As many of the 
more dynamic Chinese export drop in and out of the export basket, we can provide more 
information for the full set of products. The compensating benefit of focusing on one 
country is that our chains of causation are better identified and we avoid the complex 
interactions and endogeneities of Fu et al. (2012).
5
  
 
Our organising framework for actual competition is to assume that firms compete on 
price and that this may be schematically modelled as Bertrand-type competition 
between two countries selling differentiated but substitutable goods in a third market. 
We assume only two main exporters to the US market, ignore local production in the 
USA and try to avoid any effects from Chinese-Mexican competition in other markets. 
(Given their shares of exports to the USA, it is plain that this is the main field on which 
their rivalry is played out.) The methodological tradition of this work is the pass-
through literature as applied to international trade policy analysis, as mentioned in our 
literature review above. 
 
As described in Iacovone et al. (2013), the rise of China in international trade can be 
seen as a situation that dealt a sudden and massive shock especially to the Mexican 
economy, where it was described as a unilateral trade shock and not a mutual trade 
expansion. Our objective here is to assess China’s price and its impact on pricing 
decisions in Mexico for the common set of products that China and Mexico both export 
to the USA. We suggest that Chinese competition over the period 1992-2008 was 
largely in terms of prices, driven by rapidly increasing productivity and scale in Chinese 
industry as producers started to catch up technologically with middle-income countries, 
absorbed large amounts of surplus labour from the countryside and attracted FDI from 
the rest of the world. In principle, we see this advance in productivity and scale as the 
main exogenous driver of China’s market expansion.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
5
 Although Fu et al. use GMM to deal with endogeneity, it is far from clear that lagging endogenous 
variables really removes the problem in cases where horizons are long and market behaviour might be 
anticipated.  
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4.2.2 Bertrand Model 
 
In the Bertrand duopoly model, two firms compete and decide on the price while letting 
consumers decide the quantity to be purchased. This model has a very strict restriction, 
in which there are only two firms with symmetrical costs selling a homogeneous 
product: there is only one price and firms have identical costs. The assumption is that 
both firms are large enough to supply the whole market. The market demand function 
can be generally represented by Equation (4.1): 
 
    ⁄  
 
 ⁄                      (4.1) 
 
where Q and P are the market equilibrium quantity and price respectively. 
 
If products are homogeneous, consumers will always purchase from the cheaper source. 
However, when the prices charged by the two firms are identical, consumers will be 
indifferent between purchasing from the two firms, and the assumption is that each firm 
will share the market equally and each possess half the market share. Under these 
conditions, the quantity of demand faced by Firm 1 is represented by Equation (4.2): 
 
                                     (4.2a) 
                           (4.2b) 
                             (4.2c) 
 
where subscripts 1 and 2 denote Firms 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
As costs are constant, it can be seen from Equation (4.2) that demand switches when 
either firm tries to undercut the other. It shows that demand for Firm 1 is zero when 
     , while Firm 1 gets the total market demand when        and each firm gets 
half the market demand when      . Because costs are linear, the discontinuity in the 
demand causes a discontinuity in profits. Given that the profit function is not 
continuous, we need to identify the Nash equilibrium to obtain the equilibrium price. 
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Both firms will try to undercut the other if price is above marginal costs. Price 
competition between the two firms will lead to zero economic profit, and it is also 
assumed that these firms are large enough to supply the whole market. The Nash 
equilibrium for the Bertrand model occurs when          This is the only 
equilibrium price at which neither firm has the incentive to deviate. Thus, in a pure 
Bertrand model, the price charged by both firms should be the same and both will share 
the market equally. Each firm will try to maximise profits by adjusting its own price 
given the price set by its rivals, taken to be given. The profit function for Firm 1 is a 
function of its own price given the price of its rival, which is taken to be given and is as 
in Equation (4.3), where   is the profit function: 
 
                                 (4.3) 
 
 
4.2.3 Our Model 
 
 
The pure Bertrand model as explained is an unrealistic assumption in the real world, as 
products are differentiated by country of origin. Hence, we introduce differentiated 
goods into the model. This implies that when products are differentiated, one firm will 
not necessarily gain the entire market by undercutting the other. Also the undercutting 
firm might not necessarily have the capacity to supply the entire market. In this model, 
both countries set their price iteratively to maximise profits given what the other firm 
does. Firms control the price and let consumers decide how much to purchase. Based on 
the Bertrand price model, firms are involved in price competition where we believe that 
Mexico’s price will be affected by China’s price.  
 
Under Bertrand imperfect competition, we came up with a simple model by assuming 
that there are only two countries, China and Mexico, exporting to the US market. We 
assume that there is a representative firm that produces output in both China and 
Mexico and products are differentiated by country of production. By assuming 
differentiated products, we can now calculate the first-order conditions with respect to 
price for each firm and solve them simultaneously to obtain equilibrium prices. The 
products are assumed to be produced solely for the purpose for exporting to the USA 
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and this market is independent of all other markets. It is assumed that costs are constant 
and that each firm has a cost function that is homogeneous of degree one in its input 
price. The two firms compete with each other in the US market independently, without 
worrying about their strategies in other markets.  
 
The demand functions for Mexico and China are given by Equations (4.4a) and (4.4b) 
respectively, where the demand for each firm depends not only on its own price, but 
also on the price set by its rivals. Note that for simplicity we have the same demand 
function for each country. 
 
                                     (4.4a) 
                                     (4.4b) 
 
Simple economic theory would suggest a negative relationship between a firm’s own 
price and its quantity demanded, and a positive relationship between its rival’s price and 
the quantity demanded for its own products. The demand functions for Mexico and 
China are represented using Equations (4.5a) and (4.5b) respectively. As products 
between the countries are seen as substitutes, an increase in China’s price will cause a 
reduction in the quantity demanded for Mexico's product; as Mexico's price increases, 
the quantity demanded of its products will fall. 
 
                            (4.5a) 
                             (4.5b) 
 
The two firms compete against each other in the US market based on price competition 
to maximise profits in their own currency. The US demand for Mexican products 
depends on the prices of both Mexico and China. Taking China’s price as given, 
Mexico will decide on its own price in order to maximise profits. The profit-maximising 
condition is to equate its marginal revenue to marginal costs. Mexico's marginal costs 
are assumed to be constant and are thus independent of the total amount demanded for 
its products in other markets. Similarly, the same explanation is offered for China's 
case. The average cost function can be written as    and    for Mexico and China 
respectively. The profit function for Mexico and China can be represented by Equations 
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(4.6a) and (4.6b) respectively. After substituting for  , the profit function are 
represented by Equations (4.7a) and (4.7b) respectively. The first-order condition for 
profit maximising for each country with respect to its own price given its rival’s price is 
as represented by Equations (4.8a) and (4.8b).  
 
)Re{ TotalCostsvenueTotalMax
p

 
 
                                       (4.6a) 
                                          (4.6b) 
 
                               (4.7a) 
                                 (4.7b) 
 
   
   ⁄       
                          (4.8a) 
   
   ⁄      
                             (4.8b) 
 
The reaction functions for both Mexico and China are derived from their demand 
function. We solve for Equations (4.9a) and (4.9b) to get the reaction price functions for 
Mexico and China, which are given by    and    respectively. 
 
         ⁄      
               (4.9a) 
         ⁄      
                (4.9b) 
 
The slopes of the reaction function can be found by totally differentiating (4.9a) and 
(4.9b) with respect to    and    respectively. The reaction function for Mexico and 
China can thus be represented by Equations (4.10a) and (4.10b) respectively: 
 
            
   
   
    ⁄          (4.10a) 
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 ⁄          (4.10b) 
 
 
For the model to be stable, China’s reaction function should be steeper than Mexico’s 
reaction function (    ⁄  . The vertical axis depicts Mexico's prices, while the 
horizontal axis shows China's prices. The reaction functions for China and Mexico are 
shown in Figure 4.1. The slope of the two countries’ reaction function is assumed to be 
positive, as their exports are seen as substitutes. The positively sloped reaction function 
   means that a price decrease by China will induce Mexico to reduce its price as well. 
The intersection of the reaction function for both firms is the Bertrand equilibrium 
point. The firm in Mexico maximises profit given that China's firm sets its price at    . 
The same explanation holds for China. Both firms will have no incentive to change their 
price given the rival's price. 
 
Figure 4.1: Reaction Function for China and Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studies have shown that Chinese productivity has been growing tremendously over the 
years and the productivity increase in the country has lowered the costs of production, 
leading to cheaper Chinese exports. In Figure 4.2, a drop in China's cost (    will cause 
a leftward parallel shift in the Chinese reaction curve from RC to RC1. The fall in 
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China's costs will lead to a new Bertrand equilibrium point, which is now represented 
by point B. The increase in Chinese productivity means that China can charge a lower 
price for any given level of Mexico's price. Under the new Bertrand equilibrium, 
Chinese prices have fallen from     to      and more demand will shift towards the 
cheaper Chinese products, while Mexico's price fell from     to     . 
 
Figure 4.2: Increase in Chinese Productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our main interest lies in the responsiveness of Mexico's price to changes in Chinese 
costs. To summarise, as China's costs falls, China will reduce its price for every level of 
output and more demand will be shifted towards Chinese products. Mexico will respond 
by lowering its own price, illustrated by a movement down in its reaction function RM. 
Our main interest lies in the change in Mexico's prices to a corresponding change in 
Chinese prices brought about by changes in China's costs.  
 
The above is a simple model showing the reaction functions for Mexico and China, 
where we include only the final prices in terms of the importer’s currency. We denote 
MP and CP as the tariff-inclusive price (final prices) in their own currency for Mexico 
and China respectively and this is represented by Equation (4.11): 
 
MMM PP *  , 
CCC PP *                  (4.11) 
Pc 
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where )1( MM tariff is the ad valorem tariff factor and 
M
P is the pre-tariff price for 
Mexico; a similar explanation applies for China. The functions ),( CMM PPq  and 
),( CMC PPq are the demand functions in the USA for China and Mexico's products 
respectively. The nominal exchange rates are denoted by Me and Ce for Mexico and 
China respectively, where Me and
Ce are given by Peso per unit US dollars (Peso/$) and 
Yuan per unit US dollars (Yuan/$) respectively. Mexico and China will try to maximise 
their profit function, as represented by Equations (4.12a) and (4.12b) respectively: 
 
          
  
  
                                       (4.12a) 
          
  
  
                                           (4.12b) 
 
Similarly to the simpler model, the first-order profit-maximising conditions are solved 
with respect to their own price for Mexico and China respectively, which we denote by 
   
  
  
. Mexico’s profit-maximising price is a function of the Chinese price, the Peso 
exchange rate, US-imposed tariffs on its products and also its marginal costs, as 
represented by Equation (4.13a): 
 
   
   
      
   
   
       
   
   
               (4.13a) 
   
   
      
   
   
       
   
   
                   (4.13b) 
 
At the equilibrium, Mexico and China’s first-order profit-maximising condition must be 
satisfied; the reaction functions for both Mexico and China can be represented by 
(4.14a) and (4.14b) respectively,: 
 
  (  
 
  
)  
 
  
                                           (4.14a) 
   (  
 
  
)  
 
  
                                            (4.14b) 
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given that   
   
   
 
  
  
 is the partial elasticity of demand and     is the marginal cost 
of Mexico, which we assume to be constant. Note that             and    
         as products exported by China and Mexico are considered as substitutes; 
also, as products are differentiated, prices need not be the same for both countries. 
Similar to the simple equation, we used the two countries’ first-order conditions to 
derive the reaction functions, using Mexico’s first-order condition to find a reaction 
function that shows Mexico’s profit-maximising price as a function of China’s final 
price, the Peso exchange rate, tariffs imposed on its own products and also its own 
marginal costs of production.   
 
                                   (4.15a) 
                                     (4.15b) 
 
We assume constant marginal costs with respect to quantity; Mexico’s price function in 
the log linearised form is specified as Equation (4.16), where the data for each product 
are appended over time to form panel data: 
 
      
           
       
                        (4.16) 
 
The variable    is the set of time-invariant unobservables that can affect Mexico’s price. 
The variable      is the idiosyncratic error, as it represents the time-varying 
unobservables that can affect Mexico's price. The index i refers to the unit of 
observation for each product at the HS6 level, t refers to the time period, while the 
superscripts M and C refer to Mexico and China respectively. The coefficient   in 
Equation (4.16) measures the exchange rate elasticity for Mexico with respect to its own 
price. However, as the data on annual exchange rates are constant for all observations in 
a particular year, they will be differenced out in our fixed effects regression and thus 
will be represented by the annual    time dummy variables as shown in Equation (4.17), 
where    represents the annual time dummies, one for each year from 1992 until 2008. 
The time dummies represent the constant shift in the intercept term for each period. 
 
      
           
                                  (4.17) 
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In Equation (4.17), the final price can be further categorised into two components, 
namely the pre-tariff price ( P ) and the ad valorem tax (1+t). This is shown in Equations 
(4.18) and (4.19), where we break down the final price into its two main components to 
investigate their individual effects. The main interest lies in the coefficient   , which 
measures the size of the effect that Chinese prices are having on Mexican prices. In 
Equation (4.18), the coefficient    measures the Chinese price effect on Mexico's price, 
while    and    measure the elasticity of Mexico's price with respect to US-imposed 
tariffs on Mexico and China respectively.  
 
   ̅   
         ̅   
      (      
 )      (      
 )                      (4.18)  
 
      
     ̅   
    (      
 )        
     ̅   
    (      
 )                              (4.19) 
 
There is also the issue that Chinese producers will react to Mexican prices just as 
Mexican producers react to Chinese ones. That is, the Chinese price is likely to be 
endogenous and we will address this problem by using Instrumental Variables. 
However, even at this stage it is worth observing that in terms of competition between 
China and Mexico in the USA, the major shock over the period 1992-2008 was 
undoubtedly the emergence and growth of China, which may be plausibly taken to be 
independent of anything that Mexico did. We have argued that Chinese export growth is 
mainly attributed to the increase in productivity of the real factors of production, rather 
than nominal rigidities. China’s abundant labour force and their reallocation to 
manufacturing industries, its FDI inflows and its capital accumulation provide the 
support that is often needed during the initial stages of development. China is one of the 
major recipients of FDI and we believe that the positive spillover effects from FDI and 
the increasing competition from privatisation increased firms’ efficiency, leading to 
increasing Chinese productivity. In principle, we see this advance in productivity and 
scale of growth as the main exogenous drivers of China’s market expansion. 
 
To summarise, the Bertrand duopoly model as derived is a simple representation of 
price competition between two countries in the US market; where our main object of 
interest is the Chinese price effect. The USA is the world’s consumer and hence in 
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reality involves many competitors; hence Mexico’s price might also be affected by other 
major players in the US market. The Bertrand duopoly model could be extended to 
accommodate the other sources of imports by including the global unit price as a control 
variable. This will get rid of the general trend in product price and better isolate the 
effects of the Chinese competition. As the annual exchange rates are constant for all 
observations in a particular year, they will be differenced out in our fixed effects regression 
and thus will be represented by the annual time dummy variables. As there is likely to be 
simultaneity in the Bertrand model, we will use Instrument Variables (IV) to control for the 
endogeneity for the Chinese price. Our specification test will control for these elements 
of competition to test for the significance and robustness of the Chinese price 
competition.  
4.3 Experiment and Data 
 
4.3.1 Sample Selection (Identify Common Set of Exports) 
 
 
This study will use trade data disaggregated at the HS6 level (HS92), as reported by the 
United States with China and Mexico as trading partners, where a product here is 
defined at the HS 6 digit code level. There are just over 5000 products defined at the 
HS6 digit level. As explained in the previous chapter, we use import data from the USA 
because import data are generally held to be more consistent than export data; 
developed countries have better data than developing countries; and by taking data on 
Mexico and China from a common source, we leave less room for differences in 
definitions, recording practices or units of measurement. 
 
Figure 4.3: US Imports from China and Mexico at the HS6 Level (1992-2008) 
 
 
 
 
Common Set of Products (Actual Competition) 
B 
Imports from 
China Only 
Imports from 
Mexico Only 
A 
C 
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We need to match all the common products that both China and Mexico exported to the 
US market in the period 1992 to 2008, represented by the Venn diagram in Figure 4.3. 
The overlap area ‘B’ is the set of common product headings for both countries at the 
HS6 level.  The areas A and C show the product years in which US imported from only 
Mexico and only China respectively. Our sample is an unbalanced panel, where new 
products are introduced while others are dropped in certain years. The unbalanced 
sample provides more observations and greater relevance,
6
 but we will do a separate 
exercise on the balanced set as well. 
 
The total number of products that the USA imported from China and Mexico for the 
period 1992-2008 is tabulated in Table 4.1. We get slightly fewer observations here as 
compared to the earlier chapters; we have to drop those product years with positive 
trade value but where quantity data are missing; we lose some observations in doing so. 
Here, we provide a brief summary of the export structures of both countries. China 
seemed to have increased the number of products it exported to the USA for every year 
until 2007. As we have discussed in the previous chapter, in part the recorded decline in 
2007 was due to the drop in the total number of product headings imported by the USA 
and also the concordances used to span the revision in the HS classification,
7
 but 
detailed matching across the revisions failed to eliminate it.  
 
The total number of common products that the USA imported from China and Mexico 
can be represented by ‘B’ in the Venn diagram in Figure 4.3. China’s trade overlap with 
Mexico has increased annually from 65% of Mexico’s total export headings to the USA 
in 1992 to around 93% in 2008. It would be unrealistic to have a 100% trade overlap 
between China and Mexico and it is approximately at maximum during the early 2000s. 
The high degree of trade overlap implies that China exports many of the products that 
Mexico also exports, assuming that the products are substitutes. The trade overlap 
indicates that both countries have very similar export structures. The trade overlap 
                                                 
 
6
 Refer to the discussion in Chapter 3 on the rationale for using the unbalanced sample (we lose too much 
data, especially on the manufactured products, if we use the clean sample). 
7
 For example, two HS02 headings, A and B, may be mapped onto one heading in HS07, say C.  If A 
greatly outweighs B in value, C is typically mapped back just to A, and B apparently disappears even if 
imports in 2006 (which are recorded in HS02) and in 2007 (recorded in HS07) are identical in every 
respect.   
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between Mexico and China’s exports to the USA is greater than one would expect to 
arise merely from chance, because they both export labour-intensive manufactures, but 
changes in the degree of overlap are almost perfectly predicted just from the changes in 
the numbers of products that the two countries export. There are slightly over 5000 
products at the HS6 digit level; China exported about 41% of them to the USA in 1992 
and Mexico 44%. If the product selection were random, we would expect to find about 
18% of products in common (which is the probability of both China and Mexico 
exported to the USA i.e. (0.44*0.41)), whereas the actual figure is about 29% (we take 
the common products divided by the total number of HS6 headings i.e. (1448/5032)). 
Repeating this exercise in all years, the correlation between the actual and expected 
overlaps is 99.4%. Thus, the export bundles of China and Mexico to the USA have not 
become materially more or less biased towards each other over the period 1992-2008.  
 
Given that neither China nor Mexico would be able to produce and export every HS6 
heading to an open market like the USA, the figures in Table 4.1 should help to assuage 
concerns that the results below are seriously disturbed by a selectivity problem. That is, 
even in 1992 there was not much possibility of selection by China of which products to 
export (or by Mexico), and by the middle of the period there was probably room for 
very little. In addition, the parallel between the overlap and the total numbers of 
products exported suggests that there was little spill-over from Mexico’s performance to 
China’s set of exported products. 
 
The common products are compiled for a particular year and appended together to form 
a panel data set, with the aim of investigating the response of Mexico’s prices to 
changes in Chinese prices.  
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Table 4.1: US Common Products from China and Mexico 
 
Product Headings Imported Ratio of Common to Total Imports 
 
From China From Mexico In Common 
Common/ 
China 
Common/ 
Mexico 
1992 2,108 2,239 1,448 0.69 0.65 
1993 2,261 2,339 1,551 0.69 0.66 
1994 2,380 2,458 1,691 0.71 0.69 
1995 2,552 2,805 1,970 0.77 0.70 
1996 2,630 2,954 2,091 0.80 0.71 
1997 2,784 2,983 2,224 0.80 0.75 
1998 2,865 2,975 2,267 0.79 0.76 
1999 2,990 3,012 2,373 0.79 0.79 
2000 3,635 3,459 2,922 0.80 0.84 
2001 3,659 3,407 2,893 0.79 0.85 
2002 3,781 3,389 2,983 0.79 0.88 
2003 3,858 3,365 3,011 0.78 0.89 
2004 3,944 3,400 3,070 0.78 0.90 
2005 4,073 3,445 3,164 0.78 0.92 
2006 4,180 3,412 3,178 0.76 0.93 
2007 3,821 3,151 2,940 0.77 0.93 
2008 3,603 3,011 2,783 0.77 0.92 
Total 55,124 51,804 42,559 
 
 
 
 
There are 55,124 product-year observations for China’s exports to the USA for the 
period 1992-2008, while there are 51,804 observations for Mexico’s exports in the same 
period.  Our selected sample for ‘actual competition’ between the two countries 
comprises a total of 42,559 observations. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel, where 
products are sometimes dropped from the selected sample ‘B’ when either of the two 
countries stopped exporting for a specific year or had not entered the market. Thus, 
there will be some products in which China competes with Mexico for a longer period 
of time and also some for shorter periods.   
 
4.3.2 Detecting Outliers 
 
The unit price for a product-year observation is obtained by dividing the total trade 
value in that product by the quantity of exports. The unit price for a product differs 
between countries. A product is identified at the HS6 digit level, while an observation is 
referred to as a product-year. The unit price data obtained at the product level are very 
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noisy due to measurement errors; however, they do provide us with an indication of the 
price movements for internationally traded goods.  
 
In the presence of outliers, the sample means and variances will be influenced, which 
can distort our estimates. Outliers can create a problem because we want our estimates 
to reflect the fitted data, not only single observations, which can have an influence on 
the fitted model. Thus, we need to purge our sample of the obvious outliers, as we found 
certain observations that have exceptional values. There is a worry when we try to 
detect outliers by using just the absolute relative price, as we might drop all 
observations within a product where China is always much cheaper or more expensive 
than Mexico. One way to get over this problem is to reference the distance of the 
relative price for each product from its median to the ratio of its interquartile range. This 
is better described in Equation (4.20): 
 
            
           
 
   
 
      
 
   
   
   
 
⁄                    (4.20) 
where X is the relative price 
    
 
    
 ⁄  , the median and the interquartile range         
       are product specific and allow for some products to have a much greater degree 
of natural variability than others. However, there is the problem of the denominator in 
Equation (4.20) having a zero value or a value very close to zero for some products, 
which will wrongly identify outliers. If the interquartile range has a value of zero or 
very close to zero, the ratio of the distance will be undefined or magnified. This 
problem can be overcome by adding one to the absolute value in both the numerator and 
denominator, as in Equation (4.21):  
 
          
     
 
      
 
     
   
   
 
⁄                                (4.21) 
The distance from the median relative to its interquartile range will help to detect 
outliers in this case. An observation that shows extreme variation can be potentially 
marked as outliers, but we need a cut-off point to identify them. We trimmed the top 1% 
and bottom 1% of the distribution of the observations. Altogether we dropped 852 
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observations and after getting rid of outliers our sample now consists of 41,707 
observations. The example in Table 4.2 shows a product (551219) that China and 
Mexico export to the US market for the following period. An observation is considered 
as an outlier if it is marked 0 in the outlier column in Table 4.2. There is only one 
observation within the product that was dropped, which is in 1992, as its deviation is in 
the top 1%. Although the value of the relative price is only 10 in 1992, this observation 
is dropped as the ratio of its deviation from the median to the interquartile range 
exceeds the threshold. 
 
 
Table 4.2: An Example of an Outlier for Product (551219) 
Period 
X (Relative 
Price) 
Median ln(1+(X/Median)) ln(1+(Q75/Q25)) Deviation 
Outlier (1% 
threshold) 
1992 10.06 0.55 2.97 1.29 2.30 0 
1995 2.24 0.55 1.63 1.29 1.26 1 
1996 4.10 0.55 2.14 1.29 1.66 1 
1997 0.50 0.55 0.65 1.29 0.50 1 
1998 1.10 0.55 1.11 1.29 0.86 1 
1999 0.55 0.55 0.69 1.29 0.54 1 
2000 0.57 0.55 0.72 1.29 0.56 1 
2001 0.40 0.55 0.55 1.29 0.43 1 
2002 0.10 0.55 0.17 1.29 0.13 1 
2003 0.77 0.55 0.88 1.29 0.68 1 
2004 0.47 0.55 0.62 1.29 0.48 1 
2005 0.42 0.55 0.57 1.29 0.44 1 
2006 0.48 0.55 0.63 1.29 0.49 1 
2007 0.11 0.55 0.18 1.29 0.14 1 
2008 1.00 0.55 1.04 1.29 0.81 1 
Note: Outliers are marked as 0 in the Outlier column  
*Product: Woven fabric >85% polyester staple fibres, (551219) 
 
 
4.3.3 Overview of China and Mexico’s Unit Prices 
 
Chinese products have gained increasing market share in the global market because of 
their lower prices, made possible by the increase in Chinese productivity. The average 
logged price levels for each year is shown in Figure 4.4. This is consistent with our 
hypothesis where the result shows that on average China’s prices were consistently 
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lower than that for Mexico for the period 1992-2008. We also compared their logged 
average unit price by sectors, and the results showed that Chinese products are 
consistently lower than Mexico almost all the sectors except for the primary sectors like 
animal products, vegetable products, chemical and mineral products sectors. As we are 
dealing with an unbalanced panel, the logged  average annual price is just an indicator 
of the average price of Chinese exports for each year.  
 
Figure 4.4:Average Annual  Price for China and Mexico in the USA 
 
 
We hypothesise that China’s price movement put pressure on other exporters. It is 
useful to see how prices evolve, especially in the case of Mexico. We will look at 
Chinese prices relative to Mexico in the US market. In order to compare relative prices 
across years, the starting year has been normalised to 1. The natural logs of the relative 
average price in each year can provide us with an illustration of whether Chinese 
products are actually getting cheaper over the years. The price pattern in Figure 4.4 is 
plotted based on Equation (4.22): 
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where    
  is China’s unit price and    
  is the unit price of Mexico denoted in US 
dollars.
8
 The subscripts   and   indicate the product and year respectively. The products 
are similar in years t and (t-1), but are different for (t-1) and (t-2). In Table 4.3, we show 
that the total number of common products is different for each year and that it is 
increasing until 2006, probably due to the HS07 revision problem. For each product, we 
took the relative price in period t relative to its price in period t-1. We then took the 
average of    
    
     
 ⁄
      
       
 ⁄
  for each year, which is shown in Column (2) in Table 4.3. 
This way, the relative price index is relative to the previous year, so we transform each 
year’s index by accumulating for every year to make it relative to base 1992; this is 
what we get in Column (3). 
 
Table 4.3: Relative Price Pattern 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year Price Pattern Accumulated Observations 
1992 - 0.00 0 
1993 -0.03 -0.03 1115 
1994 -0.02 -0.05 1205 
1995 0.10 0.05 1362 
1996 0.04 0.09 1564 
1997 0.07 0.16 1742 
1998 -0.09 0.07 1866 
1999 0.00 0.07 1925 
2000 0.01 0.08 2006 
2001 -0.06 0.02 2517 
2002 -0.08 -0.06 2544 
2003 -0.03 -0.08 2605 
2004 0.01 -0.08 2655 
2005 -0.04 -0.12 2745 
2006 -0.02 -0.14 2780 
2007 -0.01 -0.15 2594 
2008 0.09 -0.05 2441 
 
Chinese prices relative to Mexico’s are sketched in Figure 4.5. There is a downward 
trend in relative prices over the period, especially after 1997, an indicator that Chinese 
                                                 
 
8
 We use post-tariff price for the unit price. 
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prices are getting relatively cheaper, and supporting the case for China’s increasing 
market share over recent years. The relative price is seen to have experienced a sudden 
jump in the period 1994 to 1997, which includes the year in which the peso crashed and 
Mexico’s exports became relatively cheaper. From then on, relative prices exhibit a 
downward trend until 2007. Relative prices rose in 2008, which is probably due to the 
peso’s depreciation in 2008. Overall, we observe that over time Chinese prices are 
getting relatively cheaper compared to Mexico’s 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Chinese to Mexico Relative Prices (1992-2008) - Unbalanced Panel 
 
 
Other than the sudden jump in the relative price in 1994, we wanted to justify that the 
decline in relative prices is not due to the Chinese RMB fluctuation. As in Figure 4.5, 
the drop in relative price is more prevalent especially after 1997, we would expect a 
depreciation of the RMB during this period if the relative prices are driven by the 
exchange rates. However the RMB has remained relative stable since 1995 as shown in 
Figure 2.5 above, and has actually appreciated amidst pressure by the USA.  
 
Using the same equation specification as in Equation (4.22) and a sample size similar to 
Figure 4.5, we use the specification in Equation (4.23)  to derive China’s price pattern in 
order to check on how Chinese prices have evolved over time.   
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Similarly, we also derive the individual price pattern for Mexico. The individual price 
pattern for both countries is shown in Figure 4.6. Both countries show quite similar 
upward trends from 2002. If they both follow a trend, the first difference method will 
get rid of the specific time trend.  
 
Figure 4.6: Individual Price Patterns - Unbalanced Panel 
 
 
 
To check that the results are not driven merely by entry and exit, we included only those 
common products that are present in all years for both markets. The balanced set of 
products is very restricted and we are left with just 682 products that China and Mexico 
exported to the US market every year from 1992-2008. The price pattern for the 
balanced set is derived using Equation (4.22) but segmented to only the balanced panel. 
We get two slightly different relative price patterns when comparing the balanced panel 
and the unbalanced panel. Using the balanced panel sample in Figure 4.7, the relative 
price shows an increasing trend from 1994 until 2000; however, the Chinese price 
seems to have fallen relative to Mexico after 2000. Both samples show an initial upward 
trend in their relative price, but the unbalanced sample started to trend down from 1997, 
while the balanced sample shows a relative price drop starting from 2000. The 
difference in price pattern shows the problem with, which focused on the balanced panel 
alone. The balanced panel is a special set of products in which we are comparing similar 
products over 17 years. However, the relative unit price does provide us with some 
indication that Chinese prices are getting cheaper over time.  
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Figure 4.7: Chinese to Mexico Price Pattern (1992-2008) - Balanced Panel 
 
 
We look at some of the properties of the balanced sample in Appendix 4.1. The 
balanced set consists of only 11,594 observations, compared to 41,707 for the 
unbalanced set; this is only about 28% of the observations in the unbalanced set (the 
sample we will use for regression analysis). In Appendix 4.1, we also provide the share 
of trade in the balanced sample relative to the unbalanced sample. We find that the 
relative trade share is very high in the textiles and machinery sectors: 79% in the textiles 
sector and 57% in the machinery sector. It is not a surprise to see high volumes of trade 
in these two sectors, considering that the balanced sample is considered to include 
established products for China; these are also the country’s two dominant sectors. 
 
4.3.4 Tariff Data 
 
 
Because competition between Mexico and China takes place inside the USA’s territory 
rather than at its border, we need to consider tariff-inclusive prices and China and 
Mexico face different tariff regimes. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) was signed on 1 January 1994. From 1989 to 1993, US tariffs on Mexican 
goods were actually lower, on average, than tariff rates applied to imports from China 
(McDaniel and Agama, 2003). Even before NAFTA, Mexico had the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) benefits, but China did not have these from 1989 to 1993. 
The formation of NAFTA in 1994 was likely to create an adverse effect on China’s 
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terms of trade, because it reduced Mexico’s post-tariff prices. However, Chinese exports 
continued to grow rapidly even after NAFTA was formed, largely attributed to higher 
productivity growth. The relatively higher tariffs imposed on Chinese exports tend to 
make Chinese products relatively more expensive and will most probably affect 
Mexico’s prices. Our Bertrand-like model makes use of the changes in post-tariff prices, 
but we are also interested in checking whether decomposing tariffs and pre-tariff prices 
separately makes any difference to our estimates. Nonetheless, we need tariff data to 
create tariff-inclusive prices and to check whether the pass-through of tariffs is the same 
as that of price changes. 
 
The tariff schedule for NAFTA lists products according to the Harmonised System (HS) 
and specifies a phase-out period for each product. It classifies products into different 
categories and associates with each group its tariff phase-out period. The tariff phase-
out period took place immediately for certain categories, while the others were assigned 
equal-sized annual reductions of 5, 10 or 15 years. International trade data is recorded at 
the HS6 digit level; however, tariff data are set at the finer HS8 digit level and then 
aggregated to the HS6 level using simple averages. Also, the tariff data as obtained 
from TRAINS in the WITS online database are given at their native HS level, namely 
HS92, HS96, HS02 and HS07 classifications, and thus we need to transform all of them 
into a single HS92 classification by using the conversion tables obtained from 
Comtrade. We thus obtained the tariff rates for Mexico and China at the HS6 level at 
the HS92 revision after transformation.  
 
There are no tariff data for US imports under WITS for 1994, thus we look at the tariff 
data provided by Romalis for that specific year. Also, there seemed to be an error in the 
tariff rates from Comtrade for 1992, 1993 and 1998, which reported similar tariffs 
enjoyed by both China and Mexico, which is not correct, as Mexico had GSP status for 
1992 and 1993 and had NAFTA privileges by 1998. Thus we will obtain the tariff data 
for the selected years from data provided by Romalis. Tariff data provided by Romalis 
are only available for the period 1989 to 2001. The finest tariff data can be obtained 
from WITS at the HS6 level, while tariffs from Romalis are recorded at the HS8 level. 
Therefore, we need to convert the Romalis tariff data to the HS6 level by aggregation of 
its simple mean at the HS8 to HS6 level. 
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We use the simple annual average tariff rates as an indicator for the tariff levels faced 
by both countries. The simple average tariff rate for the period 1992-2008 is shown in 
Figure 4.8. The diagram shows the simple average tariff of all products from China and 
Mexico over the period 1992 to 2008. Mexico had also been granted a lower tariff than 
China even before NAFTA was introduced. Both are declining and the (average) wedge 
between the two is more or less constant after 1994. We need to transform the tariff data 
into a single HS92 classification in order to have panel data that will match our trade 
data. 
 
Figure 4.8: Simple Tariff Aggregation 
 
 
 
4.3.5 Problem with OLS 
 
We build a dataset to investigate how Mexico’s pricing responds to China’s pricing 
within products and over time. The panel data consist of many observations which are 
product specific and is an unbalanced panel, as there exist some products that are 
dropped every year while new products are developed.  If we were to run our sample 
data using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), we would have a pooled dataset that assumes 
there are no significant product-specific effects. However, our sample consists of many 
different products, for example hairclips and laptops that have many potential 
differences between them, for example different units and different average prices, so 
fixed effects regression is necessary. As products are different, we have to control for 
the variables which differ between products i.e. the different level of sophistication for 
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hairclips and laptops. In using fixed effects, we are only interested in the variables that 
change over time; variables which are time invariant will be differenced away. The 
fixed effects method categorises products into groups and takes into account the 
variation in the mean prices for each product while controlling for the different 
characteristics between products; this way we can get rid of the product specific omitted 
variable bias which could not be measured and is constant through time. The fixed 
effects method get rids of all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between products 
and hence restricts all actions in the regression to be within the product. This makes it 
more plausible to compare our basket of goods comprising many different products of 
different unit prices. In fixed effects panel regression, we constrain all products in our 
sample to share a common slope. With fixed effects, we are exploring the different 
relationships between deviations from means. Thus, we have eliminated the key source 
of omitted variable bias, namely, unobservable across-product differences in quality, 
sophistication and so on.  
 
The fixed effects method can be illustrated more clearly with an example, as follows: 
 
                                    (4.24) 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅           ̅   ̅    ̅                  (4.25) 
 
where     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅,     ̅, ̅ are the means for                respectively. 
 
By subtracting Equation (4.25) from Equation (4.24), we get the time-demeaned data 
for Y and X, as in Equation (4.26),  
 
   ̈      ̈     ̈                                (4.26) 
 
where    ̈        ̅  and     ̈        ̅ and similarly for    ̈ . 
 
Our panel specification is that there is an unobserved product-specific effect    that 
enters linearly in the regression. The time-invariant product-specific    are differenced 
out in the fixed effects regression. OLS regression will be unbiased under the 
assumption that the products   are mutually independent where     and    are 
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independent, and that             and             . However, the fixed effects 
model has differenced out the unobserved heterogeneity across products    and we no 
longer need the assumption that             to hold.  
 
As shown in Figure 4.9, if we had used OLS, all the observations would be pooled 
together and generate a regression of the dotted line through all those data points, which 
could be misleading. Both China and Mexico have high unit values for laptops and low 
unit values for hairclips. The regression using OLS is represented by the dotted line 
with the steeper slope. The fixed effects regressions for the three products are 
represented by the three bold regression lines with similar slopes.  
 
Figure 4.9: Problem using OLS 
 
 
There are other factors such as exchange rate fluctuations and political influences that 
could influence Mexican prices; these factors vary over time, but are constant across 
products. These factors are controlled for by including year dummies for each year for 
the period 1992-2008 in our specification. Thus we can control for across-product 
heterogeneity and time heterogeneity using the fixed effects model.  
 
Our data consist of the whole population and are not just a random sample selection; 
therefore it will not be appropriate to use random effects. We are trying to find China’s 
price effect on Mexico in the USA; this is not merely a random sample selection and 
thus it will not be appropriate to use random effects. If we were trying to find Chinese 
price effects in different cities in the USA, then we would quantify by using random 
effects. In this case, a city would be considered a random sample of all cities in the 
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population. However, in this study, we have identified the USA as the main market and 
we are interested to find the Chinese price effects on Mexico in this market. 
 
4.3.6 Summary Statistics 
 
We present the summary statistics of the variables included in our main equation in 
Table 4.4. After dropping outliers, we have 41,707 observations for our panel data from 
1992-2008. The summary statistics are all in demeaned log form and thus all variables 
at a product level have a zero mean. As part of doing a multiple regression analysis, we 
created a correlation matrix among the variables in the regression model. The standard 
deviations for the demeaned logs of the final and pre-tariff prices for China and Mexico 
both have quite similar values, of around 0.82 and 0.87 respectively, and there does not 
seem to be much variation for the tariff schedules for both countries. There appears to 
be little correlation between China’s tariffs and Mexico’s prices and also little variation 
in both countries’ tariff schedules. The most notable feature is the negative relationship 
between the Chinese tariff and the price variables. This implies that products tend to 
have higher than average tariffs when they have lower than average prices. The small 
variation in the tariffs plays a very insignificant role in the determination of prices, and 
also there exist many products with zero tariffs for both countries. The figures in Table 
4.4 are calculated using the full sample, which includes both zero and non-zero tariffs. 
 
Table 4.4:  Standard Deviations (SD) and Correlation Matrix 
 
S.D 
China 
Final 
Price 
Mexico 
Final 
Price 
China 
Pre-
tariff 
Price 
Mexico 
Pre-
tariff 
Price 
China 
Tariff 
Mexico 
Tariff 
China 
Shares 
Interaction 
 
  
Correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China Final Price 0.82 1 
       
Mexico Final 
Price 
0.87 0.51 1 
      
China Pre-tariff 
Price 
0.82 1.00 0.51 1 
     
Mexico Pre-tariff 
Price 
0.87 0.51 1.00 0.51 1 
    
China Tariff 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 1 
   
Mexico Tariff 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.38 1 
  
China Shares 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.08 -0.21 -0.17 1 
 
Interaction 0.30 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.19 -0.14 -0.12 0.73 1 
* Data is in logarithms and in demeaned form 
* Tariffs are calculated using (ln(1+t)) 
*Interaction = (Price*Shares) 
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4.4 Estimation and Results  
 
4.4.1 Results (Fixed Effects Regression) 
 
 
The results for the fixed effects regression are shown in Table 4.5, where we report 
these OLS panel regressions with fixed-year and product-specific effects. All three 
regressions are run using the mixed sample, where all variables are in natural 
logarithms. Column (1) shows the regression results on final prices for both Mexico and 
China. The final price product price comprises of the pre-tariff price and the tariff 
imposed on each product, which can be referred to in Equation (4.18) and (4.19). 
 
Table 4.5: Product Level Regression (Fixed Effects-OLS) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Mex. Final Price Mex. Pre-tariff Price Mex. Final Price 
China Final Price 0.53*** 
 
0.52*** 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
China Pre-tariff Price 
 
0.53*** 
 
  
(0.005) 
 
China Tariff 
 
-1.87*** 
 
  
(0.36) 
 
Mex. Tariff 
 
1.72*** 
 
  
(0.22) 
 
Interaction (final price*share) 
  
0.13*** 
   
(0.02) 
China share 
  
-0.27*** 
   
(0.062) 
R
2
 (Within) 0.267 0.27 0.268 
R
2
 (W’in excl time FEs) 0.256 0.259 0.259 
R
2
 (Between) 0.798 0.803 0.795 
R
2
 (Overall) 0.721 0.719 0.719 
N 41707 41707 41707 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Stars denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*)  
Numbers in parenthesis () represent the standard errors 
 
 
Our results show that if the Chinese price falls by 1%, Mexico will on average respond 
by dropping its price by 0.53%, which we term the Chinese price effect. That means 
that as the Chinese prices of exports to the USA have fallen, Mexico has gradually lost 
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competitiveness, partly by not matching fully the cuts through time. Our main 
statement, however, is that Mexico has also lowered its price if China’s products 
become cheaper. This can be represented graphically in Figure 4.4, where the relative 
China to Mexico price ratio has dropped since 1997. The R
2
 within shows that China’s 
final prices alone accounted for around 25.6% of the variation in Mexico's price, and it 
plus the year fixed effects accounted for 26.7%. The year effects (not reported) show an 
increasing trend, ranging from 0 in 1992 (omitted category) to 0.22 in 2007. 
 
Column 2 in Table 4.5 breaks up the final prices into their pre-tariff and tariff 
components. The Chinese price effect itself is still 0.53, but the coefficients on tariffs 
for both countries are implausibly large and perverse. This would suggest at first glance 
that Mexico’s prices tend to be affected more by tariff changes than by changes in 
Chinese prices, which is our main subject of interest. Taken at face value, they imply 
that an increase in the tariff on Chinese goods would drive down the Mexican price and 
an increase in the Mexican tariff drive it up. However, there are two factors that suggest 
this is not the right interpretation, namely the endogeneity in tariffs and the very slight 
variance in tariffs. There is a potential endogeneity issue whereby goods in which China 
becomes very competitive will tend to have slower and smaller declines in tariffs – 
again, see Table 4.4 above, where Chinese tariffs are negatively correlated with prices. 
Lardy (1995) commented on the increased level of protectionism in developed countries 
like the United States and the EU, imposing relatively higher tariffs on China’s products 
as Chinese import penetration increased rapidly in their market. The sort of goods that 
are particularly subject to higher tariffs are light manufactures like textiles, toys and 
clothing. However, we do not believe that the result regarding tariffs should be taken 
too seriously.  
 
Secondly, because we have product fixed effects, the coefficients are determined solely 
by inter-temporal variability, which is very small for the tariff series ─ Table 4.6 
implies that if we decompose the variance of final prices into pre-tariff price and a tariff 
component, as in Equation (4.27), the latter accounts for substantially less than 1% of 
the variation in final prices for Mexico; similarly for China. Because of the small 
variation in tariffs, the coefficients on tariffs should be interpreted with caution, 
although it is still useful to work out what is happening with them. 
 
120 
 
 
))1ln(,cov(ln2))1(ln()(ln)(ln
)1ln(lnln
PrPr
Pr
tariffPtariffVarPVarPVar
tariffPP
eTariffeTariffFinal
eTariffFinal


    (4.27)    
           
 
Var (Final Price) Var (Pre-tariff Price) Var (ln(1+tariff) 
Mexico 6.02 6.02 0.00 
China 4.62 4.62 0.00 
 
Our explanatory variables have a wide range of means and variances and hence it is not 
appropriate to compare coefficients directly. We need to standardise the demeaned 
variables to compare the relative importance of each explanatory variable. In Table 4.6, 
we show the regression results with standardised variables. The results show that 
Chinese price is the most important variable, with a standardised coefficient of 0.50, 
while tariffs carry little weight with a very low coefficient. We conclude that tariffs are 
a weak and potentially misleading determinant of the final price in our sample. Overall, 
therefore, while these results are a disappointment, we feel justified in setting them 
aside and proceeding with the analysis of final, tariff-inclusive prices. We thus dropped 
the tariff variable from the regression and instead focused on only the final prices. 
 
Table 4.6: Standardised Coefficients with Product Fixed Effects 
 
(1) 
 
Mex. Pre-tariff Price 
China Pre-tariff Price 0.50*** 
 
(0.0042) 
China Tariff -0.06*** 
 
(0.0057) 
Mex. Tariff 0.02*** 
 
(0.0023) 
Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*)  
 
 
Going back to our main regression results in Table 4.5, we inserted China shares in the 
USA       
 ) and also the interaction term (       
      
   as additional controls in Column 
3. Our model assumes a duopoly in the US market, but in reality there will be other big 
players exporting there. We accounted for the Chinese influence by controlling for 
Chinese import shares (   
   in the US market. China's price influence might presumably 
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be greater for products with a greater share in the US market; we call this the interaction 
term. This is represented in Equation (4.28) by the interaction of the Chinese import 
share with Chinese prices (     
     
  , where the coefficient    measures the marginal 
effect of trade shares on the Chinese price effect (interaction term). 
     
           
         
      
         
                   (4.28) 
     
         
 (        
 )       
                             (4.29) 
 
In Equation (4.30), the Chinese price effect on Mexico's price as represented is    plus 
the size of its trade shares. If      and is statistically significant, this implies a 
stronger Chinese price effect as China's export share increases.  
 
    
 
    
 ⁄           
           (where                              (4.30) 
 
The (partial) coefficient on the trade share,   , is negative and significant at -0.27, 
suggesting a modest share effect that, in fact, has eluded many previous commentators 
(see the literature survey above) – where China has a 50% market share, Mexican prices 
are, ceteris paribus, 13.5% lower than when the Chinese share is 1%. More 
interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant at 0.13. Thus, if     
     the Chinese price effect is just 0.52, whereas if 
    
       it increases to 0.59. This is not a large increase, although it is in the expected 
direction. This would suggest that China's price effect will be stronger in the 
electronics/machinery sector and miscellaneous manufactures, as these are the main 
export sector for China. Considering the relative sizes of the main Chinese price effect 
and the interaction, this suggests that competition from China is not merely a matter of 
market penetration, but also has a large existential component – as soon as China 
appears in the market, Mexican producers find their pricing discretion curtailed.  
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
 
4.4.2 Endogeneity: Instrumental Variables (IV) 
 
The Bertrand model indicates that there might be some kind of reverse causation in our 
model specification, where    equally depends on   . Moreover, China, being a 
relatively new player, might take into account its competitor’s existing product price 
before it priced its own product. There exists endogeneity in Chinese prices and the use 
of IV provides a tool to extract the variation in the endogenous variables. The IV must 
have the properties of both relevance and exogeneity. It has to be an important 
determinant of Chinese price (relevance) and can have an effect on Mexico’s price only 
through its effect on China’s price.   
 
4.4.2.1 Choice of Instrumental Variables (IV) 
 
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, China’s output growth is due to increases in 
productivity, capital accumulation, increase in FDI and the reallocation of labour to 
manufacturing industries. China is not at the frontier of technology innovation during 
the early stages of growth, and even now is depending on the transfer of technology 
from more developed countries. The basic story of China’s growth is that via 
technological catch-up, capital investment and the absorption of surplus labour, the 
country’s capacity to produce has increased immensely, faster than for any other 
country over our sample period; indeed, this is the big shock in the context of 
competition for export markets. Moreover, we argue that China’s growth is quite 
independent of anything Mexico might have done or not done and of issues pertaining 
to individual markets. Thus, the most natural instruments for Chinese export prices 
would be factors causing output shocks at home; that is, productivity, capital investment 
and perhaps even employment. However, the data are not available at anything 
resembling the level of disaggregation that we have in trade data and so we also need to 
consider a series of instruments based on trade data.  
 
Productivity 
 
China’s productivity level can be used as an IV for the unit price of its exports. As seen 
in a study by the Asian Productivity Organization (2001), China’s productivity 
performance (TFP) was increasing at a rate of 3.1% per year during 1970–2006. This is 
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outstanding considering that the growth rate for Taiwan (ROC) and South Korea is 
estimated at around 1.6% and 0.5% respectively during the same period. Productivity is 
a measure of the amount of output we get for each unit of input. Theoretically, the 
productivity level is assumed to be negatively correlated with unit price in China. In 
terms of the exogeneity issue, we assume that Chinese productivity will have an effect 
on Mexican prices only through its influence on Chinese prices. There is an argument 
that there may be common productivity shocks where the advancement in technology 
influences prices in both China and Mexico, but we do not find it persuasive. First, any 
year-specific but cross-product shock will be picked up by the year’s fixed effects. 
Second, for developing countries technological improvement comes mainly from catch-
up, not from the development of new technologies, and thus is much more likely to be 
determined by local rather than global factors. Third, the factors behind China’s 
increasing productivity are widely believed to be internal, such as high investment rates 
(including FDI), privatisation and a shift of labour out of agricultural work.   
 
(Holz, 2006) found the total factor productivity level for 39 different sectors of the 
Chinese economy from 1994 until 2002. The productivity data as provided by Holz 
(2006) do not contain all the individual industrial sectors, but only Directly Reporting 
Industrial Enterprises (DRIEs). The productivity levels for the 39 DRIEs are then 
matched according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) of 
Economic Activities, Revised Version 3.1, based on the closest similarity by description 
of the sectors involved. After obtaining the Chinese productivity level at the sectoral 
level, we need to convert the industry code to the HS92 6 digit level using the 
concordance table of trade data provided by UN Comtrade. This process is noisy and we 
lost quite a number of observations during the conversion process, as the DRIEs for 
China do not cover all the products in ISIC, and also because limited data is available in 
terms of productivity-level data from 1994 until 2002. For all these reasons, 
productivity is not such a good instrument in practice as it is in theory. 
 
Sectoral Mean Prices as IV 
 
We use Chinese sectoral mean unit prices to represent sectoral productivity, on the 
assumption that products in a sector share some productivity shocks and that individual 
product shocks are netted out by aggregation. This is an alternative to sectoral 
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productivity, but generates far more observations. Bekker and Ploeg (2005) mention 
that grouping with the aim of generating instruments has also been used in models with 
panel data. Suppose that there are 100 products in Sector 1 with their own individual 
unit price, 
10021 ~, PPP , then our instrument for each product can be defined as 



ij
ji PP 99
1 , which is the average unit price of the 99 remaining products in that 
particular sector. Using the HS2 classification, we categorise our products into 97 
different categories identified by their first two digit HS coding and calculate the 
average unit price for all products in that particular sector.  
 
Chinese Import Price to Other Destinations as IV 
 
Other IVs that we will be using are the Chinese price to other markets where Mexico 
has little trade. Chinese export prices differ across individual country markets, but can 
be assumed to be correlated with each other through their underlying production and 
productivity shocks. To avoid the concern that China’s influence in country A affects 
Mexico’s price in the US market via Mexico’s exports to country A, we chose markets 
in which Mexico is a small player. Japan and Korea have this feature; that is, where on 
average about 1.5% and 0.3% of Mexico’s exports go to Japan and Korea respectively. 
There is also very little export overlap between China and Mexico in these two external 
markets. Japan imported more than 60,000 product-years from China over the period 
and Mexico participated in only about 23% of these. Korea imported more than 58,000 
product-years from China over the same period, whereas Mexico only participated in 
about 10% of these exports to the Korean market. Also, as these two markets are also 
major export markets for China, we will be able to obtain more observations to 
instrument for Chinese prices in the USA. There will be some cases where the units of 
measurement used on each product differ between reporting countries. However, since 
we are using natural logarithms and fixed effects, there is no problem in comparing 
products that are measured with different units. These countries are considered 
developed and rich, so product quality differences are less likely to contaminate the data 
as applied to the USA. 
 
Overall, we believe that we can reasonably claim that Japanese and Korean import 
prices from China have the properties of both relevance and exogeneity necessary to be 
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effective instruments. However, there will still exist outliers for the unit price as 
reported by Japan and Korea, which we identify by using the same method we used for 
detecting outliers for the case of China and Mexico. 
 
China’s Export Price to the USA 
 
China's exports to the USA are also recorded bilaterally by the Chinese and US 
authorities and these sources do not completely match (Rozanski and Yeats, 1994; 
Ferrantino et al., 2012). We will also use the unit price of exports to the USA as 
reported by China to instrument for Chinese prices reported by the USA. Although 
informative, the unit price data at the HS6 level as reported by the USA are noisy ─ 
subject to many measurement errors. As mentioned in the previous chapter, China’s 
reduction in the VAT rebate on exports increases the incentive to under-report at the 
Chinese border to avoid paying VAT. There is concern of over-reporting at the US 
border as multinationals try to avoid paying higher corporate income tax. The objective 
in this case is to reduce the effect of measurement errors in the data series. Nonetheless, 
as long as the errors in the two series are not perfectly correlated, we can expect to gain 
some benefit by using the Chinese data as an instrument. Again, we have to eliminate 
some outliers.    
 
Endogeneity of China’s Market Share 
 
A second potential source of endogeneity is China’s share of imports into the USA, 
which might be affected by the price of Chinese exports relative to other exports, 
including those from Mexico. A natural instrument for this would be China’s share to 
other markets. As before, it is desirable that there be no risk that the price of Mexico’s 
exports to the USA be affected directly by this share, but the possible causal link seems 
less direct than for prices per se – from China’s share to Mexico’s share to Mexico’s 
price in that market to Mexico’s price to the USA. In this case, therefore, given that 
market shares may well be influenced by distance, we have opted to use China’s share 
of EU imports as the instrument rather than its share of Korean or Japanese imports. 
The share of Mexico’s exports to the EU25 averaged just around 4.5% over the period 
1992-2008.  
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4.4.3 Fixed Effect Regression – with Instrumental Variables (IV) 
 
Our regression thus consists of up to three endogenous independent variables, namely 
Chinese prices (     
  , the Chinese share (   
   and the interaction of Chinese prices 
with its import shares (     
     
  . We experimented with five different instruments for 
     
 , a single instrument for share    
  and for (     
     
   using the products of the 
chosen instruments. The instruments for each of the endogenous variables are shown in 
Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7:  Endogenous Variables and Its Possible IVs 
Endogenous Variables Possible IVs 
China Price 
China Productivity, Sectoral Price, Japan Price, Korea Price, China 
Reported Price to USA (up to 5 instruments) 
ChinaPrice*ChinaShares 
5 instruments if we cross multiply (price instrument and share 
instruments) 
China Shares EU25 (1 instrument) 
 
The estimation results in Table 4.8 are done using 2 Stage Least Squares (2SLS), 
whereby each endogenous regressor is related to all three instrumental variables and the 
exogenous variables in the second-stage equation, namely the year dummies and fixed 
effects. The results for the simple bivariate regression with different instruments for 
Chinese prices are summarised in Table 4.8. The Chinese price effect is significant and 
exceeds the OLS estimate for every scenario when using Instrumental Variables. 
However, using Chinese industrial productivity from Holz (2006), theoretically the best 
instrument, has a very weak first-stage estimate with an F-statistic (7.55), with an    of 
0.004. Moreover, the Hausman endogeneity test has a p-value of 0.29, which suggests 
that we might be better off with OLS estimates rather than IV estimates. The reason is 
very probably the limited coverage of the productivity data – only 39 industries over 11 
years, which not only gives us limited variation across products, but a huge loss in the 
number of observations, which falls from around 42,000 to about 19,000. 
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All the remaining instruments, which are based on trade data, have the property of 
relevance, as indicated by their high first-stage F statistics, suggesting that weak 
instruments are not a problem, with one exception – Korea reported prices have a 
strongly significant Hausman statistic. The results obtained motivated the use of IV. 
Using the sectoral mean prices as instruments is attractive in that we lose very few 
observations and the test statistics are strong. It gives a much larger estimate of the 
Chinese price effect of 0.76, but there may be residual doubts about the exogeneity of 
the instrument in this case. 
 
Table 4.8: Instrumental Variables Estimates (Basic Equation) 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
Price Instrument is: Productivity 
Sector Average 
Price 
Japan Price Korea Price 
China  Export 
Price 
China Final Price 0.74*** 0.76*** 0.58*** 0.54*** 0.61*** 
 
(0.22) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
Hausman Test 0.2922 0 0.04 0.1646 0 
R
2
 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.22 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-Stage Equations 
Instrumental Price -0.37*** 0.58*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.21*** 
 
(0.09) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
F Statistic 
F(  9, 15894)= 
7.55 
F( 17, 37355)= 
231.69 
F( 17, 31532)= 
88.09 
F( 17, 29541)= 
68.75 
F( 17, 32420) 
=119.87 
R
2
 0.004 0.095 0.045 0.038 0.059 
N 19069 41278 35087 33100 35966 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity , 
 Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*)  
 
When we instrument with Japan, Korea or China reported prices, the sample sizes are 
reduced slightly because we can use only product-years that are not only sold by both 
Mexico and China in the USA, but also by China in the ‘instrumental’ country. Thus, 
for example, when using the prices of Chinese exports reported by Japan, there are only 
34,986 out of the 41,707 product-year observations that Japan reported on imports from 
China. The estimates of the Chinese price effect in these equations are all positive and 
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statistically significant at 0.58, 0.54 and 0.61 respectively, not too different from the 
OLS estimates, and for two of the three, the Hausman test suggests that endogeneity 
does indeed need to be addressed using IV regression. The OLS regression is more 
efficient than the IV estimator if endogeneity is not a problem. However, in the presence 
of endogeneity, OLS estimates are biased and not consistent, hence we need to correct 
for the bias using IV regression. Under the Hausman test, the null hypothesis is that 
OLS estimates are efficient; by rejecting the null hypothesis, the tests support the use of 
IV. 
Table 4.9 reports the corresponding equations where China’s share in the USA and the 
interaction terms are also taken as endogenous. This entails a further loss of 
observations, because now we need to take into account China’s exports to the EU as an 
added necessary condition. The first-stage equations regress each potentially 
endogenous variable on all instruments relevant for the column, but for reasons of space 
we report only the coefficients for each variable on ‘its’ instrument; that is, the example 
given below for using Japan’s reported price as the instrument for Chinese price (all 
prices are in natural logarithms): 
    
        
             
          
          
                  (4.31a) 
 
    
      
         
             
          
          
         (4.31b) 
 
    
         
             
          
          
                  (4.31c) 
 
In the simplified table below, we report    for (4.31a),    for (4.31b) and    for (4.31c) 
for their first-stage regression.  
 
The productivity instrument again is not statistically significant and hereafter we, 
regretfully, drop it from the analysis
9
. For the other instruments the estimate of the 
Chinese price effect declines slightly relative to the simple equation, except when using 
sectoral price; the share effects are negative, as expected in theory and similar to the 
OLS results; and the interactions are generally positive but insignificant. These results 
suggest that China’s presence in the US market for the common set of products has a 
direct effect on the Mexican price, and that Mexican producers find their pricing 
                                                 
 
9
 Using productivity, the first stage are statistically significant, which might suggest that the fit is awful 
and the first stage wild. 
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discretion limited by the behaviour of Chinese prices. According to the results using the 
Japanese price as instrument and ignoring the (insignificant) interaction term, when 
China enters a market with, say, a 5% market share, Mexican producers reduce their 
prices by 3.3% (-0.67*5%) and then react to declines in Chinese prices with an 
elasticity of approximately half. If Chinese prices are falling by 3% per annum, it is the 
latter effect, which is based on the competitive threat posed by China more than its 
actual presence that comes to dominate. In this case, the Chinese price effect ranges 
from 0.54 when there is no Chinese presence to 0.61 when it has a 10% market share. 
This is not a large increase, but China’s market shares do appear to have an impact on 
Mexico’s prices. 
Table 4.9: Instrumental Estimates – Full Equation 
Price 
Instrument is: 
Productivity 
Sector Average 
Price 
Japan Price Korea Price China  Export Price 
China Final Price 0.80 0.78*** 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.61*** 
 
(0.73) (0.018) (0.035) (0.047) (0.026) 
Price*Share 11.7 -0.11 0.076 0.077 0.027 
 
(61.8) (0.084) (0.065) (0.072) (0.056) 
China Share -28.1 -0.16 -0.67*** -0.63** -0.52*** 
 
(144.9) (0.26) (0.22) (0.25) (0.19) 
Hausman 0.01 0 0 0 0 
   -4.07 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.22 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First-Stage Regression 
Instrumental Price -0.41*** 0.61*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.22*** 
 
(0.092) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Instrumental Price*Share 0.12 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.63*** 0.66*** 
 
(0.12) (0.019) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Instrumental Share 0.42*** 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.69*** 
 
(0.015) (0.16) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
F Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Instrumental Price 6.92 1176.6 330.73 218.05 521.8 
Instrumental Price*Share 163.44 2169.49 2476.97 2675.74 2509.65 
Instrumental Share 310.52 2254.52 1892.43 1733.02 2081.98 
R
2
 0.005 0.101 0.046 0.038 0.061 
N 18255 39777 34404 32467 35267 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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The Chinese price effects are a little higher in the IV regressions than the OLS results. 
One possibility is that the IVs correct for errors in observation and hence remove some 
attenuation bias. Another, however, is that instrumenting reduced the sample sizes in a 
non-random way. Hence, in Table 4.10 we provide OLS estimates based on exactly the 
same samples as the corresponding IV equations in Table 4.9. The results are quite clear 
that the sample does not account for the differences in the estimated price effects – the 
OLS results on reduced samples are very similar to those in Table 4.9 (full sample) 
above. On the other hand, it is equally plain that the sample does explain a good deal of 
the difference in the estimated share and interaction effects. On the reduced samples, 
even the OLS estimates find negative share effects, albeit of smaller magnitudes than 
the IV results, and positive interaction effects.  
Table 4.10: FE Regressions Using the Same Samples as Table 4.9 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
Price 
Instrument is: 
Productivity 
Sector Average 
Price 
Japan Price Korea Price 
China  
Export Price 
China Final Price 0.51*** 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.47*** 0.51*** 
 
(0.0080) (0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0059) 
Price*Share 0.32*** 0.12*** 0.096*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 
 
(0.044) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) 
China Share -0.46*** -0.23*** -0.12* -0.22*** -0.21*** 
 
(0.13) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.065) 
   0.26 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.23 
N 18255 39777 34404 32467 35267 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The results discussed above use single instruments for each of the endogenous variables 
and hence preclude us from testing their exogeneity. To do this we combined 
instruments – at the cost of further reductions in sample size, again – and report the 
corresponding estimates in Table 4.11. The exogeneity condition implies that the 
instruments used are uncorrelated with the error term, an essential condition for the 
validity of the IVs. To do this test, we use the Sargan statistics, where the joint null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid. The test shows that the sector average price 
instrument does not meet the exogeneity requirements, but that the remaining three 
price instruments – prices reported by Japan, Korea and China and China’s share in the 
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EU – apparently do. Eventually we get rid of the sector means as a possible IV as 
averaging across the very different products for each sector might seem inconsistent 
with the product level analysis. This is the set that we take as our definitive set of 
instruments for the rest of the analysis, although its results are not much different from 
those using the same instruments individually. 
 
Table 4.11: Instrumental Estimates with Over-identification 
Dependent variable is Mexico’s price 
 Simple Bivariate Regression Full Equation 
Instrument 
sets: 
Sector average, 
Japan price, 
Korea price, 
China price, 
EU share 
Japan price, 
Korea price, 
China price, 
EU share 
Sector average, 
Japan price, 
Korea price, 
China price, 
EU share 
Japan price, 
Korea price, 
China price, 
EU share, 
China Final Price 0.68*** 0.57*** 0.68*** 0.54*** 
 
(0.015) (0.024) (0.018) (0.027) 
Price*Share   0.0086 0.080 
 
  (0.051) (0.054) 
China Share   -0.26 -0.51*** 
 
  (0.19) (0.20) 
Sargan  Test 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.58 
Hausman 0 0 0 0 
   0.21 0.22 0.20 0.22 
N 28362 28391 28122 28151 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Our results show that the Chinese price effect is quite similar for the simple bivariate 
and full equation regression. Using combined instruments, our results are quite similar 
to that using separate individual IVs. Again, the interaction term is not significant and 
China’s increased influence in the USA keeps Mexico’s price down.  
 
4.4.4  Technology Intensity Classification by OECD 
 
We constrain all products to have the same slope (price effect) when we run a fixed 
effects regression on the whole product set. By categorising products, we postulate 
different price effects for each category as indicated by their technological intensity. 
The technological index developed by OECD classifies products according to their level 
of technology intensity: ‘low technology’, ‘medium low technology’, ‘medium high 
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technology’ and ‘high technology’ (Hatzichronoglou, 1997). These sectors are classified 
accordingly by indicators based on the amount of RD expenditure as determined by the 
OECD, and we classify our products according to the different groups, as in Table 4.12. 
According to the OECD classification, most of the products (84%) at the HS6 level
10
 
are classified into the low technology and medium high technology sectors. Only 6% of 
products are classified into the high technology sector, while about 11% of products are 
classified as non-industrial.  
 
Table 4.12: OECD Classification - Technological Classification 
Description Products Percentage 
Non-industrial 508 11 
Low Technology 1,594 33 
Medium Low Technology 802 17 
Medium High Technology 1,602 34 
High Technology 265 6 
Total 4,771 
 
Source: (OECD, STAN Indicators Database) 
 
We classify China and Mexico's common exports into five different sectors, 
characterised by their technology intensity, to find the total number of product-years for 
each group, as in Table 4.13. Most of the common exports between China and Mexico 
are classified in the low technology (35%), medium low technology (20%) and medium 
high technology (32%) sectors. To allow for different effects for each sector, we assign 
one dummy for each of the five OECD sectors, construct the interaction term of the 
sector dummy with each of the three explanatory variables and allow all coefficients to 
vary by group.  
 
Table 4.13: Common Exports by OECD Classification (1992-2008) 
 
Product-Years Percentage 
Non-industrial 2808 7 
Low Technology 14666 35 
Medium Low Technology 8407 20 
Medium High Technology 13381 32 
High Technology 2409 6 
Total 41671 100 
 
                                                 
 
10
 HS92 system. 
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Equation (4.33) shows the full regression specification for incorporating time dummies 
and their interaction term,   , is a dummy variable that equals 1 for each OECD sector 
(k=1,..,5) and is coded 0 otherwise. The coefficient     represents the Chinese price 
effect for the five different sectors.     and     are the interaction and share effect for 
each sector. Doing this, we come up with a total of fifteen endogeneous variables, five 
different classifications for each of the three explanatory variables.  
 
      
    ∑     (      
    )  ∑     (       
        
 )      ∑     (      
    )              
(4.33) 
 
The IV regression results for the simple bivariate and full regression are shown in Table 
4.14. The instruments we will be using will be a combination of Chinese prices reported 
by China, Japan and Korea. For the simple bivariate regression, the Chinese price effect 
has a positive and significant effect on the Mexican price for all sectors, where the 
effect is strongest for the low technology (0.8) sector and is declining with the level of 
product sophistication. The low technology sectors are mainly labour intensive and 
China is still a labour abundant country.  
 
The coefficients for medium low, medium high and high technology products are 0.53, 
0.37 and 0.21 respectively. The smaller coverage of the common exports in the high 
technology sector at 6% of the total sample; according to the OECD technology 
classification, only 6.4% of total products are classified in this sector. The Chinese price 
effect is relatively smaller in the more sophisticated sector, which is to be expected, as 
China’s advantage is still in labour-intensive industries. Another factor is that more 
sophisticated products are generally believed to have lower substitution between 
varieties. The Chow test (not reported) has a value of 136.9 and so indicates that the 
differences in the Chinese price effect are statistically significantly across groups. The 
weaker effect in the non-industrial sector is also expected, as China’s exports are 
stronger in manufactured products.  
 
It would seem that China has now ventured into higher end manufacturing however its role 
is mainly involved in the process of assembly due to its cheaper labour costs. Although the 
share of processing trade in total exports has declined for the low, medium low and medium 
high technology sector, its shares have risen in for the high technology sector, where its 
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share has risen to above 85% since 2000  (Fu, 2011). Fu (2011) also found approximately 
90% of China’s exports in the technology intensive sector exports are in fact controlled by 
the MNEs instead of the local enterprises. The involvements of MNEs have led to positive 
FDI spillovers domestically but have discouraged export participation from local firms. In 
the processing trade system, productivity plays a lesser role as the MNEs are responsible for 
the marketing and sale in the destination market. Hence we would expect to see a lower 
Chinese price influence in the more sophisticated sectors. 
 
Table 4.14: IV Regression by Technology Classification 
Dependent variable is Mexico’s price
 
(1) Simple Bivariate Regression (2) Full Regression 
OECD Sector 
 
Combined Instruments Combined Instruments 
Non-industrial China Price Effect 0.22* 0.16 
  
(0.13) (0.16) 
Low Technology China Price Effect 0.86*** 0.83*** 
  
(0.028) (0.035) 
Medium Low Technology China Price Effect 0.53*** 0.49*** 
  
(0.056) (0.095) 
Medium High Technology China Price Effect 0.37*** 0.35*** 
  
(0.041) (0.048) 
High Technology China Price Effect 0.21** 0.39*** 
  
(0.089) (0.11) 
 
Sargan Test 0.2 0.00046 
 
Hausman 0 0 
 
  
 
0.21 0.21 
 
Year Fixed Effect similar for all sector similar for all sector 
 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
 
N 28389 28149 
*Combined instruments are Japan price, Korea price, China price. 
 
For the full regression in Column (2), China’s influence over Mexico’s price is 
insignificant for the non-industrial sector; however, its effect is quite similar to the 
results obtained for the simple regression for the other manufacturing sector. The 
interaction term and Chinese shares (not reported) are mostly insignificant when using 
the full regression. The Sargan statistic does not satisfy the exogeneity condition, 
possibly because there might be too many endogenous variables: fifteen by categorising 
products according to OECD technology intensity, which might cast doubt on the 
validity of the Sargan test of exogeneity. A potential problem is that the bias of 
instrumental variable estimators increases with the number of instruments, irrespective 
of whether they are weak or strong instruments.  
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Another way to get different effects across sectors is to group products at the HS2 digit 
level, where we classify all the products into 15 different sectors. The regression results 
are shown in Appendix 4.2, where for the full regression we only allowed the Chinese 
price effect to have different slopes across sectors, but constrained the interaction and 
Chinese shares to be similar across all 15 sectors, otherwise we could end up with too 
many endogenous variables. The Chinese price influence is mostly in the right direction 
and significant for the manufacturing sectors. The effect for non-manufacturing sectors 
like animals and vegetables is insignificant; the transport sector also reported 
insignificant results for the Chinese price effect. Surprisingly, the IV regression shows 
an insignificant effect for the footwear sector and this might indicate completely 
different products between the two countries: China dominated the footwear market and 
had an average product share of 66% in 2008, whereas Mexico’s average product share 
was less than 5% for the set of common products. The Chinese share and the interaction 
term, although not significant, show the expected influence in the right direction on 
Mexico.  
 
4.4.5 Rauch  Classification 
 
Another way to seek heterogeneity is to categorise products according to the Rauch 
classification. The Rauch Classification maps the SITC4 digit level into three different 
groups of products, namely differentiated, homogeneous and referenced (Rauch, 1999). 
We need to convert the data to the HS 6 digit level following the concordance table as 
provided by Comtrade. Rauch defined homogeneous products as those with prices set 
on organised exchanges: sugar, oil and so on. Goods that do not have their prices set but 
are assigned a benchmark price are defined as referenced. Finally, products without a 
reference price and whose price is not set in the exchange market because of their 
immanent features are labelled differentiated. Rauch suggested two definitions, a 
conservative and a liberal one, in order to account for the difference in product 
classification. Liberal pricing maximises the number of products that are categorised as 
homogeneous, while conservative pricing minimises the number of products. There are 
relatively fewer products classified as homogeneous under the conservative system as 
compared to the liberal definition. Under the liberal regime, we found that about 70% of 
China’s products in direct competition with Mexico are categorised as differentiated 
products while about 5% are categorised as homogeneous products. Kang (2008) found 
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that China’s export structure is mainly concentrated in differentiated products. If 
products are homogeneous, competition is based strongly on pricing and we would 
expect tougher competition between countries. Homogeneous products tend to have a 
larger elasticity of substitution as their prices are set at organised exchange market and 
hence exports tend to be weaker between distant countries.  We report the regression 
results using for the liberal classification in Table 4.15. 
 
Table 4.15: Rauch Classification: Liberal (Simple Specification Regression) 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Instrument is Japan Price Korea Price China  Export Price 
 China’s Price       
(Homogeneous) 0.87*** 0.81*** 0.92*** 
 (0.061) (0.049) (0.046) 
(Referenced) 0.49*** 0.40*** 0.33*** 
 (0.082) (0.080) (0.062) 
(Differentiated) 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.65*** 
 (0.036) (0.049) (0.031) 
Hausman 0 0 0 
   0.23 0.21 0.22 
N 33642 31743 34437 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Theory would suggest that the degree of substitution to be smaller between two 
countries for products which are differentiated (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). China’s main 
export sector is in manufactures (differentiated products) and its market presence is 
considerably weaker for primary products (homogeneous). For differentiated products, 
we have argued that Chinese and Mexico’s products are close substitutes as they are 
both middle income countries; both countries compete in terms of pricing in the US 
market. This is consistent with the results which show that the Chinese price effect is 
around 0.54 to 0.65 for differentiated products; which is smaller than the estimates for 
homogeneous products. For homogeneous products, China’s price elasticity is around 
0.9 i.e. when China’s price drop by 10%, Mexico will retaliate by reducing its price by 
around 9%. The higher price elasticity for homogeneous products is as expected 
because of less scope for product differentiation i.e. we would expect commodities like 
sugar to have a higher degree of substitutability. China’s export success are mostly in 
manufactures and our results show that the cheaper Chinese products have constrained 
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the Mexico’s pricing, supporting the hypothesis that products from these countries are 
seen as close substitutes. The Hausman test again supports the use of IV regression. The 
Chow test (not reported) shows that the Chinese price effect is statistically significantly 
different across groups. 
 
4.4.6 Non-Tariff Barriers 
 
 
China not only faced relatively higher tariffs than Mexico, but the USA also imposed 
other restrictions on imports from China, particularly through non-tariff barriers (NTB). 
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) is one example of an NTB in which we are 
interested, under which developed countries like the USA set quotas on textile imports 
from developing countries like China. The impact of the MFA was seen as a way to 
raise the domestic price of clothing by limiting imports from cheaper developing 
countries. Another impact of MFA came from regional trade agreements like NAFTA, 
under which Mexico indirectly benefited from US quotas on its competitors. The quotas 
removed the competitive threat, because Chinese exports into the USA cannot increase 
beyond a certain amount. Under the Uruguay Round, the MFA was replaced by the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) in 1995. This started the process of 
gradually removing the quotas on textiles and clothing products in four phases, as 
shown in Table 4.16.  
 
Table 4.16: Phase-out Schedule 
Phase Starting Date Share of Export Volume 
Integrated 
Increase in Quota Growth Rate 
1 January 1, 
1995 
16 16 
2 January 1, 
1998 
17 25 
3 January 1, 
2002 
18 27 
4 January 1, 
2005 
49 n/a 
Source: US Office of Textile and Apparel (OTEXA) 
 
The abolition of quotas on textiles was completed in 2005. The importing country has 
the power to choose which set of products to include for each phase-out period, as long 
as it complies with the shares of its export volume integrated where generally the least 
sensitive products were integrated.  
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The product headings that were dropped off the quota list according to each phase were 
obtained from the US Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA). Suppose that a product 
coded 420292 is in phase 3; we drop this product for all years prior to 2002, as the USA 
imposed a restriction on this product. Any quotas imposed on this product will be lifted 
starting in 2002. However, as China was not a member of the WTO until December 
2001, it was not entitled to the first two phases of the schedule, but quotas were only 
lifted after 2002. The data for each phase-out are available from OTEXA at the HTS 10 
digit level. By matching all products for the four phases to the HS6 digit level, we 
dropped over 5000 product-years. The non-tariff barrier might cause a bias in the 
Chinese price effect, as Mexico is protected by the MFA and hence its prices will not be 
very responsive to the predicted Chinese price in the textiles industry. The other NTB 
that we managed to find is that related to anti-dumping duties, and we dropped a further 
200 product-years from our sample. After cleaning out the sample for products 
associated with NTB, we ran our IV regression and the results are shown in Table 4.17. 
 
Table 4.17: IV Regression (Remove Non-Tariff Barriers) 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price
 
 
(1) Simple Regression (2) Full Regression 
 
Combined Instruments Combined Instruments 
China Final Price 0.54*** 0.53*** 
 
(0.026) (0.029) 
Price*Share  0.009 
 
 (0.056) 
China Share  -0.15 
 
 (0.21) 
Sargan Test 0.58 0.78 
Hausman Test 0.15 0.00 
  
 
0.23 0.23 
N 24173 23968 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
*Combined instruments are Japan price, Korea price, China price. 
 
Our results for the Chinese price effect are the same as before. If on average China 
drops its price by 10%, Mexico will respond by dropping its price by around 5.3%. The 
partial effect of share has the expected negative sign, but is not significant and the 
interaction term is also statistically insignificant.  
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4.4.7 Established Products 
 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel where products sometimes drop out and new 
products are introduced in some years. The Chinese price effect might be different for 
‘new’ products and ‘established’ products. We consider a product to be more 
established if China exports it for a longer period of time; that is, when China exports to 
the US market consecutively for a period of five years. We expect that Mexico might 
react differently to China’s prices on those established products from China as 
compared to products that China has just started exporting. The example in Table 4.18 
provides a better explanation of how an established Chinese product is being selected.  
 
Products X, Y and Z provide examples of products that China exported to the USA 
from 1992 until 1998. In this example, only product Y will be selected as an established 
product from 1994 to 2008, as China exported Y for five consecutive years, while both 
products X and Z showed some inconsistency where the product was not being exported 
in certain years. Product Y flips from an established product before 1994 to an 
established one after five years of trade. We did this for our sample and obtained a list 
of products where China has reported consecutive exports for five years or more; this is 
termed the set of established products. Those products that China exported for a 
sequence of less than five years, we termed unestablished products. 
 
Table 4.18: Example of Established Products  
Period (t)  Product Product  Product  
China Exports to US  X Y Z 
1992 1 0 0 
1993 0 0 1 
1994 0 1 0 
1995 1 1 1 
1996 0 1 1 
1997 1 1 0 
1998 1 1 1 
 
 
Although our sample started from 1992, this does not necessary mean that the first year 
of Chinese exports for a particular product was 1992. The product could have been 
exported in the previous year, which is not shown in our sample data set. To solve this 
problem, we used only those products where China did not report any exports to the 
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USA in 1992 for the unestablished products. This process will help identify that the year 
1992 is not the first year of exports, which is particularly important for the identification 
of unestablished products. This identification problem is not important for the set of 
established products, as an established product is still considered established even if 
China exported that product before 1992, although we could have missed some 
observations for established products.  
 
An example might make this clearer. Product X is not considered an established product 
because it was exported for only three years, namely 1992, 1993 and 1994. Although 
this product might be an established product if China could have exported product X 
before 1992 – that is, in 1990 and 1991 – the product will be dropped for our 
established product set. It will also not appear in our unestablished product set, as China 
exported product X in 1992.  
 
We then divided Chinese exports into two samples, where Sample 1 consists of 
observations where a Chinese product existed in the US market for at least five years 
and Sample 2 consists of Chinese exports during its first four years of competition. 
After dropping observations for 1992 and using IVs, we are left with fewer observations 
for the two different groups; we have over 7000 observations
11
 for the unestablished 
products and about 18,000 observations for the established products. 
 
The regression results for the established and unestablished products are shown in Table 
4.19. For established products, the Chinese price effect is statistically significant at 0.53, 
while it is relatively lower at 0.38 for unestablished products. The Sargan statistic 
indicates the exogeneity of our combined instruments, while the Hausman test supports 
the case for using IV regression for both groups. The Chinese price effect is stronger for 
established products, but our results show that shares are no longer significant. This 
would indicate that if China is established in that product, it represents a credible threat 
even if actual trade is not large. 
 
                                                 
 
11
 We lose quite a number of observations for unestablished products after dropping 1992 and those that China does not export to 
Japan, South Korea and the ROW.    
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For unestablished products, suppose that China enters the market with an insignificant 
share (0%), then its price effect will be 0.38, but if China enters the market with a 10% 
share, the Chinese price effect will increase to 0.44. This is quite a significant increase 
considering that many of China’s products occupy more than 10% of market share. The 
effects of China’s share are also considerably large in those products in which China 
has a 10% market share, where Mexico’s price will be 13.7% lower. From our 
calculations, China has on average a 14% product share for unestablished products. 
Unestablished products are considered relatively new in the market and it is quite likely 
that China might be more dynamic in its pricing, although we are unable to tell as we 
take the Chinese price as given; Mexico’s pricing might also react differently to the 
scale of these Chinese products, which are just trying to establish themselves in the 
market. If Chinese products enter on a larger scale, there might be more pressure on 
Mexico to respond compared to smaller-scale exports. A larger Chinese share shows a 
more credible threat for the future. The Hausman test does not support the use of IV for 
the unestablished set. 
 
Table 4.19: IV Regression (Established Products) 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
Instrumented Using (1) (2) 
Japan, Korea, China, EU Shares Established Unestablished 
 
(>= 5 years) (<5 years) 
 
IV IV 
China Final Price 0.53*** 0.38*** 
 
(0.033) (0.11) 
Price*Share 0.016 0.63*** 
 
(0.062) (0.23) 
China Share -0.39 -1.37* 
 
(0.25) (0.71) 
Sargan Test 0.35 0.12 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0 0.53 
   0.21 0.12 
N 17989 7229 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0 0 
4.4.8 Clean Products 
 
To avoid the classification problems, we checked the regression results with the clean 
sample set. There have been three HS changes since 1992, namely the HS96, HS02 and 
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HS07 revisions. The HS is regularly updated to accommodate the emergence of new 
products and the disappearance of previously existing products. As a reminder, products 
that have not undergone any HS code changes during the conversion are considered 
clean products, while mixed products are those that have undergone HS changes. The 
data samples set that we have used for the above regressions is the combined set of 
clean and mixed products, which can be termed the ‘complete’ set of products. 
 
In Table 4.20, the IV regression results for the clean products show that the Chinese 
price effect is 0.52 for the full regression and is slightly higher at 0.59 for the simple 
bivariate regression. The result shows that shares do matter: if China has a 10% share in 
the market, Mexico’s price will be 72% lower, which is a big influence considering 
China’s large share in the USA. The effect of shares on the Chinese price effect is also 
significant at 0.15. This means that the Chinese price effect will increase by 0.015 for 
every 10% increase in its shares. The Sargan and endogeneity test again support the IV 
regression.  
 
Table 4.20: Clean Products 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
Intrumented Using (1) (2) 
Japan, Korea, China, EU Shares IV Regression IV Regression 
 
simple full 
China Final Price 0.59*** 0.52*** 
 
(0.028) (0.032) 
Price*Share 
 
0.15** 
  
(0.064) 
China Share 
 
-0.72*** 
  
(0.21) 
Sargan Test 0.25 0.070 
Hausman Test 0.0 0.0 
   0.26 0.26 
N 21499 21307 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
 
 
4.5 Robustness Tests 
 
The above experiments make use of fixed effects IV regressions to solve for specific 
product effects and also the endogeneity issue for the Chinese price. In this section, we 
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will examine various other specifications and estimate methods to see how our core 
specification estimates behave under different assumptions. 
 
4.5.1 Taking out Global Price Trends in Product Prices (IV Estimates) 
 
There is a danger that the connection between Mexican and Chinese prices reflects not a 
causal link but a common trend due to both being determined by world prices for the 
products concerned. In order to take these trends into account, we controlled for the 
variable     
       
, which is the global export unit price at the product level. It included 
in our IV fixed effects regression. We obtained the global export price for each HS 6-
digit product by calculating the unit price for each product. The products’ unit price is 
obtained by dividing total world export value by the total quantity exported, having 
netted out China and Mexico’s exports to the USA so as to avoid the problem of double 
counting. The specification with the global price index as shown in Equation (4.34) is 
also consistent with controlling for other competitor’s price in the US market. The 
assumption is that the global export price is exogenous. 
 
     
            
          
     
        
         
                         (4.34) 
 
The results of this estimation, reported in Table 4.21 suggest that even allowing for any 
common price trends, China’s presence in the US market for the common set of 
products has a direct effect on the Mexican price, and that Mexican producers find their 
pricing discretion limited by the behaviour of Chinese prices. The global export price 
has a positive effect on Mexico’s price and has explained part of the variation in that 
price. The share effect is less consistent than the price effect. We found that the Chinese 
price effects are all still statistically significant (ranges from 0.3 to 0.47) after 
controlling for the global price trend and China’s market share. This is perhaps the most 
convincing result as it is consistent controlling for other competitors. 
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Table 4.21: Instrumental Estimates – Full Equation 
Dependent variable is Mexico’s price 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Instrument is Japan Price Korea Price China  Export Price 
China Final Price 0.38*** 0.30*** 0.47*** 
  (0.068) (0.100) (0.051) 
Price*Share 0.056 0.033 0.13** 
  (0.072) (0.085) (0.063) 
China Share -0.18 -0.030 -0.42** 
  (0.22) (0.24) (0.19) 
Global Export Price 0.34*** 0.38*** 0.27*** 
  (0.042) (0.061) (0.029) 
Hausman 0.2 0 0 
R
2
 0.28 0.26 0.25 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Wald F Test 71.3 34.4 125.5 
First-Stage Regression 
Instrumental Price 0.12*** 0.075*** 0.16*** 
  (0.0084) (0.0072) (0.0088) 
Instrumental Price*Share 0.71*** 0.63*** 0.70*** 
  (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) 
Instrumental Share 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.70*** 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) 
N 34248 34248 34970 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
*standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity 
 
 
That the Chinese price effect remains so well defined and strong after the allowance for 
global price trends is a powerful result. It insulates our conclusions from the fear that all 
we are picking up is a general model of price setting between multiple competitors and 
validates our identifying assumption that Chinese productivity growth and its 
corresponding reduction in prices is the major shock to the US import market over the 
1990s and 2000s. Some scholars have argued that indeed this should be our main 
specification of the pricing equation. We have some sympathy with this view but have 
persisted with our simple bi-lateral model because it is cleaner as Mexico and China are 
so clearly competing against each other in the USA. It is a great comfort, however, that 
this issue of specification has so little effect on our basic conclusion.   
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4.5.1 First Difference 
 
 
There is also the worry that there exists a common trend causing both     
  and    
  to be 
moving in the same direction over time, thus we need to control for time trend. 
Although our assumption is that China provides the largest shock since the early 1990s, 
a potential problem that can occur is when     
  and    
  both follow a deterministic 
common trend where each might actually be independent of each other. If this is the 
case, first differencing provides a way to get rid of the trend and will give unbiased 
results. The first difference method is another way to get rid of the time-invariant 
unobserved effect. The fixed effects method is more efficient when the error term     is 
serially uncorrelated (Wooldridge, 2009). However, if the error term follows a trend 
(serial correlation) the first difference method is better, as the      will be serially 
uncorrelated. Thus using first difference will detrend the variable to make it stationary. 
The first difference model can be represented by the following equations: 
 
   
             
                            (4.35a) 
     
               
                   (4.35b) 
 
    
          
                               (4.35c) 
 
First differencing will get rid of the unobserved time invariant factors    and get rid of 
the linear time trend (t) for both China’s and Mexico's prices in Equations (4.35). If we 
assume the trend to be product specific, then we are still left with the time-invariant 
product-specific effect    in Equation (4.35c). In this case, first difference fixed effects 
estimation will get rid of the product-specific trend. To correct for endogeneity issues, 
we use IV fixed effects regression for the first difference. The regression results for the 
first difference method are shown in Table 4.22. 
 
Using the first difference method, the Chinese price effect is significant at 0.32 under 
the OLS estimates. The first difference method in Column (1) has a single constant 
trend effect. The interaction term and the shares are all significant and have the 
expected signs. However, to get rid of the product-specific time trend – that is, common 
productivity shocks for the different products – we take the fixed effects of the first 
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difference. We get similar results for the Chinese price effect; the interaction and shares 
are also very similar. This suggests that the Chinese price effect is genuine and that this 
effect is not a result of a product-specific time trend causing both China’s and Mexico’s 
prices to move together.  
 
We use IV to solve for the possible endogeneity in Chinese prices. The Chinese price 
effect weakens slightly to 0.29 and is expected to increase by 0.06 for every 10% 
increase in shares. The partial effect of shares is not significant using this method. 
However, all three regressions show that the Chinese price effect is significant and has a 
positive influence on Mexico’s price. 
 
Table 4.22: First Difference and Fixed Effects of First Difference 
Dependent Variable is the first difference of  Mexico’s Price 
 
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) IV 
 
First Difference First Difference Fixed Effects First Difference Fixed Effects 
d.china_FinalPrice 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0067) (0.10) 
d.interaction 0.41*** 0.46*** 0.56* 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.29) 
d.China share -0.74*** -0.81*** -0.13 
 (0.090) (0.097) (1.03) 
constant 0.019***   
 (0.0045)   
Sargan   0.038 
   0.10 0.099 0.034 
N 33666 33666 21875 
 
 
4.5.2 Long Difference 
 
 
China’s rapid growth over the past few decades is impressive and as long as China can 
maintain its productivity, Chinese competition is here to stay and is a long-run issue 
Griliches and Hausman (1986). The long difference method is another way to get rid of 
a product-specific effect by differencing observations that are more than one period 
147 
 
 
apart (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Observations are taken to be less correlated with 
each other in longer-run phenomena as compared to one year apart. However, we suffer 
from a further loss of observations when using long difference. We ran a regression 
using long difference by differencing each product for every eight years. Each product 
had a maximum of two observations for our 17-year sample period (1992-2008). The 
first observation for a product is the difference between the 9
th
 year and the 1
st
 year of 
Chinese exports; if China exports this product in the 17
th
 year, the 2
nd
 observation will 
be recorded. As shown in Table 4.23, the Chinese price effect is still significant and 
ranges from 0.63 to 0.72 depending on the number lags we use. Using lags of 16 where 
we take the difference in the unit price between 2008 and 1992 (            , we 
obtained a coefficient of 0.72. The coefficients of the trade shares for both Mexico and 
China are not very significant for predicting changes in Mexico's price. 
 
Table 4.23: Long Difference 
 
Long Difference (OLS) 
 
 
lag 8 lag 16 
China price 0.63*** 0.72*** 
 
(0.015) (0.029) 
Price*Share 0.071 -0.11 
 
(0.061) (0.090) 
China share 0.031 -0.38 
 
(0.19) (0.30) 
constant 0.14*** 0.22*** 
 
(0.025) (0.062) 
   0.35 0.46 
N 3578 801 
 
 
 
4.5.3 Regressing Mexican Price on EU price in the USA 
 
Our assumption is that China is the shock that is exerting competitive pressure on the 
other countries, especially developing countries like Mexico. However, in the interest of 
completeness, we wanted to check if Mexico’s prices are affected by the EU countries’ 
prices in the USA. In Equation (4.36), our results show that the EU price is insignificant 
in the IV regression, but is positive and significant in Equation (4.37) after taking into 
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account global trends. We use EU prices to Japan to instrument for EU prices in the 
USA. 
 
     
           
                                            (4.36) 
     
           
          
                    (4.37) 
 
Using OLS fixed effects that are not reported, we found that Mexico will reduce its 
price by 5.5% if the EU drops its price by 10% in the US market. In OLS, prices are all 
linked, but when we get to IV we expect to see weaker results. The IV regression results 
are shown in Table 4.24; the EU price effect on Mexico is not significant, as shown in 
Column (1), and the Hausman test does not support the use of IV regression. The 
regression seems implausible with a negative   ; we then decided to take out the trends 
in product prices by controlling for global export prices (excluding Mexico and EU 
exports to the USA). After controlling for global price trends, the EU price effect is now 
positive but very large at 1.17, although we still get a very low   ; the results also show 
that the global price does not affect Mexico’s price in the USA.  
 
Table 4.24: Regressing Mexico on EU price 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
 
(1) (2) 
Instrument is EU price in Japan EU price in Japan 
EU Price 1.44 1.17*** 
 
(1.13) (0.34) 
Global Export Price 
 
-0.078 
  
(0.20) 
Hausman Test 0.35 0 
    -0.19 0.031 
N 37607 37597 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
 
4.5.4 Regressing China on Mexico’s Price (Mexico’s Price Effect) 
In the Bertrand model, there exists the problem of endogeneity in product price and 
hence the estimates will be biased. In looking at the Chinese price effect, we identified 
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that the increasing Chinese productivity as the exogenous shock on Mexico’s price. 
However when looking at Mexico’s price effect,  it is quite hard to find a suitable 
instrument for Mexico’s price in the USA, as China is a major exporter to many 
countries (China has a 10% share in Canada for 2008) while Mexico’s main export 
market is the USA. Although not a suitable instrument, we chose Mexico’s price to 
Canada to instrument for its price in the USA. We note that the estimate will be biased 
if because of endogeneity in product prices especially when there are no suitable 
instruments available. In the interest of completeness, we also regressed Chinese prices 
on Mexico in the USA following Equation (4.38) and the results are shown in Table 
4.25. 
     
           
         
                                              (4.38) 
 
Mexico’s price effect on China is positive and significant, as shown in Table 4.25 when 
we control for the global price trend. However, the instrumenting problem above and 
our arguments thus far about the dynamism of Chinese exports, which is widely seen as 
a causal shock, lead us to expect the correlations.  
Table 4.25: Regressing China on Mexico’s Price 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price (1) 
Instrument is Canada price 
Mexico Price 0.43*** 
 (0.062) 
Global Export Price 0.31*** 
 (0.033) 
Hausman 0.02 
   0.28 
N 24477 
Product Fixed Effect Yes 
Time Dummies Yes 
 
 
4.5.5 Using Lagged Japan, Korea Price and China price as IV 
 
Given the price interactions between products that are possible substitutes and the 
increasing globalisation and transparency in trade price data, we use one year lag of 
Japan. Korea and China prices as possible IV as a robustness test. We loose some 
observations when using one year lag of the selected instruments as compared to using 
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current spontaneous prices. The Chinese price effect is still statistically significant and 
is in the range from 0.38 to 0.54 as shown in Table 4.26. Overall the test result show 
that the Chinese price effect is present while the share effects are less well defined and 
less robust.  
 
 
Table 4.26: Using Lag (1) for Japan, Korea and China’s Price as IV 
 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Instruments are Lag Japan Price Lag Korea Price Lag China  Export 
Price 
China Final Price 0.38*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 
  (0.060) (0.14) (0.058) 
Price*Share -0.058 -0.089 0.047 
  (0.068) (0.077) (0.060) 
China Share 0.094 0.14 -0.27 
  (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) 
Global Price 0.34*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 
  (0.036) (0.083) (0.034) 
Hausman 0 0 0 
R
2
 0.29 0.27 0.26 
N 29153 27386 29785 
Wald F Test 115.9 22.6 121.9 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
4.5.6 Distribution of Coefficients by Product 
 
Our sample consists of more than 4000 products. We ran separate regressions by 
product to obtain their individual coefficients; each product now has its own slope. The 
regressions were done for products that are in the common exports for both China and 
Mexico and that are present for at least eight years. We ran the simple OLS regression 
and also the simple bivariate equation by product, controlling for the endogeneity in 
Chinese price using the combined IVs. This regression was run using Equation (4.39) 
and the results are shown in Table 4.27. 
 
  
         
          (4.39) 
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For the OLS regression, we are left with 1256 products and the average price effect at 
0.72.We get slightly fewer observations when using IV regression; at the individual 
level the average Chinese price effect is similar at around 0.74.. On average the Chinese 
price effect is around 0.74, which is still about what we obtained with the IV estimates, 
it is nonetheless positive and consistent with the overall story. 
 
Table 4.27: Summary Statistics of Chinese Price Coefficients 
  Variable Products 
Mean of Parameter Estimate 
–Chinese Price Effect 
SE of Mean 
OLS 
Estimates 
For Exports ≥ 8 
years 
1256 0.72 0.02 
IV 
Estimates 
For Exports ≥ 8 
years 
1101 0.74 0.05 
*all estimates are significant at 10% 
 
Figure 4.9 (OLS) and Figure 4.10 (IV) shows the Kernel density function and also the 
normal distribution function for   , where i represents each product heading. Kernel 
density plots are usually a much more effective way to view the distribution of a 
variable, which in our case is the coefficient of Chinese price. Most of the estimates are 
concentrated around the mean and have higher peaks around the mean compared to the 
normal distribution. However, we feel reasonably assured that on average the Chinese 
price effect has the correct positive sign and is consistent with the overall story.  
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Figure 4.10: Distribution of Coefficients (OLS) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Distribution of Coefficients (IV) 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
 
The regressions carried out at the product level comprise around 42,000 observations 
when working with the common set of exports. Because of the noise surrounding the 
unit price, we removed outliers that could lead to a bias in our estimates. We need to 
solve for endogeneity in the Bertrand model by choosing suitable instruments for the 
Chinese price i.e. Japan price, Korea price and China’s reported price. Our main finding 
is that the Chinese price effect is significant and positive after subjecting it to several 
robustness tests. Although the effect of shares and the interaction term do have the 
expected signs, they sometimes fail to provide significant effects. Overall, our results 
suggest that a 1% fall in Chinese price will cause Mexico to lower its price by 0.5%; the 
Chinese price effect, however, ranges from 0.3 to 0.68 when using the combined set of 
instruments (Japan, Korea and Chinese reported price). The Hausman identification test 
has helped to support the case for IV regression on which most of our latter regression 
results are based. In order to take into account for the other competitors’ effect on 
Mexico’s price, we run the main specification using the global price. The Chinese price 
effect dropped slightly to around 0.3 to 0.47 (not including sector average) as the global 
price has perhaps explained part of the variation in Mexico’s price. This is perhaps the 
most convincing result as it is consistent controlling for other competitors. We got rid of 
the trend by using the fixed effects of the first difference; the price effect falls to around 
0.29 to 0.32. We also got rid of those observations where NTB have been imposed; the 
Chinese price effect is still around 0.5.  
 
By classifying products accordingly to the Rauch classification, we found the Chinese 
price effect to be greater for homogenous products; this is expected as there is a lesser 
degree of differentiation and greater degree of price competition in this category. For 
differentiated products the Chinese price effect is around 0.51 to 0.75 and is statistically 
significant. For manufactured products (differentiated), there will be price competition 
between China and Mexico as their products are seen as closer substitutes.  
 
We also found the Chinese price effect to be stronger for the low technology and 
medium low technology sector. We postulate that Chinese competition is largely in 
terms of prices, driven by rapidly increasing productivity and scale in Chinese industry. 
However for sophisticated products which usually involves processing trade, 
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productivity plays a lesser role as the MNEs are responsible for the marketing and sale 
in the destination market. Hence inferences on the Chinese price effect in the more 
sophisticated need to be taken with caution. 
 
The study also showed that the changes brought about by the HS revisions do not seem 
to have much influence on the Chinese price effect, as shown in our clean and complete 
set of products. The definition of an ‘established’ product is subjective; in our study we 
define established products as those that have been on the market for five years or more. 
China’s price effect is slightly smaller for the unestablished set of products, but one 
interesting finding is that China's import share for newer products in the market matters 
to Mexico, while only price matters for the set of established products.  
 
We conclude that the Chinese price effect is significant and positive after subjecting it 
to several robustness tests. The share effects are less well defined and smaller than the 
price effect. The China effect is existential. We do acknowledge that the Chinese price 
effect is not based only on the common basket of exports, but China also has a price 
influence on products that it has the potential to export in future. The study of potential 
competition will be our main objective in the next chapter. 
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Appendices for Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.1: Balanced and Unbalanced Set 
 
 
Balanced Set Unbalanced Set Share of Trade 
Sector 
Product 
Headings 
Billions 
USD 
Product 
Headings 
Billions 
USD 
(Balanced/Unbalanced) 
Animals (0) 272 12.90 707 14.00 0.92 
Vegetables (1) 510 3.89 1809 6.38 0.61 
Foodstuffs (2) 544 8.62 1346 13.30 0.65 
Minerals (3) 119 11.20 778 14.80 0.76 
Chemicals (4) 884 10.90 5010 33.30 0.33 
Plastics (5) 476 23.30 2112 73.20 0.32 
LF (6) 136 20.30 601 69.60 0.29 
Wood (7) 595 22.80 1911 47.70 0.48 
Textiles (8) 2992 176.00 8228 223.00 0.79 
Footwear (9) 306 29.50 697 181.00 0.16 
Stone (10) 391 8.10 1567 43.10 0.19 
Metals (11) 1411 41.40 5324 125.00 0.33 
Machinery (12) 2091 471.00 7507 821.00 0.57 
Transport (13) 102 12.20 897 40.30 0.30 
Misc (14) 765 100.00 3213 416.00 0.24 
Total 11594 952.11 41707 2121.68 
 
*Data obtained from Comtrade and derived using own calculations 
*There are 682 products for each of the 17 years (1992-2008) for the balanced set 
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Appendix 4.2: Sectoral Classification 
 
(1) (2) 
 
IV Simple regression IV Full regression 
Animals (0) -0.11 -0.097 
 
(0.29) (0.28) 
Vegetables (1) 0.25 0.25 
 
(0.18) (0.18) 
Foodstuffs (2) 0.82*** 0.72*** 
 
(0.073) (0.082) 
Minerals (3) 0.60*** 0.51*** 
 
(0.17) (0.18) 
Chemicals (4) 0.17*** 0.17** 
 
(0.065) (0.066) 
Plastics (5) 0.58*** 0.57*** 
 
(0.093) (0.092) 
LF (6) 0.64*** 0.65*** 
 
(0.11) (0.11) 
Wood (7) 0.98*** 0.98*** 
 
(0.039) (0.039) 
Textiles (8) 0.84*** 0.83*** 
 
(0.041) (0.044) 
Footwear (9) 0.29 0.27 
 
(0.31) (0.31) 
Stone (10) 0.73*** 0.70*** 
 
(0.26) (0.25) 
Metals( 11) 0.50*** 0.50*** 
 
(0.059) (0.059) 
Machinery (12) 0.45*** 0.44*** 
 
(0.049) (0.052) 
Transport (13) -0.11 -0.14 
 
(0.22) (0.22) 
Misc (14) 0.51*** 0.49*** 
 
(0.065) (0.069) 
Price*Share 
 
0.020 
  
(0.057) 
China share 
 
-0.11 
  
(0.21) 
  
 
0.21 0.21 
N 28391 28151 
Sargan 0.00080 0.0012 
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 Potential Competition 5.
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
China is an important player in the world and is considered a price setter in many 
products. As emphasised in the chapter on actual competition, a product is categorised 
at the HS 6 digit level. In 1992, China’s direct influence covered just about 65% of 
Mexico’s products exported to the USA and this grew to 92% in 2008. Although China 
exports most of the products that Mexico exports to the USA, there are still some 
products in which Mexico does not face direct competition. Our study here is an 
extension of actual competition in several ways. In actual competition, we are using the 
sample that covers 83% of Mexico’s total product-years to the US market for the period 
from 1992-2008. This chapter will look at the remaining 17% of Mexico’s product-
years in which there is no Chinese presence in the US market. The products that China 
has not yet exported to the US market are termed ‘potential products’ and the main 
objective of this chapter is to find Mexico’s price reaction to China’s price for this 
particular set of products. The threat of China entering the market might act as a 
reminder constraining Mexico from charging a higher price, deterring China from 
entering or returning to the market.  
 
We identify China’s threat of entry by identifying products where China exports to 
other markets, arguing that it will easier for China to shift its supply to the USA as the 
productive capacities are already in place. Andrews (1949), one of the pioneers of 
'potential competition', emphasised the concept of 'cross-entry competition', where firms 
that are already established in other closely related products can diversify and move into 
the market if conditions are right. In the context of international trade, the work by 
Schiff and Chang (2003) is to our knowledge the only literature related to potential 
competition. Although there has not been much study done on potential competition in 
international trade, this concept is popular in studies of airline and retail markets. In the 
context of potential competition, the Chinese competitive effect on Mexico is not 
constrained to products in which China is present in the market, but extends to the set of 
products that China has the potential to export.  
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We assume that the Chinese competitive effect occurs even before actual competition 
takes place. One of the problems arising when doing this exercise is to find the 
estimated Chinese prices in the US market for the set of products in potential 
competition, as there is no trade on these products reported by the USA. This thesis will 
use China’s exports as reported by Japan and Korea, for reasons explained in the actual 
competition chapter, in order to predict Chinese prices on the set of potential products to 
the US market. We will also use China's reported price to the ROW other than the USA 
to predict China's price for potential products in the US market. All regressions will be 
done using fixed effects to eliminate constant but unobservable differences across 
products. The model is very loosely related to Bertrand price competition, but behaves 
more like limit pricing, with two firms exporting to a third market, where the incumbent 
firm will respond to the likely prices of the entrants. This chapter aims to investigate the 
effect of changes in China’s predicted export prices on Mexico’s export prices in the US 
market for the set of potential products. The unit price for a potential product is the 
predicted price based on China's prices to other markets.  
 
Another way to identify potential competition is to look at Mexico’s price pattern before 
and after China’s first entry, which we term the temporal dimension of Chinese 
competition. If China threatens to enter the market, Mexico will be constrained to 
charge a lower price to keep China out of the market in order to gain a bigger share of it. 
However, actual Chinese prices in the US market can only be observed when Mexico 
has failed, which leads to China’s first entry or return to the US market. To isolate this 
shock, we will use the logit model to find the propensity of China to enter the US 
market, which is independent of Mexican firms’ pricing decisions. China's probability 
of exporting a potential product depends on its establishment of other closely related 
products where resources are assumed to shift easily between products. Chinese 
competitiveness to the ROW in a particular product is a vital factor that can assist 
China’s first batch of exports into the US market in period t as well. We calculate the 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index at the product level and use it as an 
indicator to measure China's competitiveness in potential products. Our assumptions are 
that China’s entry into the US market is a consequence of the increased level of 
competitiveness brought about by its increased productivity, and that China's entry is 
independent of Mexico’s pricing strategy. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. The next section will provide discussion of some 
of the literature on potential competition. We then proceed to give an overview of the 
potential competition model and also some stylised facts on the potential products. We 
will explain our model specification and discuss the data and sample selection, which 
will be followed by the regression results. Another method of looking at potential 
competition is by considering the temporal price effect, which will then be discussed 
and examined. 
 
5.2 Literature Review  
 
Among the early pioneers of price competition, Hall and Hitch (1939) conducted  
questionnaire interviews and found that most firms do not behave according to the 
marginal cost pricing rule principle, but instead price their products based on the ‘full 
cost’ or average cost of production. Firms usually do not charge above their full costs, 
fearing that higher profits might encourage potential entrants to the market. Oligopoly is 
a common feature for manufactured products and firms’ pricing decisions depend not 
only on the reaction of actual competitors but also of potential competitors. (Bain, 1949) 
later further developed this concept and also stated that the established firm might forgo 
current profit by limiting price to prevent potential entry. P.W.S Andrews (1949) 
extended potential competition by introducing the concept of 'potential cross-entry', 
where the incumbent firm faces competition not only from direct competition but also 
from potential firms producing closely related products, whose resources could be 
quickly diverted to producing these products if profits get high. We can relate these 
findings to competition between Mexico and China; as China produces many of the 
product headings in which Mexico is also exporting to the USA, it will be easier to 
divert its resources to produce these products if profits become attractive.  
 
Baumol (1982) argued that countries will not be able to exploit their monopoly power 
when the market itself is contestable, as there are other potential entrants waiting to 
enter the market. In potential competition, pricing is based not only on taking share 
away from your competitors, but also on pricing accordingly in order to offset potential 
entrants. A contestable market is an extreme case of potential competition where the 
assumptions are that there is no cost of entry and exit, so potential firms can just enter 
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the industry if there are profits to be made and exit when prices are pushed down by 
increases in supply, leading to normal profits. Accordingly, the absence of sunk costs 
and no barriers to exit play a crucial role in contestable markets, where the threat posed 
by the possibility of new firms entering the market is taken to be a key determinant of 
the behaviour of existing firms. Potential competition is a result of the extent to which a 
market is open to new entry. This means that based on the potential competition model, 
the incumbent firm will behave as if it were in a perfectly competitive market and 
charge a price based on minimum average costs in the long run. As a result, consumers 
can continue to enjoy lower prices from competition. A contestable market has all of the 
characteristics of a perfectly competitive market, but is characterised by few firms in the 
market. Hence, the price charged by the incumbent firm will be the main factor 
determining potential new entrants to the market. There exist three conditions in 
contestable markets, as described by Helpman and Krugman (1989), where the first 
equilibrium condition is that the market must clear; that is, demand must equal supply. 
The second equilibrium condition is that the market price should be at least able to 
cover the costs of production. The third condition is that in the long run, market 
equilibrium should be sustainable, which implies that no firm can undercut the market 
price, supposing that the cost function is the same for all firms.  
 
Potential competition is often seen in the airline, mobile telecommunications and 
banking and electricity markets. Baumol (1982) emphasised the airline industry as the 
perfect example of a contestable market during the early 1980s, as there was much ‘hit 
and run entry’ by low-cost airlines during that period. Since 1993, the industry has 
become more liberalised and competition has increased. Some of the literature on airline 
pricing includes (Borenstein, 1992; Reiss and Spiller, 1989; Brueckner et al., 1992; 
Mayer and Sinai, 2003). However, most of these studies looked at pricing only after 
entry occurs. For potential competition, Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) found that the 
incumbent airline companies, having identified South West Airlines (SWA) as a threat, 
lowered their fares on specific routes even before SWA entered; the potential threat of 
entry started when SWA began to announce that it was entering a specific route. Their 
study found that incumbents’ fares were relatively lower for routes where SWA 
threatened to enter, as compared to their other routes from the same airport. They 
concluded that price competition occurs before competition actually occurs, when the 
incumbents identify the threat of potential entrants. 
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Ghosal (2002) stated that more liberalised international markets may not only lead to 
greater actual foreign competition, but also greater potential foreign competition. By 
focusing on the US market, these results showed that an increase in profit in the 
previous period (      will lead to an increase in import shares (IMS) in the current 
period t. This is what is termed inter-temporal potential competition: as the market 
becomes too lucrative it will attract potential entrants in the next period. Ghosal 
measured potential foreign competition by estimating the response of a country’s 
Industry Import Share (IMS) in period t to profit margins (   in the current period (t) 
and the lagged period (t-1). Using annual data covering the 332 4-digit US 
manufacturing industries over the period 1969–1994, the import share (potential foreign 
competition) is measured as the ratio of imports to the sum of imports plus domestic 
sales. The model specification is constructed using the first differences method, as 
shown in Equation (5.1):  
 
                                                 (5.1) 
 
The results show no significant effect of the current profit level (   on import shares 
(       .  
 
In Ghosal’s study, the domestic price setting is the driver for import penetration, while 
we hypothesise the increased Chinese productivity as the driver for lower Chinese 
prices; assuming few barriers to entry, China will be able to sell and gain shares in the 
market if it can produce cheaply. As in actual competition, theoretically speaking we 
believe that China’s entry into the US market is the main exogenous shock, which is 
independent of Mexico. Our study here is focused on the competitive effects on Mexico 
for the set of products that China does not currently export to the USA. We identify 
potential Chinese entry into the USA by China’s ability to export to other countries. If 
China can export to other markets, it will be easier to shift exports to the USA, 
assuming no barriers to entry. In the potential competition model, China will still exert 
competitive pressure in the USA even if there is no actual Chinese presence. There have 
not been many studies conducted on potential price competition in international trade, 
and nothing on China that we know of. A study done by Schiff and Chang (2003), 
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which is an extension of the work done by Chang and Winters (2002), examines the 
impact of market presence and contestability on the price reaction of US exporters (non-
members) to Argentinian exporters (members) in Brazil’s market when MERCOSUR 
was formed. Schiff and Chang chose the USA and Argentina as these countries 
represent two of the biggest suppliers to Brazil. In their paper, they used preferential 
tariff changes given to member countries as the driver to gauge the competitive pressure 
on non-member countries for the set of products without Chinese presence, which we 
term ‘potential products’.  
 
Even for those products without any Argentinian presence in the market, there might 
still be competitive pressure on the USA. It is noted that tariff schedules exist even for 
products that Argentina does not export to Brazil. Schiff and Chang’s study emphasised 
the competitive effects on the USA for products without Argentina’s presence, and 
further refined contestability as products that Argentina export to the ROW but not to 
Brazil. Their results show that Argentina’s threat of entry increased the US price 
reaction to preferential trade liberalisation. They did not find any statistically significant 
effect on US price behaviour for products in which Argentina is absent in Brazil’s 
market and does not export to the ROW. They then concluded that under the context of 
‘contestability’, the non-member country (USA) will tend to constrain its pricing to 
deter entry. 
 
The method proposed by Schiff and Chang (2003) is used to measure the one-time 
shock in tariff changes and the price response of the incumbent country. This one-time 
shock in tariff changes is quite difficult to observe in the case of China, as the country 
received Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status from the USA even before its entry to the 
WTO. China has been granted MFN status by the USA since 1980, and the contract has 
been renewed since 1989 (the year of the Tiananmen incident), but strenuous discussion 
usually occurs between the two countries and it was only after its WTO accession that 
China was been granted MFN rights in the US market. Similar to actual competition, we 
seek to identify the price effect directly, as we find little variation in the tariff schedules 
for both China and Mexico.   
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5.3 Definition of a Potential Product 
 
It should be emphasised that a product is treated as a potential product if Mexico 
exports to the USA and China does not in a particular year. So we first need to identify 
all those products where Mexico exports to the USA without any Chinese competition, 
which we term the potential set of products. For this set of potential products, there is a 
probable threat of entry for Chinese products into the USA if China has the capability to 
produce this product. However, it is not possible to know whether China actually 
produces at the HS6 digit level, so we identify the threat of entry by looking at China’s 
exports to the ROW (but not to the USA) for the set of potential products.  
 
Figure 5.1: Potential Products and Threat of Entry (Contestable Products) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A+B are China’s export headings to the ROW but not to the USA for the sample period 
B+C are the export headings of Mexico to the USA for the sample period 
B is the set of potential products, where China exported to the ROW (but not to the USA) that overlap 
with Mexico’s exports to the USA 
 
The data obtained are derived from the UN Comtrade statistics at the HS6 level (HS92), 
similar to that defined in actual competition. In Figure 5.1, the set ‘A+B’ is the set of 
product headings that China exports to the ROW but not to the USA, while Set ‘B+C’ is 
the set of product headings from Mexico to the USA. Set B is the common set of 
products that China exports to the ROW (but not to the USA) and Mexico exports to the 
USA; these are termed ‘contestable products’. An example of a potential product is 
illustrated by product 251311 in Table 5.1, where it is assumed that China and Mexico 
are the only two countries exporting product code 251311 to the USA.  
US market (at 
time T+1) B
  
Mexico Export to the 
USA (B+C) 
China Export to the 
ROW and not to the 
USA (A+B) 
Contestable Products 
C B A 
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Product 251311 can be considered a potential competition product for all years where 
Mexico is the only exporter to the US market; however, the threat of entry can be 
identified if China exports to the ROW. We can see that China exported this product to 
the USA in certain periods, but dropped out of the export basket in most periods. It 
seems that China started to export pumice stones more consistently after 2000. There is 
concern about the appropriateness of allocating the product to the potential basket for 
the period 2000 to 2006, as it is absent from China's exports for only a year since 1999, 
which might be attributed to a data entry error. However, as there are relatively few 
observations for potential products, in general we take all product-years in which 
Mexico exports without actual Chinese competition to be a potential product. In the 
section on temporal potential competition, we addressed this issue by using a slightly 
different definition of a potential product.  
 
Table 5.1:  Example of a Potential Product 
Year Product Code Exporting Countries Competition 
1992 251311 Mexico Potential 
1993 251311 Mexico Potential 
1994 251311 Mexico and China Actual 
1995 251311 Mexico Potential 
1996 251311 Mexico Potential 
1997 251311 Mexico Potential 
1998 251311 Mexico Potential 
1999 251311 Mexico and China Actual 
2000 251311 Mexico Potential 
2001 251311 Mexico and China Actual 
2002 251311 Mexico and China Actual 
2003 251311 China 
 
2004 251311 Mexico and China Actual 
2005 251311 Mexico and China Actual 
2006 251311 Mexico Potential 
2007 251311 None 
 
2008 251311 None 
 
* 251311 – (Pumice Stones) 
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5.4 The Model for Potential Competition 
 
Our model is related to the limit pricing theory, where the established firm (Mexico) 
will constrain its price due to the potential entry of its rival (China). Thus, Mexico will 
charge a price that is lower than its monopolist price today even though competition has 
yet to occur. Potential competition can be seen as a way to discipline the monopolist 
price. For the simple model, we will first consider the market for a single homogeneous 
product where Mexico is the only exporter to the USA. In Figure 5.2, the linear demand 
curve D (p) represents US demand for import of the product. The downward-sloping 
demand curve D (p) indicates a fall in the quantity demanded when price increases and 
vice versa. The marginal revenue curve (MR) is derived from the downward-sloping 
demand curve. There are assumed to be constant marginal costs, meaning that different 
export markets are independent of each other. The marginal cost for Mexico is 
represented by the horizontal line MC. Suppose that Mexico is the incumbent exporter 
of a particular good in the US market, its profit-maximising price will be at P
M
 and the 
quantity supplied will be at Q
M
. There are positive profits to be made if Mexico is 
acting as a monopolist in the US market. The price charged by a monopolist will be 
higher compared to perfect competition; however, this does not mean that Mexico will 
charge the monopolist price at Pm, as there is the threat of China entering the market.  
 
Figure 5.2: Monopolist Pricing (Mexico’s Exports to the USA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q
M
 
D(p) 
MR 
MC 
Qb 
Pb 
P
M
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As emphasised by Andrews (1949), the potential competitors are those that are already 
established in closely related products, making it easier to shift resources between 
production sites. The potential of China entering will constrain Mexico from charging 
the monopolist price. Here, we are assuming that the average costs function differs 
between Chinese and Mexican firms. 
 
Now suppose that China's predicted price is as represented by P
C
 in Figure 5.3; this is 
the assumed price at which China enters the market. In potential competition, Mexico’s 
strategy is to prevent China from entering the US market and thus will be constrained 
from charging a price slightly below P
C
. For homogeneous products, we assume that as 
long as Mexico is disciplined enough not to charge a price above P
C
, China will not be 
able to enter the US market.  
 
Figure 5.3: Potential Competition Pricing (Homogeneous Goods) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, over time the increased level of Chinese productivity might lead to a fall in 
Chinese prices from P
C 
to P
C1
. Suppose that initially Mexico charges a price of P
C
 to 
prevent China from entering the US market. However, the increased level of Chinese 
productivity has now pushed prices down from P
C
 to P
C1
. Mexico will try to respond to 
China’s lower prices by reducing its prices to just below PC1. Thus, Mexico will respond 
to changes in the predicted Chinese price by trying to deter Chinese entry. We 
Mexico’s Exports to the USA 
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mentioned in the previous chapter that China has had the highest productivity growth 
over the past few decades; this has led to the reducing cost of production being passed 
on to its exports and is termed the ‘China price factor’. Theoretically, in Figure 5.3, if 
China managed to get its price down below   , Mexico would be forced out of the US 
market. However, in the real world, products are not completely homogeneous and 
products at the HS6 level exported by China and Mexico might be slightly different. 
The price charged by both countries need not be exactly the same for differentiated 
products, but China's price does influence Mexico's price, as they are considered close 
substitutes.  
 
5.4.1 Differentiated Products  
 
For differentiated products, Mexico will still be able to sell its products even if its prices 
are not identical to China’s. However, if products are considered to be close substitutes, 
their demand will be closely linked. Consider the Mexican firm’s problem of keeping 
the Chinese firm out. The Chinese side of it is illustrated in figure 5.4 below. Suppose 
that if the Mexican firm charges a price P
Mex
, the demand for the Chinese product will 
be given by demand curve D(p). The Chinese firm is a monopolist in its own market 
and so with marginal cost curve (MC) and the marginal revenue curve MR it will 
choose to sell Q
M
 at price P
M
. This is its profit maximising sales level, but it still needs 
to choose whether to enter or not.  If, after allowing for some fixed costs, its average 
costs are given by average costs AC, P
M
 > AC, so profits are positive and entry will 
occur. 
 
Now, however, suppose that the Mexican firm lowers its price. With their 
interdependent demands, the demand curve faced by the Chinese firm will contract to 
D1(p), with corresponding marginal revenue of MR1. Assuming the same cost curves, 
the new profit-maximising output is Q
M1
 with price P
M1
 and at this point prices do not 
cover average costs and so the firm will choose not to incur the fixed costs and enter the 
market.  
 
Finally assume that Chinese costs fall because of its improving productivity. Although 
we have not drawn it into the figure, it is plain that AC could fall far enough that the 
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point (Q
M1
, P
M1
) could generate positive profits, at which time in this simple model 
entry will occur. The Mexican firm might be able to block it but only by reducing its 
own price even further so that the residual demand curve facing the Chinese firm 
contracted further. That is, improving Chinese productivity would have forced the 
Mexican firm to reduce its price even though the Chinese firm did not sell a thing in that 
particular market.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Differentiated Products 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Stylised Facts 
 
5.5.1 Coverage 
 
For potential competition, our main emphasis will be on the sample of 9622 product-
years that Mexico exports to the USA without any actual Chinese competition, shown in 
Table 5.2. We use US reported data for similar reasons as described in actual 
competition. Over the period from 1992-2008, there are 9622 out of a total of 57,460 
product-years that Mexico exported to the USA without Chinese competition. In this 
chapter, our main objective is to look at the potential price competition of Chinese 
products. 
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There is a decline in the number of products that Mexico exports to the US market 
without Chinese competition over the years, as shown in the ‘potential’ column in Table 
5.2. In 1992, there were a total of 872 products that Mexico exported to the USA 
without Chinese competition. The products under potential competition declined 
gradually every year, so that in 2008, there were just over 200 products under potential 
competition. We looked at 83% of Mexico’s exports that were in actual competition for 
the period 1992-2008, but here we will be considering the remaining 17% of those 
products that were in potential competition.  
 
Table 5.2:  USA Imports from Mexico by Product Headings at HS6 
Year Actual (Competition from China) Potential (No China Presence) Total Exports 
1992 2,017 872 2,889 
1993 2,146 845 2,991 
1994 2,300 813 3,113 
1995 2,528 867 3,395 
1996 2,589 891 3,480 
1997 2,729 794 3,523 
1998 2,781 739 3,520 
1999 2,893 660 3,553 
2000 2,992 547 3,539 
2001 2,960 516 3,476 
2002 3,039 414 3,453 
2003 3,066 362 3,428 
2004 3,124 333 3,457 
2005 3,203 282 3,485 
2006 3,232 238 3,470 
2007 3,132 215 3,347 
2008 3,107 234 3,341 
Total 47,838 (83%) 9,622 (17%) 57,460 (100%) 
*Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
In order to get a better understanding of the dispersion of products that China does not 
export to the USA, we provided a summary description of the 9622 potential products 
by categorising them into 15 different sectors, as shown in Table 5.3. In 1992, most of 
the products that China did not export to the USA are in Sectors 1 (Vegetable Products), 
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4 (Chemical Industry), 8 (Textiles), 11 (Metals) and 12 (Machinery). The table also 
shows that most of the potential competition occurred during the earlier period, but that 
China exported almost everything that Mexico exports by 2008. There does not seem to 
be any potential competition involved in Sector 9 (Footwear) or Sector 14 
(Miscellaneous), as China exports almost all of these products to the USA, which 
Mexico also does for the whole period.  
 
Table 5.3: Coverage by Sector (Product Headings) 
Sector 1992 2000 2008 
Animals (0) 28 40 38 
Vegetables (1) 75 63 50 
Foodstuffs (2) 29 33 26 
Minerals (3) 58 27 20 
Chemicals (4) 178 97 25 
Plastics (5) 55 15 0 
LF (6) 11 7 1 
Wood (7) 42 24 11 
Textiles (8) 94 81 14 
Footwear (9) 0 0 0 
Stone (10) 30 16 5 
Metals (11) 116 60 20 
Machinery (12) 102 54 11 
Transport (13) 25 19 12 
Misc (14) 29 11 1 
Total 872 547 234 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
There is a slight worry over whether these potential products are not being recorded in 
China’s export basket due to the HS revisions, as already discussed in Chapter 3.4. 
After further examination, it was found that 7006 out of the 9622 products are in the 
clean product sample, which means that 76% of the potential products are completely 
free from the HS revision problem.  
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5.5.2 Stylised Facts by Trade Value 
 
We tabulated the total trade value of Mexico’s exports for both actual and potential 
competition (Table 5.4). The accumulated total trade value for the potential products 
from the period 1992-2008 is reported at USD 119.35 billion, which is only about 
5.78% of Mexico's total exports to the US market over the entire period. This 5.78% of 
value is covered by 17% of Mexico’s headings. It is noted that on average the potential 
products are relatively small compared to actual products. The percentage of potential to 
total exports remained quite low after 1998.  
 
Table 5.4:  USA Imports from Mexico by Trade Value at HS6 (Reporter US) 
Year 
Actual 
Competition 
(USD 
Billions) 
%(Actual/Total) 
Potential 
Competition 
(USD Billions) 
%(Potential/Total) 
Total Exports 
to USA (USD 
Billions) 
1992 28.2 78.7 7.63 21.3 35.83 
1993 32.8 80.57 7.91 19.43 40.71 
1994 45.7 90.78 4.64 9.22 50.34 
1995 57.3 91.26 5.49 8.74 62.79 
1996 58.5 78.95 15.6 21.05 74.10 
1997 80.4 92.24 6.76 7.76 87.16 
1998 85.2 88.75 10.8 11.25 96.0 
1999 105 94.4 6.23 5.6 111.23 
2000 133 96.69 4.55 3.31 137.55 
2001 128 96.63 4.47 3.37 132.47 
2002 132 97.08 3.97 2.92 135.97 
2003 129 92.27 10.8 7.73 139.80 
2004 152 96.56 5.41 3.44 157.41 
2005 166 96.19 6.57 3.81 172.57 
2006 196 97.72 4.57 2.28 200.57 
2007 207 97.27 5.8 2.73 212.80 
2008 210 96.26 8.15 3.74 218.15 
Total 1946.1 94.22 119.35 5.78 2065.45 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
As Mexico’s total exports to the US market increased steadily but slowly over the years, 
the products in potential competition accounted for about 2% of Mexico's total exports 
in 2006. The percentage of potential to total exports at 21% seemed to be particularly 
high for 1996, 1998 and 2003. It is quite a surprise to find the sudden hike in potential 
trade volumes for these periods and we investigated it further. The breakdown for the 
potential products by sector for these three years is shown in Appendix 5.1. On closer 
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inspection, we found an exceptionally high value of trade in Sector 13 (Transport) for 
those periods compared to the other periods. The products in the transport sector usually 
consist of heavy-duty vehicles and parts; that is, trucks, motorcycles, buses and so on. 
There are only 33 product headings in the transport sector and this made up 59% of the 
value of potential products for 1996. An example can be provided for product 870421 
(diesel-powered trucks), which Mexico exports to the USA while China does not. 
Mexico exported around USD 836 million of this product heading alone in 1996; this is 
around 5.5% of the total value of potential products in 1996. The other products in the 
transport vehicle sector consist of heavy-duty products such as automobiles 
(engines>3000cc), road tractors and so on.  On average, we found that the transport 
sector made up 42% of the total value for potential products. The vegetable products 
sector is the second largest sector of potential products, making up 24% of potential 
products for the sample period. 
 
5.5.3 Classification of Potential Products by Different Case Scenarios 
 
We wanted to find out whether the sudden hike in potential products is actually due to 
China’s exit or whether China just does not export the product. A product can be termed 
a potential product if Mexico exports to the US market without any Chinese competition 
in a particular period (T). We have argued that China could still be a huge threat even if 
in that year it did not export, as theoretically speaking there could be less competitive 
pressure on Mexico’s firms if China exited instead of trying to get in. Potential 
competition in period T can occur if Mexico starts to or continues to export the product 
in period T while China does not. There are four possible scenarios that make a product 
eligible to be classified as a potential product in period T, as shown in Table 5.5.  
 
In Case 1, both countries exported the particular product in period T-1, but China exited 
while Mexico continued to export in Period T. In Case 2, China did not export in either 
period while Mexico exported in both periods. In these two cases, this potential product 
is considered an existing export of Mexico’s. In Case 3, if both countries did not export 
that product to the market in the previous period (T-1), that product would become a 
potential product if Mexico started to export in period (T) and China did not. In Case 4, 
China exported the product but Mexico did not in period T-1, but for some reason, 
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Mexico started exporting the product in period T while China exited. In both these 
cases, this product would be considered a new export for Mexico. The products in Cases 
1 and 4 are potential because of China’s exiting the market in the current period. A 
product becomes a potential product if Mexico starts to or continues to export while 
China does not in period T.  
 
Table 5.5: Different Scenarios of How a Potential Product Can Occur 
 
Period T-1 Period T Potential Competition by Cases 
Case 1 China Export China does not export China Exit 
 
Mexico Export Mexico Export Mexico Existing Products 
Case 2 China does not export China does not export China does not export 
 
Mexico Export Mexico Export Mexico Existing Products 
Case 3 China does not export China does not export China does not export 
 
Mexico does not export Mexico Export Mexico New Products 
Case 4 China Export China does not export China Exit 
 
Mexico does not export Mexico Export Mexico New Products 
 
5.5.4 Classification by Coverage (Product Headings) 
 
The numbers of product headings that are in potential competition classified according 
to the four different case scenarios for each period are shown in Table 5.6. Initially we 
are interested in finding out the unusual increase in potential products in 1996, as shown 
in Table 5.4. In 1996, there were 891 products that Mexico exported to the US market 
without any Chinese presence. Out of these 891 potential products, 18% (163 products) 
are in Case 1, 58% in Case 2 (518 products), 19% in Case3 (171 products) and only 4% 
in Case 4 (39 products). In 1996, there are 202 products (22%) that China exited the 
market (Case 1 + Case 4). Most of the potential products belong to Case 2, where 
Mexico exported for two consecutive years and China has yet to enter. We conclude 
that the majority of Mexico’s potential products are in Case 2 and Case 3; on average 
we found that 79% of potential products fall into these two cases for the sample period. 
The lack of Chinese presence is not because China has exited the market, but because it 
has yet to penetrate it. Mexico might not be too worried about constraining its own price if 
China exited the market in the first place, as the logic behind potential pricing is to deter 
entry, although there is the worry that China might re-enter the market. It seems like Case 2 
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and Case 3 is a better description for potential competition; we will deal with the different 
classification in the regression analysis section. However for now, we provide some 
descriptive statistics of all products in potential competition.  
 
Table 5.6: Potential Products by Product Heading 
Year Product Headings Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
1992 872 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1993 845 126 482 201 36 
1994 813 119 466 200 28 
1995 867 133 465 231 38 
1996 891 163 518 171 39 
1997 794 128 507 140 19 
1998 739 133 465 115 26 
1999 660 128 403 102 27 
2000 547 102 325 94 26 
2001 516 120 292 79 25 
2002 414 83 243 74 14 
2003 362 75 214 52 21 
2004 333 72 181 61 19 
2005 282 57 169 38 18 
2006 238 50 135 41 12 
2007 215 49 130 23 13 
2008 234 57 138 28 11 
Total 9,622 1595 (17%) 5133 (53%) 2522 (26%) 372 (4%) 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
As shown in Table 5.7, the trade value of Mexico's new products (Case 3 + Case 4) 
totalled only around USD 56.5 million in 1996, compared to Mexico’s existing products 
at USD 15,500 million. As mentioned, the 1996 spike in potential products was mainly 
in the transport vehicle sector and we found that 99% (USD 15500 million) of potential 
products in this sector consists of Mexico’s existing products (Case 1 + Case 2). The 
results indicate that Mexico's increased trade in potential products in 1996 is not so 
much new products but more existing products. Our study found that potential 
competition is more likely to occur because China has not entered the market, not 
because China has exited the market, although 1996 is an exception, where we find that 
increased potential trade is due to China exiting the market. We need to investigate this 
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further, as theoretically speaking limit pricing is a strategy used to prevent entry; once 
entry occurs, Mexico and China might play a Bertrand game. Thus if China exited the 
market, it might be due to the country losing its comparative advantage.  
 
Table 5.7: Mexico's Trade Value by Cases 
Year (USD Millions) Product Headings (USD Millions) Product Headings 
 (Case 3 + Case 4) (Case 1 + Case2) 
 
(New Products) (Existing Products) 
1993 67.4 237 7840 608 
1994 121 228 4520 585 
1995 155 269 5340 598 
1996 56.5 210 15500 681 
1997 20.1 159 6740 635 
1998 185 141 10600 598 
1999 20.3 129 6210 531 
2000 40.8 120 4510 427 
2001 32.1 104 4440 412 
2002 35.6 88 3940 326 
2003 37.2 73 10800 289 
2004 27.8 80 5390 253 
2005 11.1 56 6560 226 
2006 23.9 53 4540 185 
2007 16.3 36 5780 179 
2008 5.76 39 8140 195 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
 
5.5.5 Mexico’s Influence in the USA 
 
Although the trade value of potential exports constitutes just a small percentage of 
Mexico's total exports, this does not mean that these products are insignificant exports 
for Mexico. The small trade ratio of the potential products is most probably due to the 
small number of observations in potential competition (9622), as compared to those 
observations in actual competition (41,707). In order to get a better understanding of the 
significance of potential products for Mexico in the US market (for all cases), we 
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computed each product’s market share in the US market. We then found the simple 
average trade shares for all products, for both actual and potential competition in a 
given year (Table 5.8).  
 
Table 5.8: Average Trade Shares for Mexico's Exports 
Year Actual Competition Potential Competition (Case 1 to case 4) 
1992 0.073 0.121 
1993 0.075 0.115 
1994 0.072 0.123 
1995 0.076 0.132 
1996 0.082 0.134 
1997 0.089 0.132 
1998 0.090 0.140 
1999 0.091 0.146 
2000 0.091 0.158 
2001 0.092 0.169 
2002 0.091 0.145 
2003 0.089 0.156 
2004 0.089 0.161 
2005 0.089 0.176 
2006 0.089 0.207 
2007 0.088 0.205 
2008 0.088 0.216 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
Mexico's mean product share in the US market for potential products was around 21.6% 
and only around 8.8% for products in actual competition with China in 2008. The 
average trade share for Mexico's product in potential competition has increased every 
year, from 12.1% in 1992 to around 21.6% in 2008. Mexico's average market share is 
higher for those products where there is no Chinese competition. This might be 
expected, as there is no Chinese presence to shift demand away suppliers like Mexico. 
Although Mexico has a major market share in the USA for these products, it is not the 
only exporter to the US market. Our findings show that there are more than 100 
countries exporting to the US market in every period for the set of potential products. 
However, many of the exporting countries have insignificant market shares and we will 
report only on the major suppliers in the US market for the potential products. We 
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found that the major exporters in potential products were from developed countries, 
dominated by countries such as Canada, Germany and Japan during the 1990s and early 
2000s. In 1992, these countries exported many of the potential product headings to the 
US market, with exports exceeding those of Mexico for these potential products. For the 
set of potential products, the mean import shares for Canada and Japan in the US market 
are estimated at 29% and 15% respectively in 1992. In 2008, Canada exported the 
majority of these potential products, with a mean market share of 33% in the US 
market. We also observed that there are more developing countries such as Chile, Brazil 
and Trinidad and Tobago exporting these potential products to the US market in recent 
years. However, competition from these countries is concentrated only in certain 
products, as they do not have many common exports with Mexico for these potential 
products. 
 
In order to examine the absence of Chinese competition for Mexico’s trade shares, we 
classify the potential products into different categories according to market share, as 
shown in Table 5.9. Our results show that there is an increase in the total number of 
product headings in which Mexico has a large share in the market over the years. In 
1992, Mexico exported 872 products to the US market that were without Chinese 
competition, where 256 (29%) of these products had a market share of more than 10%. 
By 2008, 105 out of the possible 234 products (45%) had a market share of more than 
10%. In 2008, 34% of Mexico's product headings in potential competition had more 
than 20% of US total market share and 17% of its products had more than 50% share. 
 
By comparison, Mexico had only 26% of its products in actual competition with more 
than a 10% share in the US market in 2008. Also in 2008, Mexico had 14% of its 
products with more than a 20% market share and just 3% of its products with more than 
half of the US market. Mexico has on average a higher product share in potential 
products, compared to those where there is direct Chinese competition. 
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Table 5.9: Mexico's Trade Shares in the US market for Potential Products 
 
Total Product 
Headings 
Product 
Headings  
Product 
Headings  
Product 
Headings  
Year 
Potential 
Products 
Trade 
Share>10% 
Ratio 
Trade 
Share>20% 
Ratio 
Trade 
Share>50% 
Ratio 
1992 872 256 0.29 161 0.18 68 0.08 
1993 845 229 0.27 145 0.17 57 0.07 
1994 813 231 0.28 154 0.19 67 0.08 
1995 867 264 0.30 171 0.20 76 0.09 
1996 891 267 0.30 185 0.21 79 0.09 
1997 794 232 0.29 164 0.21 74 0.09 
1998 739 226 0.31 165 0.22 70 0.09 
1999 660 212 0.32 152 0.23 70 0.11 
2000 547 201 0.37 141 0.26 63 0.12 
2001 516 191 0.37 138 0.27 66 0.13 
2002 414 129 0.31 90 0.22 45 0.11 
2003 362 121 0.33 93 0.26 42 0.12 
2004 333 116 0.35 82 0.25 42 0.13 
2005 282 102 0.36 76 0.27 36 0.13 
2006 238 98 0.41 70 0.29 41 0.17 
2007 215 88 0.41 71 0.33 37 0.17 
2008 234 105 0.45 79 0.34 39 0.17 
Total 9622 3068 
 
2137 
 
972 
 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
5.5.6 Importance of Potential Products in China Exports 
 
Some of the possible reasons why China exported most of the potential products to 
other markets but not to the USA initially could be due to a failure to meet the required 
standards or quality issues. It might also be that these products make up a small 
percentage of total Chinese exports and are not considered as important exports for 
China. Another possible reason could be the high level of protection prohibiting China’s 
entry, and possibly a ban on certain Chinese products. It might also be possible that a 
higher tariff was imposed on these potential products to prevent China from entering the 
market in the first place. However we have shown that there is little variation in tariffs 
and as it becomes more competitive in pricing brought about by an increase in 
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productivity. We checked that most of these potential products with positive tariffs are 
from the period 1992- 1998; almost all the other potential products have zero tariff. It 
would not be accurate to measure the average tariff rate between actual and potential 
products due to their different sample size. There are about 2500 product years for 
potential products and more than 30,000 products in actual competition with positive 
tariffs imposed on them. However for reference purposes, simple tariff rates for 
potential products and actual products with positive bound tariffs are both around 6% 
for our sample.  To investigate the size of China’s exports of potential products, we 
sought to identify the importance of its exports of potential products to the ROW. 
China's total product headings and exports to the ROW, excluding the USA, are shown 
in Table 5.10.  
 
Table 5.10: China’s Export to ROW (Potential Products) 
Period 
China Exports in Potential 
Products to ROW (by 
Product Headings) 
China Exports in Potential 
Products to ROW (USD 
Billions) 
China Total Export to ROW 
Excluding USA (USD 
Billions) 
1992 769 2.89 46.04 
1993 783 3.02 107.33 
1994 757 5.32 139.65 
1995 813 5.53 171.49 
1996 845 6.81 189.6 
1997 754 5.94 209.19 
1998 707 4.1 202.91 
1999 634 3.73 226.22 
2000 537 5.21 289.39 
2001 509 3.8 300.62 
2002 410 5.5 343.52 
2003 360 3.83 433.75 
2004 329 4.72 572.48 
2005 280 8.47 712.17 
2006 236 8.43 874.22 
2007 213 10 1,089.89 
2008 229 17.1 1,273.70 
Total 9165 
  
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
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China exported the majority of the potential products to the ROW, exporting 9165 out 
of a possible 9622 potential products for the period 1992-2008. In 1992, China's exports 
in potential products were only around USD 2.89 billion, which is about 6% of its total 
exports to the ROW at USD 46 billion. By 2008, China exported around USD 17.1 
billion of potential products to the ROW; however, this was only around 1% of China's 
total exports to the ROW, which were worth more than USD 1200 billion. There are 
fewer product headings that China did not export to the US market over time, 
explaining the small amount of trade in these potential products. 
 
To find Chinese influence for the potential products, we find China’s share of ROW 
imports by product heading, as represented in Equation (5.2): 
 
   ∑ [
   
                
   
                 ⁄ ]
 
                               (5.2) 
 
where     represents a product and t represents a year,     
                
 is ROW 
imports from China while    
                 
 is ROW total import. 
 
The average product share is calculated by taking the simple product average for a given 
year, the results of which are shown in Table 5.11. China has an average market share 
of only around 2% in the ROW for the potential products in 1992, which increased 
slightly to 5% in 2008. As these are potential products, China's market share of the US 
market was zero. China’s average product share for potential products to the ROW was 
relatively small compared to its market share in actual competition to the ROW. For 
products in actual competition, China's market share to ROW increased from around 6% 
in 1992 and averaged around 17% in 2008. This suggests that China has a lower 
comparative advantage in potential products.  
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Table 5.11: China Market Share in ROW 
Year China Export Shares China Export Shares 
 
(Actual Products) Potential Products 
1992 0.06 0.02 
1993 0.09 0.02 
1994 0.09 0.02 
1995 0.09 0.03 
1996 0.09 0.02 
1997 0.09 0.02 
1998 0.09 0.02 
1999 0.10 0.03 
2000 0.11 0.03 
2001 0.12 0.03 
2002 0.12 0.03 
2003 0.13 0.03 
2004 0.13 0.04 
2005 0.15 0.04 
2006 0.15 0.05 
2007 0.16 0.05 
2008 0.17 0.05 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
A breakdown of the average market by sector for three different periods, namely 1992, 
2000 and 2008, is given in Table 5.12. It can be seen that China's market share for 
potential products in the ROW is small, especially for 1992. We noticed that the 
Chinese market share in the textiles industry had increased from 2% in 1992 to 20% in 
2008. It was noted that China only started to enjoy the quota phase-out in 2002, after it 
joined the WTO. We also found that there are 1171 observations out of the total number 
of potential products (9622) that are subject to MFA quotas, all of which are in the 
textiles sector. We could say that the increase in China’s import shares of ROW market 
in the textiles sector is likely due to MFA. 
 
In the machinery/electrical sector (12), China's share in the ROW had also increased to 
8% in 2008, compared to just 1% in 1992. Although the figures are not shown here, we 
found that China's share of ROW imports in actual competition was higher than its 
share in potential competition. The US market is the main export destination for 
Chinese products and we can say that China is more competitive and captures a larger 
market share for those products that it does export to the US market. These findings 
suggest that China exports the ‘right’ products to the USA; that is, the USA is pretty 
open, so only the ‘best’ products will be viable there.  
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Table 5.12: China’s Import Shares of ROW market for Potential Products (by 
Sector) 
 
China Import Share ROW 
Sector/Year 1992 2000 2008 
Animals (0) 0.02 0.00 0.01 
Vegetables (1) 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Foodstuffs (2) 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Minerals (3) 0.03 0.05 0.07 
Chemicals (4) 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Plastics (5) 0.00 0.01 0.00 
LF (6) 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Wood (7) 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Textiles (8) 0.02 0.09 0.20 
Stone (10) 0.01 0.02 0.06 
Metals (11) 0.01 0.02 0.08 
Machinery (12) 0.01 0.02 0.08 
Transport (13) 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Miscellaneous (14) 0.01 0.02 0.00 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
5.5.7 Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) 
 
China might exhibit different levels of competitiveness for products in actual and 
potential competition. The Balassa Index or the Revealed Comparative Advantage 
(RCA) index measures the degree of specialisation in a country’s comparative 
advantage (Balassa, 1965). The RCA index at the product level for China was 
constructed for the whole sample set, as we want to capture China’s competitiveness 
between the two set of products. A country reveals comparative advantages in products 
for which this indicator is higher than 1, showing that its exports of those products are 
more than would be expected on the basis of its importance in total exports of the 
reference area. 
 
The RCA Index is defined as in Equation (5.3): 
 
      
    
     
  
      
    
   
  
                (5.3) 
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where     
      measures China's exports to the ROW (excluding the USA) for each 
product i in period t,   
      is China’s total exports in a given year,     
    measures 
ROW total exports (excluding to the US market) for product i in period t and   
    
measures ROW total exports in a given year. We take China's exports to the ROW, 
which excludes the US market, so that the results will not be biased when we are 
comparing products in actual and potential competition.  
 
We constructed the simple average RCA index for all products in each year, as shown in 
Table 5.13. For the period 1992-2008, China’s RCA to the ROW was about 1.84 for the 
common products in actual competition, while the RCA index was just 0.50 for the set 
of potential products, indicating that China did not on average have a comparative 
advantage in the set of potential products for all the years in our sample. This is not 
surprising, considering that the USA is one of the most important import markets 
worldwide and China exports its most competitive products to the US market.  
 
Table 5.13: China’s RCA Index to ROW (excluding the USA) 
Period Actual Products Potential Products 
 
RCA Index RCA Index 
1992 2.40 0.62 
1993 1.87 0.37 
1994 1.91 0.52 
1995 2.00 0.58 
1996 2.03 0.54 
1997 1.92 0.48 
1998 1.92 0.48 
1999 1.90 0.50 
2000 1.88 0.54 
2001 1.85 0.45 
2002 1.74 0.46 
2003 1.74 0.42 
2004 1.70 0.46 
2005 1.70 0.44 
2006 1.70 0.50 
2007 1.63 0.47 
2008 1.71 0.50 
Total 1.84 0.50 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
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The RCA index are product specific as in Equation (5.3) and we compute China’s 
average RCA index to the ROW for each of the 15 different sectors and compare 
between potential and actual competition products (Table 5.14). The results indicate that 
China does not have a comparative advantage for the products in almost all the sectors 
that it does not export to the USA, except the textiles industry. As mentioned, the USA 
is a large market to which most of China’s exports will be exported. China has a 
comparative advantage for most products that it exports to the US market (actual 
competition), as indicated by the RCA index that is greater than one, but in this chapter 
we are interested only in the set of products in potential competition; the RCA indexes 
for both sets are tabulated for comparison purposes only. 
 
Table 5.14: China’s RCA Index to the ROW by Sector (1992-2008) 
 
Actual Products Potential Products 
Sector Product Headings RCA Index Product Headings RCA Index 
Animals (0) 713 1.62 538 0.16 
Vegetables (1) 1826 1.92 999 0.54 
Foodstuffs (2) 1357 1.10 582 0.53 
Minerals (3) 774 1.79 500 0.73 
Chemicals (4) 5138 1.16 1645 0.32 
Plastics (5) 2156 0.62 321 0.12 
LF (6) 609 3.48 106 0.29 
Wood (7) 1948 1.05 408 0.23 
Textiles (8) 8303 3.40 1369 1.33 
Footwear (9) 698 5.15 5 0.93 
Stone (10) 1597 1.27 294 0.32 
Metals (11) 5419 1.33 1102 0.34 
Machinery (12) 7793 1.19 870 0.23 
Transport (13) 906 0.82 290 0.13 
Misc (14) 3294 2.59 136 0.31 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
For potential products, one sector that particularly stands out is the textiles industry, 
which shows that China has a comparative advantage in the ROW markets, as indicated 
by its RCA index (excluding to the USA) of 1.33. There are more than 1300 
observations for textile products in potential competition, and it is a surprise indeed to 
find China not exporting these products to the US market if it has a comparative 
advantage in these products in the ROW markets. One possible explanation is the trade 
policy that was implemented to restrict Chinese products into the USA, specifically the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). Another problem could be that China exports many 
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of the lower-quality textiles to the lower-income developing countries. To check for 
this, we calculated China’s RCA index to just the OECD high-income countries for 
textile products in potential competition. Our results show that China has an RCA index 
of around 0.8; that is, it does not have a comparative advantage for these products in the 
OECD region either. However, many of the OECD countries also imposed MFA quotas 
on Chinese products, hence we cannot be certain about the possible reasons for China 
not exporting these products to the USA in the first place.  
 
Under the MFA, developed countries like the USA would set quotas on yarn, textiles 
and apparel from developing countries, which are seen as a way to raise the domestic 
price of clothing by limiting imports from the cheaper developing countries. Another 
impact of MFA is that Mexico indirectly benefited from the US quotas on its 
competitors. The set of products that are integrated into the WTO rules by the removal 
of quotas during each phase are import country specific.  
 
Under the Uruguay Round, the developed countries started the process of gradually 
removing the quotas on textiles and clothing products over four phases, under which the 
quotas on textiles were totally abolished in 2005. China was ineligible for the first two 
phases, as it only joined the WTO in 2001; the USA lifted quotas on Chinese products 
for the first three phases, starting in 2002. Thus, although China has a comparative 
advantage in many of these products, there is a limit on the quantity entering the USA. 
The ATC started the process of gradually removing the quotas on textiles and clothing 
products over the four phases. Under the MFA, the USA is supposed to abolish quotas 
on all Chinese products (textiles and yarns) by 2005; however, the USA successfully 
implemented safeguards on 22 products under the MFA against Chinese products, 
effective until the end of 2008 (Brambilla et al., 2010). The importing country (USA) 
has the power to choose which set of products to include for each phase-out period as 
long as it complies with the shares of its integrated export volume. These researchers 
found that Chinese exports under the MFA are still relatively restricted to the US 
market, as China faced a stronger quota system compared to other countries. Brambilla 
et al. (2010) commented that a relatively high share of Chinese exports was covered by 
the quotas, which were binding. China also faced relatively lower quota growth rate and 
was very restricted in adjusting its quotas using flexibility. After the quotas were lifted 
in 2005, China’s exports surged and these researchers also found that almost all regions, 
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except South Asian countries, experienced a decline in exports (MFA products) to the 
US market. Their findings also show that China’s unit values fell in the years in which 
its products were integrated. As Mexico is a member of NAFTA, the majority of its 
exports to the USA are not subject to quotas and hence the elimination of quotas could 
have posed a serious threat to Mexico’s products.  
 
A limit on the amount of China’s exports would generally affect its competitive effects 
on products in actual competition. In potential competition, only zero quotas matter, as 
they restrict specific Chinese products completely. The non-tariff measures for the USA 
are obtained from the TRAINS database in WITS and the data is only available up to 
the year 2006. There are many different classifications of non-tariff barriers, but the 
USA only reported those related to anti-dumping regarding China, again only affecting 
products in actual competition. For potential competition, we need to identify those 
products that the USA has banned, usually for health or safety measures. In 2004 the 
USA stopped importing poultry products from China out of fear of bird flu. However, 
most of the NTBs from the USA are not a complete ban on Chinese imports; they 
restrict the amount of Chinese imports and are more relevant to actual competition. We 
identify and investigate the characteristics of the products that are affected by the MFA 
quotas in the section on temporal competition. 
 
5.6 Deriving China’s Probability of Exporting 
 
Our assumption is that China’s increased productivity is the exogenous shock, which is 
independent of Mexico’s pricing decisions and also the tariffs imposed by the USA 
Furthermore as we are dealing with the final Chinese price, which has already taken into 
account of the tariffs. There is the worry that Chinese entry can occur due to the failure 
of Mexico's strategy to deter entry; that is, if entry is not exogenous we may get biases 
in estimating its effects. We need find a control variable that isolates the effect of 
Chinese entry. We thus propose a method to find the probability of China entering the 
market that is independent of Mexico's firms. This can be done using a binary response 
function: variables with only two categories. The main interest in a binary function lies 
in the response probability (y), which can be explained by a set of x explanatory 
variables (         , as shown in Equation (5.4). In this exercise,     
      is China’s 
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export indicator, which has a value of 1 if China exports to the USA and 0 if not. We 
consider three explanatory variables: the lagged value of the dependent variable 
itself       
     , the ratio of the HS6 (it is the total number of HS6 subheadings under each 
HS4 heading) and China’s RCA to the ROW index (excluding the USA). The lagged 
dependent variable       
      is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if China exported in 
the previous period (T-1) and 0 otherwise. We will provide an explanation to derive the 
ratio of HS6 following Equation (5.6) 
 
     |        |                   (5.4)  
 
 (   |    )           
                      
              
                 (5.5) 
 
In order to make sure that the response probability lies between 0 and 1, we use the 
nonlinear logit model. The logistic distribution function can be represented by Equation 
(5.6): 
 
     |    
 
   
 
       
 
                  (5.6) 
where              
                      
              
            
 
Our sample is panel data for the period 1992-2008. We use the lagged dependent 
variable to explain the function, following what previous authors have done (Söderbom 
and Teal, 2001). The theory would suggest    being positive, as the firm’s ability to 
export in the previous period would likely increase its ability to export again this year.  
 
We now provide an explanation of how to derive the               
     . As 
emphasised by Andrews (1949), the concept of 'cross-entry competition' can happen if 
firms that are already established in other products diversify and move into the market if 
conditions are right. We will treat the HS4 classification as specific groups that contain 
products classified at the HS6 level. It is assumed that it will be easier for a firm to 
export a potential product if it has already exported many other products in that group. 
Our approach is to find the total number of HS6 subheadings under each HS4 heading 
for each year that China exports to the USA, which we define as the 
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     . Since our main focus is on the potential set of products – that is, 
products that Mexico exports to the USA without direct Chinese competition – we take 
Mexico’s total export headings to the US market as the reference set to find the ratio of 
Chinese exports. The               
      will be used as an explanatory variable in the 
logit model. We expect products within a specific HS4 subheading to be closely related 
and hence firms within an industry (HS4) will find it easier to shift production to other 
products within that group.  
 
For a potential product, we find the number of product headings (HS6) under HS4 that 
China exports in a given year. This is done without taking into account the product itself 
during the calculation to avoid simultaneity issues. It is noted that this method of 
calculation will tend to provide a higher HS6 ratio for the potential products compared 
to products in actual competition, which is slightly perverse, but we have not discovered 
a better formulation. The example in Table 5.15 shows how the ratio of HS6 products is 
obtained. In 2000, there were five different products at the HS6 level that Mexico 
exported to the USA under the HS4 group (2811), where China exported a total of four 
out of the five products at the HS6 level. Without taking into account the product itself 
during calculation, the denominator (Mexico export) is 4 and the numerator depends on 
the number of products within the HS4 group that China exports to the USA. In this 
example, the ratio of the number of HS6 products within the HS4 category for the 
potential product has a value of 1, as China exports all the other four products to the US 
market. The values for the ratio of HS6 are obtained for each product, which is then 
used as an explanatory variable to find the probability of China exporting.  
 
Table 5.15: Ratio of HS6   
   
China Export China Export 
Mexico 
Export 
Ratio of HS 6 
Digits 
Year HS4 HS6 
0 = No Export, 1 = 
Export 
(Product 
Headings) 
(Product 
Headings)  
2000 2811 2811-11 1 3 4 0.75 
2000 
 
2811-19 1 3 4 0.75 
2000 
 
2811-22 1 3 4 0.75 
2000 
 
2811-23 0 4 4 1.00 
2000 
 
2811-29 1 3 4 0.75 
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The probability of China exporting a potential product also depends on the 
competitiveness level of China to the ROW (excluding the USA), as measured by the 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index. China’s RCA index for each product is 
obtained and calculated using Equation (5.3) above. The theory would suggest that 
China is more likely to export to the USA if it has a comparative advantage in the other 
markets. After we have obtained the values for each of the explanatory variables, the 
model is run using the ordinary logit regression model as in Equation (5.6) above. 
 
The regression results in Table 5.16 show the estimation using the ordinary logit 
regression. The coefficients for the logit model are expressed in the log odds ratio and 
cannot be read as normal OLS coefficients. The marginal effects show that an increase 
in each of the explanatory variables increases the probability of China exporting to the 
USA in period t; the effect is in the expected direction. We need to generate a new set of 
variables, so we need to estimate the predicted probability of China exporting for each 
observation in our sample.   
 
Table 5.16: Ordinary Logit Regression Results 
 
Coefficient 
(S.E) 
Marginal Effects 
      
      3.30*** 0.50*** 
 
(0.034) (0.01) 
Ratio of HS6 Digits 1.23*** 0.09*** 
 
(0.041) (0.00) 
RCA Index 0.27*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.013) (0.00) 
Constant -1.29***  
 
(0.068)  
Time Dummies Yes  
N 49861  
 
Prob > chi2    =  0.0000  
 
 
We will refer to the same example, product 281123 for the year 2000, where the 
probability of China exporting to the US market is calculated with a predicted value of 
0.45. In order to estimate the probability of exporting that product, we insert the values 
of   ,    and    into Equation (5.7). The predicted probability of China exporting a 
particular product in period t is obtained by plugging the estimated coefficients and the 
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values of the relevant explanatory variables into Equation (5.6). Thus we use Equation 
(5.7), with year dummies included (not shown in Equation) 
 
                                             (5.7) 
 
We then proceed to find the predicted probability of China exporting for each product 
year. We calculate that the average probability of China exporting is 0.41 for potential 
products, while the probability of exporting for actual products, used for reference 
purposes, is 0.91. The figures in Table 5.17 show the probability distribution for actual 
and potential products. For the products that China exports to the US market (actual 
competition), we find that 94.2% of these product-years have a probability of exporting 
of more than 0.5, while the remaining 5.8% have a probability of less than 0.5. For 
convenience purposes, the probability of 0.5 will be used as the benchmark; those 
product-years with a value greater than 0.5 will be referred to as high-probability 
products, while those with a value less than 0.5 will be referred to as low probability. 
This supports our model specification, which suggests that the probability of exporting 
to the US market is definitely higher for products that are already in China’s export 
basket to the USA. 
 
Table 5.17: Probability Distribution Table (Ordinary Logit) 
 
Count Count Total Count 
 
Prob ≥ 0.5 Prob < 0.5 
 
China Export (actual) 38708(94.2%) 2403(5.8%) 41111 
China Do Not Export (potential) 2415(27.6%) 6335(72.4%) 8750 
 
For the potential products, our results showed that 27.6% of the product-years have a 
probability of exporting that is greater than 0.5, while the remaining 72.4% of product-
years have a predicted probability value that is less than 0.5. The high probability of 
exporting is driven mainly by China exporting that product in period T-1, which implies 
a high probability of exporting in the first year during which exports cease. However, 
on the whole it seems that the model does provide acceptable probability estimates, as 
almost all of the products in actual competition that have a high export probability are 
exported, while those with low probability in potential competition are not exported. 
For products with a high probability of exporting but that China did not export, this 
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would suggest that there are some unknown factors that are not captured in our model 
specification; that is, restrictions and bans on Chinese imports. 
 
5.6.1 Probability Density Function 
 
We sketched the Kernel density function to look at the probability of exporting pattern 
for just the potential products. There are two distinct peaks, as shown in Figure 5.5, as 
the probability of exporting model has the implication that the probability of exporting 
in the current period (T) leans towards whether China exported in the previous period 
(T-1). As we have calculated, the average probability of exporting for those products 
where China exited the market is very high, at 0.91, while the other group has an 
average value of 0.27, which seems to be pretty close to the two peaks in Figure 5.5. 
Mexico might be less concerned with those products where China exited the market, but 
not assuredly so, as China might still re-enter.  
 
Figure 5.5: Probability Density Distribution 
 
 
 
5.7 Methodology 
 
Again we emphasise that China’s increased productivity is the exogenous shock which 
is independent of Mexico’s pricing decisions. We thus derived China’s probability to 
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export as an additional control variable which isolates the effect of Chinese entry. We 
introduce a model to study the competitive price effects from products that China does 
not yet supply to the US market which we termed as ‘potential competition’. 
 
 
5.7.1 Econometric Model 
 
Our approach is similar to that of actual competition where we focus on one market – 
the USA – and one other middle-income supplier – Mexico. The econometric equation 
that we use for potential competition is constructed similarly to that for actual 
competition. Potential competition in this case can be examined by regressing Mexico’s 
unit prices on the estimated price if China enters, referred to as the predicted Chinese 
price. Equation (5.8) is the main equation to find the competitive effect on Mexico and 
this is similar to that in actual competition with product fixed effects. A product at the 
HS6 level is categorised as i and the period defined as t. The exchange rates for both 
countries can be better represented by time dummy variables in Equation (5.8), as they 
are invariant across products and will be absorbed into the fixed effect regression. 
 
      
            
 ̃                              (5.8) 
 
      
  is the tariff-inclusive price of Mexico’s product in the United States and       
 ̃  is 
the estimated Chinese price in logs. This regression is used on the set of potential 
products in order to find   , which is the price effect of China on the potential set of 
products. However, as data is not available for the set of potential Chinese exports to the 
USA, we need to find a way to predict their price. When working with potential 
products, we are actually dealing with something that is not physically there and 
predicting what its price would be if China entered. 
 
 
5.7.2 Generating the Predicted Chinese Prices 
 
These potential products can be further grouped into two main categories, namely 
products that China does export to the ROW and those that China does not export at all. 
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As mentioned, we identify the threat of entry by looking at China’s exports to the other 
markets for the set of potential products. For those products that China does not export 
at all, it will not be possible to know whether China has the capacity to produce those 
products domestically, as the Chinese classification of products internally is different 
from the HS6 classification. We will ignore these products. The products that China has 
the capacity to export to the ROW but not the USA can be termed the set of potential 
products.  
 
 
As there are no actual prices to the USA for the set of potential products, we will need 
to generate the predicted Chinese price using Equation (5.9) 
 
      
                           (5.9) 
 
 In order to generate the predicted Chinese price, we need to look for suitable regressors 
(      that can provide some kind of indicator to the Chinese price in the US market. 
This in a way is similar to instrumenting for the Chinese price in the first-stage IV 
regression that we performed for actual competition. However, in potential competition, 
the Chinese prices simply do not exist, as these products are not exported to the USA 
but we have to generate their price based on the set of suitable regressors. The suitable 
regressors that we will use to predict the price for the potential products are mostly the 
same set of variables for the first-stage regression in actual competition; that is, the 
sectoral mean price, Japan and Korea’s reported prices and also China's reported price 
to the ROW. 
 
We estimate Equation (5.9) based on the mixed sample, where      is known, and use 
it to predict where it is not (potential products); that is, to generate the predicted price 
for the potential products. Once we have generated the predicted Chinese price, we will 
work only with the sample of potential products. We obtain different samples for the 
predicted Chinese price (     
 ̃  ) as the chosen regressors change. Thus we have generated 
the predicted Chinese prices for the potential set of products, which can be seen as the 
equivalent of using IV to generate the Chinese price effect as in actual competition.  
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As mentioned in the chapter on actual competition, there is also concern that Mexico’s 
prices in the other markets might also be influenced by China’s presence and hence 
affect its prices in the US market, thus we chose markets in which Mexico is a small 
player. Japan and Korea are the two markets in which Mexico has a relatively small 
share, as mentioned above. Japan and Korea are the major export markets for China, so 
we will be able to obtain more observations to predict Chinese prices in the USA. We 
assume that Chinese prices to these markets are direct indicators of the forces 
influencing Chinese prices in the US market, but have only an indirect effect on 
Mexico’s prices in the USA. Similarly to actual competition, we use importer data for 
consistency and efficiency purposes. 
 
 
In order to increase our sample size, we use the unit price of China’s exports to the 
ROW (excluding the USA). These are for the products that China exported to the ROW 
(excluding the USA) and the unit prices are those reported by China. There are of 
course many advantages in using the prices reported by China’s trading partners, as we 
have done previously, but here it is noted that different countries use different units of 
measurement for traded products, thus it will not be ideal to take the average unit price 
as reported by the ROW. However, to solve this problem, we can take the data reported 
by just one country, namely China’s exports to the ROW. Data as reported by China 
will have similar units for exports to other countries, hence there will not be a unit 
inconsistency problem. If China does export to the ROW, this will mean that China 
already has the capacity to export that product and will find it easier to shift its export 
path into the US.  
 
After generating the predicted Chinese price, the next step involves replacing the 
predicted    ̃Ci,t in Equation (5.8), where our main subject of interest is China’s price 
effect represented by   . The estimated results rely heavily on the predicted Chinese 
prices (estimated price that China would have charged if it entered) generated by the set 
of explanatory variables in the first stage. We expect the Chinese price effect to be 
positive, as Mexico will react to the predicted Chinese products in order to prevent 
China from entering the US market for potential products following limit pricing theory. 
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5.8 Regression Results 
 
The results in Table 5.18 show the regression results for predicting Chinese prices using 
the four suggested explanatory variables, namely Japan’s reported price, Korea’s 
reported price and China’s reported price to the ROW. The regressors we use are similar 
to those used for actual competition, except that we have added in China's reported price 
to the ROW. Here we get slightly more observations in the first stage as compared to 
that in actual competition, as we do not restrict our sample to only Mexico’s exports to 
the US market; that is, for Japan, an observation is taken into account if China exports 
to Japan and the USA even if it is not in Mexico’s export basket to the USA. However, 
other than the slightly different observations, the first-stage estimates are similar to 
those obtained for actual competition. The R
2
 are not high for the regressions to 
generate the predicted Chinese price and this casts doubt on the strength of our 
regressors. Nevertheless, all the regressors have an F statistic well over 10, which 
according to Staiger and Stock (1997) is a necessary condition to suggest that the 
regressors are adequately strong. 
 
Table 5.18: Predicted Variable Estimates  
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Japan Price Korea Price China Exports ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.29*** 0.26* 0.37*** 
 
(0.1) (0.14) (0.091) 
Time Fixed  Effect 
FRfFixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.029 0.027 0.02 
N 3966 3749 8469 
First Stage to get Predicted Price 
Predicted Price 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 
 
(0.0053) (0.0044) (0.0065) 
F-Stats (Prob>F) 88.09 (0.00) 68.75 (0.00) 71.49(0.00) 
R
2
 0.045 0.038 0.032 
N 35430 33469 41085 
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The Chinese price effect is significant and ranges from 0.26 to 0.37, depending on the 
instruments used. The first-stage regression shows the relevance of the selected 
variables with the Chinese price. We then use these estimates to generate the predicted 
Chinese unit prices for these potential products. The Chinese price in the US market is 
expected to fall by 0.17% for every 1% decline in prices of Chinese exports to Japan. 
The coefficient for the Korean price is significant and positive at 0.11. We obtained a 
coefficient of 0.18 in the first stage when using Chinese reported price as our 
explanatory variable. The results show that the selected regressors all provide 
statistically significant estimates, which is used to generate the predicted Chinese price.  
 
The product sample used to generate the predicted Chinese prices varies with the 
different regressors chosen. We will thus obtain different predicted prices for the set of 
potential products based on the regressors chosen. There must be observations for these 
indicators in order to predict the Chinese price that is not there in the first place. We 
lose further observations doing this and the number of observations we are left with 
using each indicator are shown in Table 5.18. Using average sectoral means and China’s 
reported price to the ROW, we get to preserve most of the sample, while we are left 
with fewer than 4000 product-years when using Japan and Korea’s reported prices. 
After we have obtained the predicted Chinese prices to the USA for the set of potential 
products, we proceed to find its competitive effect on Mexico. In potential competition, 
we use only individual indicators to predict Chinese prices, as using a combination of 
these explanatory variables will result in the loss of further observations.  
 
After controlling for product fixed effects, the regression results in Table 5.18 show that 
the Chinese price effect is positive and statistically significant. This supports our theory 
of potential competition, where Mexico will try to constrain its prices based on the 
estimated price that China would charge if it entered the market. The Chinese price 
effect ranges from around 0.26 to 0.37 depending on the predictors used; these are 
slightly lower than the values we obtained for actual competition. If Mexico predicts 
that the estimated Chinese price to enter the market will be 10% lower, Mexico will 
reduce its price by 3.7% compared to China’s price to the ROW. 
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In the previous sections, we found the probability of China exporting a product to the 
US market based on the ordinary logit model. One might hypothesise that the 
competitive effect will increase when China has a higher probability of exporting a 
product. To do this, we controlled for the interaction term      
 ̃          
 ̃   to measure 
the marginal changes in the Chinese price effect with China’s probability of exporting, 
which we will call the interaction effect of the Chinese price. Our equation specification 
is represented by Equation (5.10), which makes use of two generated regressors,     
 ̃   
and      
 ̃          
 ̃  . Our specification and regression results in Appendix 5.2 include 
adding in the         
 ̃  separately; however, as our main objective is the Chinese price 
effect and the results are quite similar for both specifications, we decided to drop 
        
 ̃  in Equation (5.10):  
 
      
          
 ̃    (    
 ̃          
 ̃ )            (5.10)  
 
In Equation (5.11), the individual Chinese price effect is    and if      this implies a 
competitive price effect when China's probability of exporting increases. We will refer 
to    as the interaction effect brought about by China’s probability of exporting. 
 
       
 
     
 ̃⁄               
                                (5.11) 
 
The predicted Chinese price effect is still statistically significant and positive when 
using the full regression in Table 5.19. We expect to see positive coefficients for the 
interaction effects, but it is surprising to see that the interaction effects on Chinese 
prices are all insignificant and even in the wrong direction.  
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Table 5.19: Full Regression 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Instrument is  Japan Price Korea Price China Exports to ROW 
    
Predicted China Price 0.38*** 0.25* 0.43*** 
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.096) 
Interaction (Pc*Prob Export) -0.050 -0.027 -0.038 
 
(0.039) (0.037) (0.028) 
R
2
 0.031 0.029 0.022 
N 3730 3542 7761 
Time Fixed  Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Our specification to generate China’s predicted probability of exporting to the USA is a 
function of China’s RCA to the ROW, the ratio of HS6 and whether China exported in 
the previous period using the logit model. However, a problem arises, as the probability 
of exporting relies strongly on China actually exporting in the previous period (T-1); 
that is, if China exports in the previous period, we expect China also to export in this 
period. As shown in Table 5.19 above, China’s probability of exporting in the current 
period increases by about 50% if it exports in the previous year. If China exited the 
market, Mexico might not be too worried about constraining its own price, as the logic 
behind potential pricing is to deter entry, although there is the worry that China might 
re-enter the market.  
 
Before we rule out the impact of the probability of exporting on the Chinese price 
effect, we drop those product-years in potential competition where China exited the 
market. We lose further observations doing this; the results in Table 5.20 show that the 
coefficients on the interaction term are still statistically insignificant and in the wrong 
direction, except when using China’s reported price to the ROW, where the interaction 
effect is in the expected direction but insignificant. It is surprising that we did not obtain 
a positive effect for the interaction term, but we feel assured that potential pricing exists 
and that the predicted Chinese price effect is still positive and statistically significant; 
the predicted Chinese price acts as a constraint on Mexico’s price even if China has not 
entered the market. 
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Table 5.20: Full Regression (China Exported in Neither T nor (T-1)) 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s Price 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Instrument is Japan Price Korea Price China Exports to ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.52*** 0.27 0.42*** 
 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.12) 
Interaction(Pc*ProbExport) 0.27* 0.014 0.13 
 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.11) 
R
2
 0.052 0.052 0.027 
N 2669 2502 5981 
Time Fixed  Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
We could argue that if China had a high probability of exporting but did not do so, this 
is probably due to some barriers of entry. Brambilla et al. (2010) found that Chinese 
exports under the MFA are still relatively restricted in the USA, as it faces a stronger 
quota system than other countries. The quota restrictions are most likely to affect actual 
competition. Bown and McCulloch (2009) also mention that the USA tried to reduce the 
trade deficit through slowing down imports from China by applying more restrictive 
measures on Chinese products. If there exists a ban on China’s product in period t, then 
this will not be picked up by our equation specification; however, there is no available 
data on China’s products banned by the USA at the disaggregated level. Although there 
are data on quota restrictions available for the MFA, these are most likely to affect 
competitive effects for actual competition. According to Bown (2009:30), some of the 
reasoning behind the US ban on Chinese products included ‘claims of unsafe chemicals 
found in Chinese products such as pet food and toothpaste, lead paint in toys, defective 
radial tires and banned antibiotics applied to farmed seafood’. If there exists a ban on 
Chinese products, then this will not be picked up by our equation specification; 
however, there is no available data on the banned products.  
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5.8.1 China Price Effect by Sector (OECD) 
 
We classify the potential products into five different sectors as characterised by their 
technology intensity, as shown in Table 5.21; most of the potential products are in the 
non-industrial to medium high technology groups.  
 
Table 5.21: Product Headings by OECD Classified Sector 
 
OECD sectors Product Years 
Non-industrial 1 1,740 
Low Technology 2 2,810 
Medium Low Technology 3 1,619 
Medium High Technology 4 3,151 
High Technology 5 245 
 
The simple bivariate regression results in Table 5.22 show the Chinese price effect as 
classified by the five different OECD sectors. The regressors are allowed to have their 
own slopes, classified by the five OECD sectors. The Chinese price effect varies 
according to the indicators used; we get the perverse sign for the high technology sector, 
but the results should not be taken seriously as there are very few potential observations 
in this sector. The Chinese effect is most notable in the low and medium low technology 
sectors, which are exactly the sectors in which we would expect Chinese competition. 
 
Table 5.22: China Price Effect by OECD Sector (Second Stage) 
Dependent variable is Mexico’s price 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Instrument is  Japan Price Korea Price China Exports to ROW 
Predicted Chinese Price 
   
Non-industrial 0.65** -0.19 0.69*** 
 
(0.26) (0.29) (0.20) 
Low Technology 1.54*** 0.70** 1.07*** 
 
(0.22) (0.27) (0.16) 
Medium Low Technology 0.99*** 0.35 1.28*** 
 
(0.25) (0.31) (0.20) 
Medium High Technology -0.26** 0.23 -0.43*** 
 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.13) 
High Technology -0.52 1.38 -1.51*** 
 
(1.24) (1.56) (0.53) 
   0.053 0.030 0.034 
N 3948 3749 8469 
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5.8.2 Robustness Tests 
 
5.8.2.1  First Difference 
 
The first difference method is another way to get rid of the time-invariant unobserved 
effect. Although our assumption is that the predicted Chinese price in the USA acts as 
the main shock causing Mexico to adjust its price under limit pricing, a potential 
problem that can occur is when     
  and     
 ̃   both follow a deterministic trend, which 
we assume to be independent of each other. If this is the case, first differencing and first 
difference fixed effects provide a way to get rid of the trend; the regression results are 
shown in Table 5.23.  
 
Table 5.23: First Difference and Fixed Effects of First Difference 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s price 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Instrument is Japan Price Korea Price China Exports to ROW 
First Difference 
Predicted Chinese Price 0.49*** 0.38** -0.15 
 
(0.11) (0.15) (0.095) 
   0.0001 0.01 0.0001 
N 2237 1992 5759 
Fixed Effect of First Difference 
Predicted Chinese price 0.45*** 0.28 -0.095 
 
(0.14) (0.20) (0.11) 
   0.01 0.002 0.0002 
N 2237 1992 5759 
 
The first difference method shows that the Chinese price effects are positive and 
statistically significant when instrumented using Japan and Korea’s reported price. The 
results show that the Chinese price effect is around 0.49 to 0.38 when predicted using 
Japan and Korea’s prices respectively. However, we are left with only about 2000 
observations when predicting using Japan and Korea’s reported prices. We would 
expect to get more accurate results when using China’s reported price to the ROW, as 
we get to retain more observations; however, the predicted Chinese price effect is not 
significant using those indicators. It is noted that we get a low    in all cases, indicating 
that the predicted Chinese prices do not explain the variation in Mexico’s prices very 
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well for the potential products.  However, we think it is more important to have a 
correctly specified model than it is to have a large   . 
 
First differencing fixed effects will get rid of the unobserved time-invariant factors    
and the trend for both China and Mexico's prices. If we assume the trend to be product 
specific, then first difference followed by fixed effects estimation will get rid of the 
product-specific trend. The Chinese price effect is only significant when instrumented 
and predicted using Japan’s reported price. The fixed effects of first difference for the 
full regression are shown in Appendix 5.3. We found China’s predicted price to have a 
significant impact, restricting Mexico’s price using Japan and Korea as indicators. 
These results also tend to suggest no effect for the interaction term.  
 
5.8.2.2 Controlling for Global Export Price 
 
As there is also the worry that prices might be correlated, we also included the global 
export to take out the trends in product price and also be seen as a control for the other 
competitors’ as a further robustness test. The regression results in Table 5.24 are 
obtained following Equation (5.12). The global export price is calculated using the same 
method as specified in the section on actual competition.   
 
      
                  
 ̃            
 ̃          
           
                (5.12) 
 
Table 5.24 : IV Regression (Controlling for Global Export Price) 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s price 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Instrument is  Japan Price Korea Price China  Export Price 
China Final Price 0.19* 0.21 0.23*** 
  (0.11) (0.14) (0.089) 
Price*Share -0.020 -0.014 -0.014 
  (0.037) (0.036) (0.026) 
Global Export Price 0.61*** 0.35*** 0.56*** 
  (0.036) (0.039) (0.018) 
N 3708 3541 7755 
R
2
 0.138 0.065 0.158 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
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We find that the Chinese price influence is still statistically significant when predicted 
using China’s export price, Japan prices and Korea’s price. The results with the global 
export price are comparable with the regression results as shown in Table 5.20 above. 
This further justifies that the Chinese price effect is indeed present in potential 
competition and the results are not driven by other competitors, pricing.  
 
5.8.2.3 Bootstrapping to Correct for Standard Errors 
 
When dealing with potential products, we are looking at ‘invisible’ prices, as the 
products are not exported to the USA in the first place, thus when we use predicted 
values we need to recognise that they are measured with error. This is a potential 
problem with our regression, because the standard errors and test statistics obtained will 
be incorrect, as they ignore the sampling variation in the generated regressors; hence 
inferences might be incorrect. We can use the bootstrapping method as proposed by 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010) to adjust for standard errors and test statistics. In general, 
bootstrapping is a nonparametric resampling method to approximate for standard errors 
based on the sample data. In using the bootstrap method, we are pretending that the 
sample is a proxy for the population, and hence the estimates of the sample are assumed 
to be close to the population estimates. The bootstrap method draws repeated random 
samples with replacement from the entire dataset to generate a bigger dataset that allows 
estimates of each sample. The bootstrapped standard errors are simply the distribution 
of each sample estimate across all the selected samples. Efron and Tibshirani (1994) 
found that 50 replications are often enough to give good estimates for the standard error 
estimates. For this study, we executed 100 and 400 bootstrap replications, a number that 
is generally adequate for correcting standard errors. The bootstrap sample contains the 
same number of observations as the true sample, however some observations appear 
several times and others never. 
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Table 5.25: Bootstrapping for the Standard Errors 
Dependent Variable is Mexico’s price 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Instrument is  Japan Price Korea Price China Exports to ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.52 0.27 0.42 
No Bootstrap (0.13)*** (0.17) (0.12)*** 
Bootstrap 100 replication (0.52) (0.33) (0.40) 
Bootstrap 400 replication (0.50) (0.35) (0.41) 
    
Interaction(Pc*ProbExport) 0.27* 0.014 0.13 
No Bootstrap (0.15)* (0.14) (0.11) 
Bootstrap 100 replication (0.28) (0.15) (0.17) 
Bootstrap 400 replication (0.26) (0.14) (0.16) 
* The asterisk denotes the significance level for the coefficients using bootstrapping 
 
The regression results in Table 5.25 are run using product fixed effects for simple 
bivariate regression where the standard errors are bootstrapped for inference purposes. 
The standard errors when bootstrapped using 100 and 400 replications are almost 
identical in all cases, indicating that 100 replications will be enough to get the correct 
standard errors. The results show that the Chinese price effect after bootstrapping is no 
longer significant in all cases. The results also show that the Chinese price effect in the 
USA is not affected by the probability of China exporting to the US market. We also 
conducted the bootstrapping for the simple equation (results are not shown) and 
similarly found that bootstrapping blows up the standard error, making the Chinese 
price effect no longer significant. The Chinese price effect is no longer significant after 
using the bootstrapping method to correct for the standard errors. The bootstrapped 
results seem to suggest that China does not affect Mexico’s price when it does not 
export. We acknowledge the presence of other competitors in the USA and that Mexico 
will be more worried about price competition with the existing competition when China 
is absent. Another potential explanation is that there might be some kind of barriers to 
entry imposed on these potential products; Mexico does not respond to changes in the 
predicted Chinese price. Hence inference on the Chinese price effect in potential 
competition needs to be treated with appropriate caution.  
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On the other hand it is important to reflect on the way in which bootstrapping works in a 
panel. Although the resampling with replacements over commodities rather than over 
individual observations, each observation has a different probability of being selected 
for an unbalanced panel. When it constructs samples by replacing specific observations 
by others, it does not attend to whether the two observations refer to the same 
commodity. Since we include product-specific effects, this is potentially quite 
inappropriate; it could lead to a spurious increase in the residual errors and hence in the 
calculated standard errors. Bootstrapped standard errors tend to be larger than the 
normal  OLS standard errors when data is noisy and hence provides a more conservative 
inference  (Banks et al., 2010).  
 
5.9 Temporal Price Effect 
 
The other method of identifying potential competition is to look at the temporal 
dimension before and after China’s entry. To study the effects of potential competition, 
we need to find the first year in which China entered the US market for each particular 
product. Thus, all periods before Chinese competition are classified as period T-n, 
which is defined as pre Chinese entry. Suppose China enters the market in period T, 
these products will face actual Chinese competition for the periods (T+n) after China's 
entry, which can be defined as post Chinese entry. Thus, although China does not export 
those products before period T, Mexico’s pricing could be constrained by the ability of 
China to start exporting. This method can also be used to assess the potential Chinese 
competitive effect on Mexico: Mexican producers respond to China’s entry before and 
after competition occurs. There are two possible scenarios that can happen when China 
enters the market: either the countries will engage in price competition, or they will 
realise that both will be better off if they cooperate.  
 
In Figure 5.6, we show the example of higher pricing by Mexico before Chinese entry 
and price competition occurring after Chinese entry. Mexico is more likely to charge a 
higher price if it is protected by some kind of structural entry barrier. An example is in 
the form of blockaded entry, which occurs when incumbents do not have to resort to 
any strategies to prevent entry. Under blockaded entry there will be a bigger shock to 
Mexico when the blockades are removed and China enters the market as compared to 
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non-blockaded entry. . The MFA can be considered an example of a blockaded entry on 
Chinese textile products that has benefited countries like Mexico that are members of 
NAFTA, as they face little incentive to reduce prices. On the other hand once the quotas 
are removed these products will face a bigger shock than would non-blockaded products. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Temporal Dimension (Competition) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the limit pricing conditions, Mexico will try to take action before entry even  
 
Under the limit pricing conditions, Mexico will try to take actions before entry even 
takes place to prevent Chinese products from entering the US market, usually by 
constraining its own price.  
 
Another possible post-entry scenario that can occur is that Mexico might try to constrain 
its price to deter Chinese entry, but practise tacit cooperation once China enters, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.7. Mexico’s price rise after entry would tend to suggest price 
competition before entry, and this pattern would tend to support our hypothesis of limit 
pricing for potential products. In the case when Mexico’s price falls after Chinese entry, 
there might also have the same form of potential constraint, although in terms of price 
rises the inference in fairly strong. 
 
 
 
 
 
T 
Mexico’s 
Price 
T-n T+n 
Period 
Post-entry Pre-entry 
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Figure 5.7: Temporal Dimension (Cooperation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to investigate Mexico's price pre and post Chinese entry, we will look at the 
price pattern for the three time periods, namely T-n, T and T+n. We will provide some 
descriptive statistics on Mexican prices for the three periods, where the first consists of 
observations just before Chinese entry (T-1), the second is when China first started 
exporting to the US market and the third (T+1) can be defined as the period after 
China’s entry.   
 
An example to examine the temporal dimension is illustrated for product 010600 in 
Table 5.26. China started to export product 010600 (Animals Live except Farm 
Animals) in 2000, thus 1999 (T-1) can be considered the last period in which potential 
competition happens; hence we will look at the price pattern for Mexico’s products for 
period (T-1). Similarly, the year 2001 will be termed (T+1), the first period after China 
enters the market. We will create dummy variables for each of the three specified 
periods, T-1, T and T+1, to find Mexico’s possible different reactions to Chinese 
competition before and after China enters the market. 
 
However, for Chinese exports of some products there might be some breaks during 
certain periods. We will treat it as the case that China has stopped exporting to the US 
market for whatever reason if exports stopped for three years or more. The implication 
is that China’s next entry will be considered a new product. If China did not export the 
product for just one or two years, we will treat it as a missing value and assume that 
China has not actually stopped exporting. Our sample consists of data for the period 
1992-2008, but 1992 cannot be counted as the first year of exports, since the product 
T 
Mexico’s Price 
T-n T+n 
Period 
Post-entry Pre-entry 
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might already have been exported before 1992. We thus dropped those observations 
where China’s first recorded batch of exports was in 1992. Using the full sample set we 
managed to identify 3743 product-years where an entry is recorded. It is particularly 
important that a product is genuinely a new export and not one that arises because of the 
HS classification issue.  
 
Table 5.26: Temporal Potential Competition for Product (010600) 
  
China Export to US 
T-3 1997 No 
T-2 1998 No 
T-1 1999 No 
Period T 2000 Start 1st batch of exports 
T+1 2001 Yes 
T+2 2002 Yes 
 
 
In order to avoid this classification issue, we will use only the sample of clean products, 
as these have not undergone any HS changes during the past revisions. Manova and 
Zhang (2009) provided a comprehensive view on Chinese firms’ participation in the 
export market; they found that big multinationals have a better chance of continuing to 
export, while small Chinese trading firms are the most likely to exit and re-enter the 
export market. Furthermore, they found that firms, especially smaller ones, are more 
likely to switch their export structure and trading partners compared to the bigger 
multinationals. The number of first-entry products (period T) in the clean sample is 
given in Table 5.26, where we are left with a total of 2693 product-years for the sample 
period. However, we are also interested in finding Mexico’s price pattern before entry 
takes place. China’s average share in the US market for its first-entry products was 
relatively small (5%) in 1993, but is seen to have increased after 2000 (16%). Taking 
into account that these are new-entry products, we are measuring different products for 
every year. We show that China’s average product share in the Japanese and Korean 
markets is relatively higher, at around 20% to 30% for these first entry products as 
shown in Table 5.27, indicating that it has a big player in the other markets already. 
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There seems to be a relatively high Chinese share in the USA for the first-entry products 
from 2005 onwards. To reconcile this with the fact that the MFA quotas were lifted 
starting in 2005, we wanted to check whether the high Chinese share arises because of 
this particular reason. We categorised Chinese first-entry products to the USA into two 
groups: products that are subject to MFA quotas (blockaded entry) and those that are 
not affected by quotas (non-blockaded entry). China only started to enjoy the quota 
phase-out during the third phase-out in 2002, soon after it joined the WTO. Brambilla et 
al. (2010) found that Chinese exports in textiles and clothing rose 39% in quantity terms 
the year after quotas were abolished in 2005; China’s unit prices also fell in the years 
after each quota phase-out. They also added that China’s gains came almost entirely at 
the expense of other US trading partners rather than domestic firms.  
 
In Table 5.27, it can be seen that the average product share for first-entry products 
(period T) is relatively higher for quota-restricted products compared to non-quota-
restricted products.  
 
Table 5.27: China's First-Entry Products in the USA (Clean Products) 
Year 
Product 
Count 
Average Chinese 
Share in USA 
Average Mexican 
Share in USA 
Average Chinese 
Share in Japan 
Average Chinese 
Share in Korea 
1993 257 0.05 0.09 0.19 0.20 
1994 196 0.07 0.05 0.25 0.22 
1995 213 0.10 0.06 0.24 0.23 
1996 193 0.07 0.05 0.18 0.16 
1997 149 0.06 0.07 0.22 0.25 
1998 126 0.05 0.09 0.21 0.25 
1999 147 0.05 0.08 0.19 0.21 
2000 492 0.13 0.08 0.23 0.17 
2001 113 0.08 0.04 0.25 0.19 
2002 123 0.07 0.09 0.21 0.24 
2003 123 0.08 0.06 0.29 0.27 
2004 134 0.09 0.06 0.25 0.25 
2005 129 0.10 0.05 0.30 0.28 
2006 109 0.15 0.05 0.29 0.26 
2007 114 0.14 0.03 0.32 0.31 
2008 75 0.16 0.05 0.33 0.32 
Total/Mean 2693 0.09 0.07 0.24 0.22 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
* We also noticed an unusual number of new-entry products in 2000 and concluded that these are all new-entry 
products following the method of identification. 
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The quota affected products are those that gradually integrated in each of the four phase 
out. We constructed the average product share for quota-affected products in each 
period T. China was only eligible for the third phase-out starting in January 2002. For 
these products, average Chinese shares for new products showed quite a big jump after 
2005 when quotas were lifted; they reached 38% in 2008. After quotas were lifted 
starting in 2005, Chinese textile products entered the US market in a big way, acting as 
a shock to Mexico. It was surprising that China entered the market for many products 
before 2002, considering that quotas are applied to them.  
 
 
For those products that are not subject to quotas as shown in Table 5.28, we see only a 
slight increase in China’s shares in the USA since 2005, which is not surprising given 
that average Chinese product shares in the USA have increased over time.  
 
Table 5.28: China's First-Entry Products (Quota Effects) 
 
Not Subject to Quotas 
 
Quota-Affected Products 
 
Year Product Count 
Average Chinese 
Share in USA 
Product Count 
Average Chinese 
Share in USA 
1993 209 0.04 48 0.09 
1994 155 0.04 41 0.16 
1995 159 0.07 54 0.18 
1996 162 0.06 31 0.16 
1997 112 0.05 37 0.08 
1998 97 0.05 29 0.05 
1999 103 0.04 44 0.07 
2000 459 0.13 33 0.16 
2001 101 0.07 12 0.10 
2002 110 0.08 13 0.02 
2003 109 0.08 14 0.10 
2004 118 0.09 16 0.11 
2005 101 0.09 28 0.11 
2006 89 0.13 20 0.23 
2007 97 0.12 17 0.24 
2008 65 0.12 10 0.38 
Total 2246 
 
447 
 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
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In order to identify the temporal dimension of Chinese competition, we will look at 
Mexico’s price pattern in periods T-1 and T-2, two periods before Chinese competition 
actually takes place. Similarly, we will also be looking at post-Chinese competition for 
periods T+1 and T+2. However, to make sure that we are comparing unit prices for the 
same products over time, the products have to be present in all time periods: T-2, T-1, 
T, T+1 and T+2. There are a total of 458 products for which Mexico’s price is observed 
for all five periods, leaving us with 2290 product-years. These are inclusive of quota-
restricted cases, but we will look at quota cases separately when comparing relative 
prices later on. These can be considered Mexico’s established products, as they are 
exported for five consecutive periods, two periods before China’s entry and two periods 
afterwards. For China, these can be considered new products in the US market and they 
will be competing against already established Mexican products.  
 
The sample is, however, a little restricted, since we are constraining Mexico's exports to 
be present for all five periods. It can be noted that China exported only 292 out of these 
458 products in the next period (T+1). In the subsequent period (T+2), only 291 out of 
the 458 were still exported by China. This leaves 230 common products that China still 
exported in both periods T+1 and T+2 out of these 458 products. These are Chinese 
firms that exited from the new export market. The small product share of these 
restricted products might indicate that they are small-scale exporters, who are more 
likely to exit the new export market. China is considered a new entrant and a small 
player for these products, but nonetheless Mexico might be worried about the continual 
expansion of these new Chinese products. We also found that Chinese import shares in 
these restricted products in the Japanese and Korean markets were a remarkable 17% 
and 16% respectively.  
 
Now that we have categorised the products into three different periods, we can find the 
relative price for each of the 458 products for comparison between the five different 
time periods. To make sure that different products are comparable across different 
periods, we need to normalise each product’s price by its own price in period T, which 
is represented as
       
    ⁄ . We can then compare the normalised price for all products 
in the different periods. Table 5.29 shows the average Mexican price for the 458 
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different products that Mexico exports for all five periods. Since all prices in logs are 
weighted relative to period T, the weighted price in period T is 0.  
 
Table 5.29: Average Mexico Price Pattern Relative to Period T 
Variable Observation Mean SD of mean 
T-2 458 -0.01 0.04 
T-1 458 -0.04 0.03 
T (China enters) 458 0 0.00 
T+1 458 -0.01 0.04 
T+2 458 0.04 0.05 
 
On average, the results seem to support price cooperation between the two countries, 
where Mexico’s price increases slightly in period T, but the result is not significantly 
different from no effect. The standard error obtained for our sample is the standard 
deviation of the sample mean calculated using   √ ⁄  , which is representative of the 
population. The slight increase in Mexico’s price in period T compared to period T-1 
suggest price competition from potential entry before entry. Our theory assumes limit 
pricing before entry and Mexico, being the incumbent firm in the US market, might 
have engaged in cooperative pricing with China once it realised that it could no longer 
prevent Chinese entry.  
 
To check whether Mexico’s temporal reaction to entry varied by sector, we break down 
our 458 products into different sectors in order to find their average prices (Table 5.30), 
which are appended together to find their average log unit price by sector, although 
behaviour may vary by product. There is no obvious pattern for the different sectors.  
 
However, there must be some products that follow the price pattern in Figure 5.6 (price 
competition), where the countries engage in price competition after Chinese entry. Thus, 
we categorise our sample into two groups, the first group engaging in price competition 
on Chinese entry and the second group those that follow the cooperation price pattern 
after Chinese entry. The two groups are defined by the change in Mexico’s price 
between period T-1 and period T. Products are divided into Group 1 (price 
competition), when Mexico’s price in period T falls relatively to period T-1, and the rest 
in Group 2 (price cooperation). We found that there are indeed two quite distinct 
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patterns, as shown in Table 5.30. The results show that 206 (45%) of products follow 
the price pattern in Figure 5.6 (price competition) where Mexico’s price post Chinese 
entry is lower. For this group (price competition), the figure shows that Mexico’s prices 
fell when Chinese competition occurred in period T, but started to rise slightly, although 
not as high as T-1, in the subsequent period.  
 
Table 5.30: Average Prices by Sector 
Sector Product  Headings T-2 T-1 T (China Enters) T+1 T+2 
Animals (0) 14 0.00 -0.06 0 0.02 -0.02 
Vegetables (1) 50 -0.05 0.00 0 0.08 0.04 
Foodstuffs (2) 28 0.03 -0.12 0 -0.18 -0.17 
Minerals (3) 22 0.12 0.22 0 0.29 0.28 
Chemicals (4) 101 0.07 -0.03 0 -0.12 -0.19 
Plastics (5) 31 0.11 0.13 0 -0.07 -0.12 
Wood (7) 9 0.11 -0.02 0 0.12 0.60 
Textiles (8) 79 0.03 0.01 0 -0.14 -0.05 
Stone (10) 14 0.05 0.02 0 -0.1 0.08 
Metals (11) 53 -0.05 -0.12 0 0.02 0 
Machinery (12) 39 0.17 -0.05 0 -0.03 0.36 
Transport (13) 15 0.17 0.18 0 0.27 0.09 
Misc (14) 3 -0.78 -0.36 0 -0.15 -0.37 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
 
There are also 252 (55%) out of the 458 products that experienced an increase in price 
after Chinese entry following a cooperation pattern as in Table 5.31. Mexico might be 
limiting its price to deter entry, as illustrated by its considerably lower price pre Chinese 
entry, but its price does seem to have increased after Chinese entry.   
 
Table 5.31: Mexico's Price Pre and Post China Entry (Price Competition vs 
Cooperation) 
Price Pattern 
Product 
Headings 
T-2 T-1 
T (China 
enters) 
T+1 T+2 
Price Competition 206 0.30 (0.07) 0.38(0.04) 0(0.00) 0.14(0.05) 0.15(0.6) 
Cooperation 252 -0.25 (0.04) -0.38(0.03) 0 (0.00) -0.12(0.06) -0.05(1.08) 
* In parenthesis is the standard deviation of the estimate of the mean 
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The price pattern for the two sets of products is sketched in Figure 5.8, where there 
seems to be a mean reversion pattern in both cases. One potential problem for this 
pattern is that we sort products according to whether year T exhibits an increase or a 
decline in price, so that on average the former group will tend to have positive errors of 
observation (or other random shocks) and the latter negative ones. Thus in year T+1 we 
would expect the former to fall and the latter to rise, even if there is no change at all in 
the underlying price. This is what we observe on average. However, for products in 
price cooperation, we note that the price in T+1 does not fall all the way back to the 
level in T-1; that is, there is an increase between the two years that we have not used to 
classify observations. Similarly for price competition, we find that the price increase in 
T+1 does not rise all the way up to the level in T-1.  
 
Figure 5.8: Mexico’s Price Pattern (Competition vs Cooperation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since we are dealing with China’s first-entry products, we are interested in whether 
China’s entry can somehow be explained by the probability of exporting index that we 
derived earlier; also we assume that China has a comparative advantage in this product 
if it starts to export to the USA. Table 5.32 shows China’s RCA and probability of 
exporting index for its first entry on the restricted sample (458 products), classified by 
sector. We find China’s RCA (ROW) and its probability of exporting for the two 
different groups. The Chinese RCA index (ROW) is greater than 1 in sector 8 (textiles 
and clothing) for both cooperation and competition; however, its average probability of 
 
Price Competition Cooperative Pricing 
T T 
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exporting is less than 0.5 for all sectors after controlling for other factors affecting its 
propensity to export. This indicates that China does not have a comparative advantage 
for these products (except in textiles), as represented by their small RCA to the ROW; 
these might be small private Chinese firms exporting. As mentioned above, the 
probability of exporting relies heavily on China exporting in T-1; our sample are first-
entry products, hence their low probability of exporting.  
 
Table 5.32: China's RCA and Probability of Exporting by Sector 
 
Cooperation 
 
 
Price Competition 
 
 Sector 
Product 
Headings 
China RCA 
(ROW) 
Prob 
Export 
Product 
headings 
China RCA 
(ROW) 
Prob Export 
Animals (0) 5 0.01 0.21 9 0.08 0.31 
Vegetables (1) 26 0.53 0.31 24 0.49 0.32 
Foodstuffs (2) 15 1.34 0.35 13 0.45 0.3 
Mineral (3) 12 0.68 0.3 10 0.25 0.32 
Chemicals (4) 60 0.34 0.32 41 0.25 0.31 
Plastics (5) 12 0.14 0.36 19 0.08 0.32 
Wood (7) 3 0.29 0.44 6 0.04 0.2 
Textiles (8) 50 1.02 0.35 29 1.77 0.39 
Stone (10) 9 0.16 0.29 5 0.16 0.26 
Metals (11) 27 0.4 0.3 26 0.27 0.26 
Machinery (12) 21 0.16 0.38 18 0.13 0.3 
Transport (13) 10 0.04 0.29 5 0.05 0.25 
Misc (14) 2 0.44 0.45 1 0.01 0.38 
Total/Mean 252 0.43 0.33 206 0.31 0.30 
 
We use the t test to check whether the RCA is similar for the two groups (Mexican 
firms engaging in price competition versus cooperation after China entry); our t test (p 
value = 0.23) fails to reject that the two samples are statistically different from each 
other. We also tested for RCA equality by sector and failed to reject that the two groups 
are different for every sector. Similarly, we tested for the equality of the probability of 
exporting between the two groups: the t test (p value = 0.01) rejected the null hypothesis 
that the two groups have an equal probability of exporting. However, the differences 
between the two groups are not significant between the different sectors in the economy. 
 
The distribution for the number of products that follow the two different price patterns 
seems to be quite evenly distributed between the different HS groupings, as in Table 
5.33. However, we want to test the proportion between the two groups by their different 
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HS groups. The process looks like the binomial distribution with two outcomes (i.e. 0 
and 1) and an independent probability p of success. The mean of the binary variable 
indicates the proportion or the percentage of success. The null hypothesis is to test 
whether each group has the same probability of occurrence; the probability of a product 
being in the cooperation group is the same as of it being in the price competition group. 
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that both groups are equal at the 5% confidence 
interval, except for textile products and chemicals.  
              
 
Table 5.33: Testing Proportions 
Sector z Score Cooperation Price competition 
 
Pr(|Z| < |z|) (mean) (mean) 
Animals (0) 0.13 0.36 0.64 
Vegetables (1) 0.69 0.52 0.48 
Foodstuffs (2) 0.59 0.54 0.46 
Minerals (3) 0.55 0.55 0.45 
Chemicals (4) 0.01 0.59 0.41 
Plastics (5) 0.08 0.39 0.61 
Wood (7) 0.16 0.33 0.67 
Textiles (8) 0.00 0.63 0.37 
Stone (10) 0.13 0.64 0.36 
Metals (11) 0.85 0.51 0.49 
Machinery (12) 0.50 0.54 0.46 
Transport (13) 0.07 0.67 0.33 
Misc (14) 0.41 0.67 0.33 
Total 0.002 0.55 0.45 
 
We further restrict our sample to two distinct groups: continued exports and dropped 
exports after entry because, as mentioned above, firms with continued exports are 
usually associated with bigger firms. The price pattern for the two groups is shown in 
Appendix 5.4. For continued exports, we are left with just 222 products. Mexico’s 
average price dropped slightly after Chinese entry, but started to rise in T+1 and T+2. 
For the 236 products that China dropped in either year, Mexico’s average price rose 
when China entered. We tested for the equality of the RCA and probability of exporting 
between the two groups and we failed to reject that they are similar. We concluded that 
there is nothing distinct between the two groups. We also removed the quota-restricted 
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products and were left with just 384 products shown in Appendix 5.5, for which we 
found that Mexico’s price did not change much before and after China’s entry. The test 
statistics also failed to reject that the two groups are similar. 
 
China's Exit from the Market 
 
We also tried to identify potential competition by looking at the period when China 
exited the market. China is considered to exit the market in period t if the product is 
exported in periods T-1 and T-2 and also it did not export for the subsequent periods 
T+1 and T+2; this is shown in Table 5.34. The example in Table 5.33 illustrates a 
product where China exits the market. Product 030232 is considered a dropped product, 
as China first exited the market in 1997, given that it exported the product before that in 
1995 and 1996. In order to make sure that China stopped exporting the product and it is 
not some kind of missing data, we have to make sure that the selected product is not 
exported by China for the subsequent two periods after the first exit. We are left with a 
total of 73 product-years for the whole sample and only 58 product-years after we have 
filtered out the mixed products.  
 
Table 5.34: China’s Exit 
Year China Export 
1995 Yes 
1996 Yes 
1997 First Exit 
1998 No 
1999 No 
 
The price pattern for Mexico when China exits the market is shown in Appendix 5.6. 
Because of the low number of observations, we look at the relative price pattern for T-1, 
T and T+1 only. The results show that once China exits the market, Mexico will raise its 
price; this is as expected, as Mexico’s pricing will be more relaxed. Although China 
exiting the market is also treated as a potential product, there is different pressure 
compared to when China is waiting to enter the market.  
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5.10 Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter investigates the Chinese price effect on Mexico based on the set of 
potential products. Overall, we have found some evidence that there is a potential 
competition effect. The average effect is that Mexico will reduce its price by around 
2.5% to 4.3% for every 10% drop in the predicted Chinese price. The results are fairly 
consistent, but because the margins of error in the estimation are quite large, they may 
not be statistically significantly different from a null hypothesis of no effect. Of course, 
it is noted that our sample of potential products consists of many fewer observations 
compared to those of actual competition, but the results show the significance of the 
Chinese price effect for potential products, albeit barely and not as consistently as in 
actual products.  
 
 
As there is no trade in potential products, we have to generate the predicted Chinese 
prices in the US market for these potential products using the suggested set of 
regressors. We identify China’s potential entry if China has the capacity to export i.e. 
we use China’s reported prices in destination markets to generate the Chinese price in 
the US market. We could identify the threat of China by looking at its capability to 
produce; however due to lack of Chinese domestic data and the difficulty in 
harmonising the different sets of data, we identify the threat of entry by looking at 
China’s exports to the ROW. However we do not think this is a major problem as 
majority of China’s products are exported. 
 
Using the ordinary logit model, we found the probability of China exporting a particular 
product that is independent of Mexico's pricing decision. One of the possible problems 
arising is that the probability of exporting relies strongly on China actually exporting in 
the previous period (T-1). For those products that China has a high probability of 
exporting but did not, we believe that there is something distinct about these potential 
products, as Mexico responds less to Chinese prices when China has a higher ability to 
export to the USA. Furthermore, China might not have a comparative advantage for 
products that it does not export to the USA, as China’s best products mostly go to the 
US market. Thus the Chinese price effect might not be apparent, as shown in our 
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regression results. The Chinese price effect is significant when we use the first 
difference method to get rid of the product-specific trend. Surprisingly, our results 
suggest a decrease in the Chinese price effect with an increase in the probability of 
China exporting a potential product. In potential competition we use global price to 
control for the effects of the other competitors; the Chinese price effect is significant at 
around 0.19 to 0.23. 
 
 
One major problem arises as the standard errors from the regular OLS regression are 
probably biased downwards because the Chinese price is a predicted rather than an 
observed and known value, but the bootstrapping technique we used to try to correct for 
this may not be wholly reliable in panel data such as this. The Chinese price effect is no 
longer significant when the standard errors are bootstrapped. This means Mexico’s 
prices might be influence by the other competitors in direct competition and does not 
respond to the predicted Chinese price.  Hence inference on the Chinese price effect in 
potential competition needs to be treated with appropriate caution.  
 
 
Our alternative approach to identifying potential competition effects was to look at price 
developments when China actually entered. For this temporal dimension, the results 
show that in about 55% of the products in potential competition, Mexico engaged in 
price cooperation with Chinese products when they entered. This is reflected in the fact 
that prices rose when entry actually occurred and from which we can infer that they are 
arguably depressed before entry. That is, assuming that Chinese entry was not a total 
surprise, this pattern is consistent with potential competition holding prices down before 
entry. We tested for equality of the RCA and probability of exporting between the two 
groups and the results failed to reject that the two groups are similar. However, we note 
that due to our small sample size of just 458 products, we have to caution whether this 
is actually representative of the population. It is difficult to predict which strategy 
Mexico will choose, as no distinct pattern is evident. 
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Appendices for Chapter 5 
 
Appendix 5.1: Breakdown of Potential Competition Products by Sectors  
Year 1996 Percentage 1998 Percentage 2003 Percentage 
Sector 
USD 
Millions 
(Sector/Total) USD Millions (Sector/Total) USD Millions (Sector/Total) 
Animals (0) 163 0.01 237 0.02 534 0.05 
Vegetables 
(1) 
1395 0.09 1500 0.14 1811 0.17 
Foodstuffs 
(2) 
113 0.01 155 0.01 73 0.01 
Minerals (3) 580 0.04 430 0.04 141 0.01 
Chemicals 
(4) 
511 0.03 382 0.04 148 0.01 
Plastics (5) 62 0.00 22 0.00 9 0.00 
LF( 6) 3 0.00 24 0.00 0 0.00 
Wood (7) 51 0.00 55 0.01 16 0.00 
Textiles (8) 153 0.01 191 0.02 17 0.00 
Footwear (9) 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Stone (10) 372 0.02 300 0.03 37 0.00 
Metals (11) 1083 0.07 611 0.06 730 0.07 
Machinery 
(12) 
1805 0.12 168 0.02 69 0.01 
Transport 
(13) 
9245 0.59 6725 0.62 7234 0.67 
Misc (14) 23 0.00 26 0.00 0 0.00 
Total 15560 1.00 10825 1.00 10819 1.00 
 
 
Appendix 5.2: Full Regression (with Probability of Exporting) 
 
      
             
 ̃               
            
 ̃          
               
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Sector Means Japan Price Korea Price China Exports to ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.28*** 0.47*** 0.25 0.43*** 
 
(0.087) (0.14) (0.19) (0.10) 
Interaction (Pc*Prob 
Export) 
-0.063 -0.24 -0.029 -0.028 
 
(0.084) (0.17) (0.25) (0.094) 
prob_export 0.028 0.36 0.0042 -0.023 
 
(0.15) (0.31) (0.45) (0.19) 
   0.019 0.032 0.029 0.022 
N 8438 3730 3542 7761 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 5.3: First Difference and Fixed Effect of First Difference 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Sector Means Japan Price Korea Price China Exports to ROW 
First Difference 
 
 
 
 
Predicted China Price 0.078 0.57*** 0.40*** -0.069 
 
(0.084) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) 
Interaction (Pc*Prob 
Export) 
-0.029 -0.069** -0.083** -0.040 
 
(0.026) (0.033) (0.036) (0.025) 
   0.001 0.01 0.001 0.01 
N 5886 2119 1900 5283 
Fixed Effect of First Difference 
 
 
 
 
Predicted China Price 0.12 0.51*** 0.24 -0.013 
 
(0.095) (0.14) (0.21) (0.11) 
Interaction (Pc*Prob 
Export) 
-0.027 -0.051 -0.027 -0.045 
 
(0.030) (0.040) (0.044) (0.029) 
   0.001 0.01 0.001 0.001 
N 5886 2119 1900 5283 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.4 Temporal Price Effect (Continued and Dropped Exports after Entry) 
 
 
Dropped Exports in Either Year 
 
Continuing Exports 
 
Variable Observations Mean Observations Mean 
T-2 236 -0.06 222 0.05 
T-1 236 -0.09 222 0.02 
T (China enters) 236 0.00 222 0.00 
T+1 236 -0.07 222 0.05 
T+2 236 0.02 222 0.06 
 
Appendix 5.5: Temporal Price Effect (Removing Quota-Restricted Products) 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
SD of the 
Mean 
T-2 384 0.00 0.04 
T-1 384 -0.02 0.04 
T (China enters) 384 0.00 0.00 
T+1 384 -0.01 0.05 
T+2 384 0.05 0.06 
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Appendix 5.6: Mexico Price Pattern (China Exits) 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Error of Mean 
T-1 57 -0.01 0.09 
T (China exits) 57 0 0 
T+1 36 0.18 0.11 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
 
In previous chapters, we looked at China’s competitive pressure on another supplier: 
Mexico in the US market. The USA is the largest market for Chinese products and 
about 22% of China’s total exports went to the USA in 2010. The USA is the biggest 
and most important destination market; we expect China to be more aggressive in 
pricing its products and, as mentioned in the previous chapter, to divert its best products 
to the USA. Furthermore, given the fact that Mexico exports nearly all its products to 
the USA, we expect Mexico’s imports to be particularly sensitive to China’s pricing. 
 
In this chapter, we want to explore Chinese competitive pressure on another major 
supplier – Malaysia – in a relatively smaller market – Singapore. Our first choice was to 
look at the Brunei market, which is very small; however, that was not possible due to 
incomplete data. Our next alternative was Singapore. This is not a small market 
absolutely, but it is relatively small compared to the US market. Singapore also has one 
of the most liberal import regimes in the world, with only a few border measures to 
control for security, health and environmental issues. Although Singapore has a positive 
bound tariff rate, its applied tariff rates for Malaysia and China are zero. With fewer 
controls and restrictions, the Chinese competitive influence on Malaysia is cleaner in 
the sense that it is isolated from external factors (trade restrictions) influencing prices, 
although we found little variation in tariffs in the US market. The reason for looking at a 
smaller market is to investigate a different price response to Chinese price competition 
in a relatively smaller and more liberal economy.  
 
Singapore has a relatively small domestic market and is engaged heavily in the 
international market. A large percentage of trade is carried out to meet domestic demand 
for energy, food and other necessities. Singapore engages heavily in entrepot trade, 
where a large portion of the imported products are then re-exported to other markets. In 
2010, Singapore’s total imports were estimated at around USD 311 billion, of which 
only USD 142 billion worth of products were retained imports.
1
  
                                                 
 
1
 WTO International Trade Statistics 2011. 
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Malaysia is considered a relatively small player in the world market compared to China, 
although its market share in Singapore exceeded China’s from the early 1990s; while it 
is still slightly ahead of China, the gap has almost closed. China and Malaysia are 
middle-income countries and thus it is assumed that there will be a higher degree of 
similarity in a product exported by the two countries, as compared to the same product 
exported by a developed country like Japan.  
 
Over the years, China’s exports have flooded across the borders of many countries and 
Singapore is no exception. The trade shares for both Malaysia and China in the 
Singapore market are shown in Figure 6.1. China’s market share in Singapore has had 
an upward trend since the mid-1990s, but has dropped slightly since 2007. In 2010 
China had a market share of around 11% in the Singapore market, compared to just 3% 
in 1992. Malaysia, on the other hand, was always the larger exporter in the early 1990s 
and it is currently the largest exporting country to Singapore, although its import shares 
seem to have trended downwards after reaching a peak of 18% in 2002. In 2010, 
Malaysia’s imports had a 12% share of the Singapore market. 
 
Figure 6.1: Malaysia and China Import Shares in Singapore (1992-2008) 
 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations  
 
As mentioned, our initial approach was to look at the Brunei market, but due to the 
problems of incomplete trade data and an inconsistent tariff database, we chose 
Singapore. The other major supplier, Malaysia, exports many of its products to 
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Singapore, although it is not as reliant on it as the US market is on Mexico’s exports. 
Appendix 6.1 shows the proportion of China’s total exports going to Singapore. China 
is a relatively bigger player in the world market, as the country is larger than Malaysia; 
its exports to Singapore were relatively small compared to Malaysia’s in the early 1990s 
(about five times smaller). China exported only about USD 2.25 billion worth of exports 
to the Singapore market in 1992, compared to Malaysia’s exports of USD 10.61 billion. 
However, by 2010, China’s exports had almost caught up with Malaysia’s. China was a 
relatively new player in the early 1990s and its role was to play catch-up; it has 
managed to grow faster and overtake many of the major exporters to Singapore in recent 
years.  
  
Eichengreen et al. (2007) found that China’s export surge could have a negative effect 
on Malaysia, especially in the textiles and apparel sectors. Loke (2008) looked at the 
effect of China’s growing exports since joining the WTO on Malaysia’s comparative 
advantage in manufacturing sectors. The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) 
index was used as the comparative advantage index. Results at the SITC 3 digit level 
showed that Malaysia has had a comparative advantage in labour-intensive electrical 
and electronic manufactures since the 1990s, although its RCA index has been 
declining, while China experienced an increasing RCA in these products. Loke 
attributed this to the constraint of a lack of skilled labour in Malaysia given the 
relatively cheaper wages in other emerging countries like China. Similarly, Adams et al. 
(2006) found a systematic decline in the RCAs of most of the East Asian countries for 
the period 1995-2003. China, on the other hand, experienced an increasing RCA index, 
indicating the growing competitiveness of Chinese products. The remainder of this 
chapter will be organised into two main sections: actual competition and potential 
competition.  
 
6.2 Model for Actual Competition  
 
For Singapore we use the same Bertrand-like model as with the USA, where we want to 
gauge Chinese competitive effects on Malaysia for the set of products that are in direct 
competition. We assess price changes directly: how do changes in China’s price affect 
Malaysia’s price in the Singapore market? Similar to the US market, the assumption 
here is that China is able to gain market shares in the Singapore market because of the 
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relatively cheaper Chinese products brought about by increased Chinese productivity. 
Singapore did not impose any MFA quotas, as it decided not to maintain the right to use 
safeguarding measurements on textiles products (WTO WTO Agreement, 1999). The 
Chinese competitive influence on Malaysia is cleaner in the sense that there are fewer 
controls and restrictions. 
 
 
6.2.1 Product-Level Data (China’s Coverage) 
 
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, we need to look at the product-level data in order to 
better assess the competitive pressure of China on other suppliers. We hypothesise that 
China can affect its rivals’ prices at the product level; China’s increased influence in the 
world market is due to a higher number of product headings, which mean wider 
coverage and the massive volume of its exports. We hypothesise also that cheaper 
Chinese products can constrain other competitors' prices. A product here is still defined 
at the HS6 level using data from the HS92 revision, as obtained from Comtrade. We use 
data recorded by the import country to avoid the differences in classification and timing 
that might occur when using data recorded by different countries. Our sample will 
consist of China’s and Malaysia’s exports to the Singapore market at the product level 
for the period 1992-2008.  
 
Our sample in Table 6.1 shows the total number of product headings exported by both 
countries. In 1992 Malaysia had already exported many of its products (3762 product 
headings) to Singapore, which compares with China’s 2810, but China’s product 
headings started to exceed Malaysia’s from 2005 onwards. We use the same model as 
before, which is closely related to the Bertrand price competition model; our assumption 
is that there will be some sort of competitive pressure on Malaysia’s price in the 
Singapore market, as they both export a common product. Again, our hypothesis is that 
Chinese productivity is the shock contributing to cheaper Chinese products, exogenous 
to other external factors. Similarly to the USA, we observe a slight drop in the number 
of product headings exported by both countries after 2006, which is probably best 
attributed to the HS classification issue. 
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Table 6.1: Malaysia and China Exports to Singapore in Product Headings 
 
Product Headings Imported 
 
Ratio of Common to Total 
 Year From Malaysia From China In Common Common/Malaysia Common/China 
1992 3762 2810 2468 0.66 0.88 
1993 3853 2935 2596 0.67 0.88 
1994 3923 3049 2747 0.70 0.90 
1995 3619 3135 2710 0.75 0.86 
1996 3648 3086 2685 0.74 0.87 
1997 3627 3139 2748 0.76 0.88 
1998 3609 3037 2651 0.73 0.87 
1999 3672 3217 2840 0.77 0.88 
2000 3879 3388 3097 0.80 0.91 
2001 3845 3433 3098 0.81 0.90 
2002 3863 3598 3235 0.84 0.90 
2003 3807 3686 3283 0.86 0.89 
2004 3801 3794 3371 0.89 0.89 
2005 3831 3873 3444 0.90 0.89 
2006 3797 3935 3466 0.91 0.88 
2007 3628 3791 3372 0.93 0.89 
2008 3589 3780 3338 0.93 0.88 
* Data obtained from Comtrade and tabulated using own calculations 
 
For actual competition, we are dealing with the common products that both Malaysia 
and China exported to Singapore from 1992 to 2008. In 1992, Malaysia exported a total 
of 3762 products to Singapore and China competed in 66% of these in 1992, its 
influence increasing to 93% in 2008. It can be interpreted from this that China has a 
direct influence on 93% of Malaysia’s products to Singapore by 2010, as compared to 
66% in 1992. As a share of China’s markets in Singapore, the common products 
remained at a range of around 86% to 91% during the period. These products are what 
we call the common products and these are the products for which we want to 
investigate the Chinese price effect on Malaysia. As shown in the previous chapter, 
China’s direct influence on Mexico in the US market also increased from 66% of 
Mexico’s total export headings in 1992 to around 93% in 2008.  
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6.2.2 Coverage by Sector 
 
We wanted to find China’s coverage of Malaysia for the different sectors, by 
categorising products into 15 different groups that can also be referred to as sectors of 
the economy. As shown in Table 6.2, China’s coverage of Malaysia was relatively 
weaker in the primary sectors like animals, vegetables and mineral products in 1992; its 
coverage had increased for almost every sector except the export of animals by 2008. 
China’s influence lay mainly in the manufacturing sectors in 2008, where it exported 
almost everything that Malaysia exported, especially in machinery, textiles, 
miscellaneous manufactures and footwear. China’s influence in the machinery sector 
already covered 81% of Malaysia’s product headings in 1992, and its coverage 
expanded to 98% in 2008, when it exported 647 out of the possible 660 products that 
Malaysia exported to the Singapore market.  
 
Table 6.2: Actual Competition by Sector 
 
1992 2008 
Sector China Malaysia Common China Influence China Malaysia Common China Influence 
 
Headings (Common/Malaysia) Headings (Common/Malaysia) 
Animals 
(0) 
59 65 37 0.57 57 84 44 0.52 
Vegetables 
(1) 
128 147 72 0.49 193 222 174 0.78 
Foodstuffs 
(2) 
84 91 62 0.68 126 138 113 0.82 
Minerals 
(3) 
48 85 27 0.32 85 72 59 0.82 
Chemicals 
(4) 
340 372 194 0.52 553 505 453 0.90 
Plastics (5) 98 143 88 0.62 174 180 171 0.95 
LF (6) 49 48 37 0.77 35 32 31 0.97 
Wood (7) 113 133 91 0.68 169 173 164 0.95 
Textiles 
(8) 
499 410 316 0.77 609 494 480 0.97 
Footwear 
(9) 
55 39 39 1.00 48 46 45 0.98 
Stone (10) 128 132 102 0.77 162 158 150 0.95 
Metals 
(11) 
293 339 223 0.66 476 443 432 0.98 
Machinery 
(12) 
516 541 439 0.81 682 660 647 0.98 
Transport 
(13) 
61 75 50 0.67 84 73 67 0.92 
Misc (14) 323 268 239 0.89 327 309 308 1.00 
Total 2794 2888 2016 
 
3780 3589 3338 
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In the textiles industry, China’s coverage increased from 77% in 1992 to 97% in 2008. 
In the plastics, footwear and miscellaneous sectors, its coverage was almost at 100% of 
Malaysia’s exports. We postulate that Chinese competition occurs largely through the 
price channel at the product level.  
 
6.2.3 China’s Export Structure by Sector (by Export Values) 
 
China exports many of the products that Malaysia exports to Singapore, especially in 
the manufacturing sectors. We now look at the sectoral share to total exports for 1992 
and 2008, shown in Table 6.3. In 1992, China's biggest export sector to the Singapore 
market was the textile industry, which made up 16% of its total exports; followed by the 
machinery/electronic industries (14%) and mineral industry (14%). The vegetable 
industry represented 12% of China’s total exports to Singapore in 1992. By 2008, the 
machinery/electronics industry had clearly become China’s largest export sector to 
Singapore, comprising 63% of China’s total exports to Singapore.  
 
Table 6.3: China’s Exports by Sector in Actual Competition 
 From China From Malaysia 
Sector 1992 
 
2008 
 
1992 
 
2008 
 
 
USD 
Billions 
Share of 
Total 
Exports 
USD 
Billions 
Share of 
Total 
Exports 
USD 
Billions 
Share of 
Total 
Exports 
USD 
Billions 
Share of 
Total 
Exports 
Animals (0) 26.6 0.01 43.3 0.00 349 0.03 435 0.01 
Vegetables (1) 244 0.12 328 0.01 661 0.06 881 0.02 
Foodstuffs (2) 216 0.11 269 0.01 281 0.03 591 0.02 
Minerals (3) 279 0.14 1680 0.05 861 0.08 8840 0.24 
Chemicals (4) 112 0.06 1130 0.03 174 0.02 679 0.02 
Plastics (5) 36.2 0.02 659 0.02 451 0.04 979 0.03 
LF (6) 12.5 0.01 176 0.01 18.7 0.00 22.1 0.00 
Wood (7) 43.7 0.02 288 0.01 468 0.05 579 0.02 
Textiles (8) 311 0.16 968 0.03 795 0.08 577 0.02 
Footwear (9) 22.6 0.01 178 0.01 72.4 0.01 42.7 0.00 
Stone (10) 36.4 0.02 420 0.01 104 0.01 1000 0.03 
Metals (11) 216 0.11 3450 0.10 410 0.04 1950 0.05 
Machinery (12) 284 0.14 21100 0.63 5120 0.50 19400 0.52 
Transport (13) 82.6 0.04 1220 0.04 178 0.02 519 0.01 
Misc (14) 76.9 0.04 1690 0.05 326 0.03 993 0.03 
Total 1999.5 1.00 33599.3 1.00 10269.1 1.00 37487.8 1.00 
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Malaysia’s exports to Singapore were mainly concentrated in the machinery/electronics 
sector in 1992, which comprised 50% of Malaysia’s exports to Singapore, increasing 
slightly to 52% in 2008. The minerals industry is one sector that has shown a substantial 
increase in exports over the years, comprising about 24% of Malaysia’s exports in 2008. 
China is not particularly competitive in minerals, with exports many times smaller to 
Malaysia. Malaysia’s exports in direct competition to Chinese products are concentrated 
in just these two sectors, making up just about 76% of its exports in 2008. Similarly to 
the USA, the trade overlap between China and Mexico is larger in the 
machinery/electronics sector, as the majority of their common exports fall into this 
category.  
 
6.2.4 China’s Increasing Dominance in the Singapore Market  
 
We now look at the market share for each product, calculated using 
    
       
    
       ⁄ , 
where the numerator is Singapore’s imports from China for product i in period t while 
the denominator measures Singapore’s total imports for product i. The four groups are 
defined by products that have market share (s) represented by s<0.1, 0.1≤s<0.2, 
0.2≤s<0.5 and s≥0.5 respectively in Singapore total imports. China’s export headings to 
Singapore classified according to market shares are tabulated in Table 6.4. 
 
In 1992, China exported a total of 2810 products to Singapore, of which 26% had a 
more than 10% share in the Singapore market, increasing to 55% in 2008. We also 
found that 17% of China’s products had shares in the category 0.1≤s<0.2, 25% were in 
the category 0.2≤s<0.5 and 12% had a more than 50% share in the Singapore market. 
These values are pretty close to China’s average shares in the USA. The total number of 
products for which China had a more than 50% share increased from 153 products to 
462. Malaysia, on the other hand, had 36% of its products with more than 10% in the 
Singapore market in 1992, dropping to 31% in 2008. In addition, the percentage of 
product headings with a more than 50% market share dropped to 7% in 2008 from 12% 
in 1992. To summarise, more Chinese products than Malaysian have gained a larger 
share in the Singapore market over the years.  
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Table 6.4: China Export Headings to Singapore by Product Shares
2
 
 
Total 
Products 
(China) 
Headings 
 
Headings 
 
Headings 
 
Headings 
 
  
s<0.10 
% of 
Total 
0.1≤s<0.2 
% of 
Total 
0.2≤s<0.5 
% of 
Total 
s≥0.5 
% of 
Total 
1992 2810 2067 73.56 280 9.96 310 11.03 153 5.44 
1993 2935 2178 74.21 297 10.12 276 9.40 184 6.27 
1994 3049 2242 73.53 351 11.51 278 9.12 178 5.84 
1995 3135 2270 72.41 348 11.10 324 10.33 193 6.16 
1996 3086 2209 71.58 340 11.02 351 11.37 186 6.03 
1997 3139 2197 69.99 399 12.71 374 11.91 169 5.38 
1998 3037 2100 69.15 399 13.14 363 11.95 175 5.76 
1999 3217 2149 66.80 491 15.26 385 11.97 192 5.97 
2000 3388 2209 65.20 499 14.73 482 14.23 198 5.84 
2001 3433 2180 63.50 506 14.74 521 15.18 226 6.58 
2002 3598 2132 59.26 573 15.93 615 17.09 278 7.73 
2003 3686 2121 57.54 579 15.71 688 18.67 298 8.08 
2004 3794 2080 54.82 598 15.76 765 20.16 351 9.25 
2005 3873 1987 51.30 649 16.76 835 21.56 402 10.38 
2006 3935 1896 48.18 698 17.74 856 21.75 485 12.33 
2007 3791 1751 46.19 648 17.09 927 24.45 465 12.27 
2008 3780 1719 45.48 651 17.22 948 25.08 462 12.22 
 
6.2.5 China’s Price Relative to Malaysia’s in Singapore 
 
 
We have discussed that fact that China’s increasing market share in the world market is 
due to the cheaper Chinese products brought about by higher productivity. We will look 
at China’s prices relative to Malaysia’s as reported by Singapore to provide a rough 
guide to whether Chinese products are cheaper than Malaysian. As in previous chapters, 
the unit price for each heading is obtained by dividing the total value of imports of a 
product by the quantity of exports. For those product-years in actual competition, there 
are some observations where the quantities for imports are not reported; we dropped 
these because, as we are dealing with unit values, we lose some observations in doing 
so. In finding the relative price, we constrain our sample to the common exports for 
both countries, and are left with 43,657 observations.
3
 However, the unit price is very 
noisy and hence we need to identify and drop these outliers to provide better results for 
the Chinese price effect. We do this by reference to the distance of the relative price        
                                                 
 
2
 Refer to Appendix 6.2 for Malaysia’s export headings to Singapore by product shares. 
3
 These are the number of observations left after dropping those without unit values. 
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(  
    
 
    
 ⁄   ) for each product from its median relative to its interquartile range. This 
measure is product specific and allows for some products to have a much greater degree 
of natural variability than others. The problem with this is that the IQR is sometimes 
zero and often very close to zero for some products, which will wrongly identify 
outliers, so we add 1 to each statistic:  
     
 
      
 
     
   
   
 
⁄       where X is the relative price 
    
 
    
 ⁄           (6.1) 
   
On the basis of Equation (6.1), the outliers are dropped similarly to what we have done 
for the US market, where we trimmed the top 1% and bottom 1% thresholds 
respectively. 
 
China’s price relative to Malaysia’s is derived using the same methods as in previous 
chapters. As a reminder, the relative price for each product is calculated using the ratio 
of China’s price to Malaysia’s. The simple average of the relative product prices is 
calculated using Equation (6.2), where the index essentially measures the prices changes 
for each year:  
 
  
∑    
    
     
 ⁄
      
       
 ⁄
  
                                        (6.2) 
 
where    is China’s unit price and    is Malaysia’s unit price denoted in US dollars. 
The subscript   and   indicate the product and year respectively. We then take the 
average of    
    
     
 ⁄
      
       
 ⁄
  for each year. This way, the relative price index is relative to 
the previous year, so we need to transform each year’s index by accumulating for each 
year to make it relative to the base 1992. The products being compared are different for 
each year, as not all products are exported by both countries in every year. We are 
dealing with more than 2000 products from the year 2000 onwards. The pattern in 
Figure 6.2 shows an increasing trend, peaking in 1998 (0.30), which coincides with the 
Asian crisis in which China did not devalue its currency, and then a downward trend 
until 2008 (0.10). Malaysia experienced an economic slowdown 2001 which resulted in 
an export slump in its export; this was however short lived and the economy started to 
233 
 
 
recover after 2002. This might probably explain the relative drop in price from 2001-
2002 as shown in Figure 6.2. We found that Singapore’s imports from Malaysia 
plunged by 15% relative to its previous year.
4
 This might probably explain the relative 
drop in price from 2001-2002 as shown in Figure 6.2. There was a slightly different 
pattern in the US market, where China’s price relative to Mexico’s shows a downward 
trend after 1997, dropping below the 1992 level.    
 
 
Figure 6.2:  Relative Price (China/Malaysia) Unbalanced Panel 
 
 
 
Using the same specification as in the USA
5
, we find the price pattern for each 
individual country using exactly the same sample (Figure 6.3). There does not seem to a 
particular trend up until 2001, but both China and Malaysia show an upward trend from 
2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Data are obtained from Comtrade and derived using own calculations. 
5
 For China  
 
  
∑    
  
       
       
 ⁄   , For Malaysia 
 
  
∑    
  
       
       
 ⁄  , 
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Figure 6.3: Individual Price Pattern for China and Malaysia (Unbalanced Panel) 
 
 
 
To check that the results are not driven simply by entry and exit, we include only those 
common products that are present in all years for both markets. This would also make 
sure that we are comparing the same basket of products for each year. Then, we are left 
with 756 products for each year (Figure 6.4). The balanced set is a special set and is 
restricted in the sense that a product has to be present for all years from 1992 to 2008. 
 
Figure 6.4: Balanced Set - China’s Price Relative to Malaysia’s (756 products) 
 
 
China’s relative prices for its exports to Singapore have shown a 24% increase for our 
sample period. However, this is just a simplistic overview of the relative Chinese 
pattern. What we are really interested is the degree of the Chinese price effect on 
Malaysia over the sample period. As mentioned, the unit price data are very noisy; this 
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again prompted the use of product fixed effects regression in order to find the Chinese 
price effect.  
6.2.6 China’s Exports to the USA and Singapore (Comparison) 
 
 
We wanted to compare the products that China exported to the USA and Singapore to 
compare the relative price pattern of China’s exports to the two countries. The unit 
prices are sourced from two different countries – namely, Singapore and the USA – and 
hence some products might have different units, so we restrict our analysis to products 
with the same units. Our sample is the common set of Chinese exports to the USA and 
Singapore, restricted to only products with the same units. The relative price index is 
relative to the previous year (for the common products with the same units), and the 
price pattern in Figure 6.5 is plotted based on  
 
  
∑    
    
       
         
⁄
      
    
     
         
⁄
  
     and so we 
need to transform each year’s index by accumulating for each year to make it relative to 
base 1992.  
 
Figure 6.5: Relative Price to Previous Year (USA/Singapore) 
 
 
China’s relative price (USA/Singapore) is plotted in Figure 6.5, where we see a 
downward pattern over the period. This indicates that Chinese products are becoming 
relatively cheaper in the USA over time. There seems to be a sudden drop in the relative 
price for the years 2000 - 2002. We note that the US dollar started depreciating relative 
to the Singapore dollar from 2001 onwards. Over time, we see that the relative price is 
falling; although it does not tell us about the relative cheapness.   
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In order to look at the level of prices for each year, we construct the relative price for all 
common products exported by China to both countries with the same units based on 
 
  
∑    
  
       
       
         ⁄   and then take the average for each year.  The relative 
price pattern are then plotted and shown in Figure 6.6. We found that on average the 
USA’s price is relatively higher than Singapore for all the years. The relative price 
reached a peak in 2002 and then dropped gradually which might be explained by the 
depreciation of the US dollar from 2001 onwards. There is again a spike for 2002, the 
data seem to show unusual pattern for the period 2000–2002. We note that there is a HS 
revision in 2002 which might result in a classification issue. Furthermore when dealing 
with unit values for Singapore and the USA, we are comparing data as obtained from 
different sources and the excess noise in this period. Although China’s products are 
relatively more expensive on average in the USA, the relative prices are falling over 
time as shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.6: Relative Price (Level Terms) 
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6.2.7 Our Approach 
 
Our model to find the Chinese price effect on Malaysia in the Singapore market is based 
on a model closely related to Bertrand price competition, as discussed in the chapter on 
the US market. China is a newly emerging country whose market shares have increased 
tremendously over the years. Thus, the Chinese price is seen as the stimulus and will be 
used as the explanatory variable to explain the variation in Malaysia’s price. The data 
used here are at the HS6 level using the HS92 system as reported by Singapore (import 
country) and the equation specification is closely related to the Bertrand model. 
Singapore's trade policy is very liberal, with a zero applied tariff for imports, as reported 
by the TRAINS system in WITS. Our regression is as shown in Equation (6.3), which 
has product fixed effects (    and year fixed effects     6: 
 
tiit
C
titi
M uPP ,,1, lnln                    (6.3) 
 
The index i refers to the unit of observation for each product at the HS6 level, t refers to 
the time period, while   and    represent Malaysia and China’s prices respectively. 
The variable      is the idiosyncratic error, as it represents the time-varying unobservable 
that can affect Malaysia's price. Our main interest lies in the coefficient   , which 
measures the  size of the competitive effect on Malaysia’s price. Similarly to our study 
in the USA, we accounted for the Chinese influence by controlling for Chinese import 
shares (   
   in the Singapore market. The additional variable included is the interaction 
of Chinese import shares with Chinese prices    
    
 , where the coefficient    measures 
the effect of trade shares on the Chinese price effect. Our model assumes cooperation, 
but in reality there will be other countries exporting to the Singapore market. We 
accounted for the Chinese influence by controlling for Chinese import shares (   
   in the 
Singapore market. 
 
     
           
          
     
        
                   (6.4) 
     
         
          
        
                               (6.5) 
                                                 
 
6
 As the data on annual exchange rates is constant for all observations in a particular year, they will be 
differenced out in our fixed effect regression and be represented by    
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The Chinese price effect on Malaysia as represented is   , plus it also depends on the 
size of its trade shares. If      and statistically significant, this implies a stronger 
Chinese price effect when China's export shares increase. We will refer to    as the 
interaction effect brought about by the size of Chinese export market shares.   
 
    
 
    
 ⁄           
           (where                              (6.6) 
6.2.8 Endogeneity: Instrumental Variables 
 
 
The Bertrand model indicates that there might be some kind of reverse causation in our 
model specification. The Chinese price effect will be biased when endogeneity exists 
and hence we will need to instrument for the Chinese price in Singapore. The 
instruments we use here are similar to those in the US market, namely Chinese sectoral 
prices, Canada’s reported price for imports from China and China’s reported price to 
Singapore. We chose Canada’s reported price for Chinese products as Malaysia exports 
barely 1% of its value of exports to Canada. This is an important factor to take into 
account, as there might be concern that Malaysia’s prices in the other market might also 
be influenced by China’s presence, which in turn has an indirect influence on its prices 
in the Singapore market. We thus chose not to use the Japanese and Korean reported 
prices, as these are large export markets for Malaysia and hence there might be this 
concern about an indirect influence on its prices in the Singapore market.  
 
A second potential source of endogeneity is China’s import shares in Singapore, which 
will be affected by the price of Chinese exports relative to other exports, including those 
from Malaysia. There is a less causal link between China’s shares and the Malaysian 
price of exports to Singapore; given that market shares may well be influenced by 
distance, we have opted to use China’s import share in Japan as the instrument rather 
than Canada’s share. The share of Malaysia’s exports to Japan averaged around 4.6% 
over the period 1992-2008. 
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6.2.9 Regression Results 
 
The regression results for the simple bivariate regression and the full regression 
(including shares) and the interaction term are shown in Table 6.5. The    within shows 
that China’s final price alone accounted for around 17.7% of the variation in Malaysia's 
price and it plus the year fixed effects for 18.8%. For the simple bivariate regression, the 
Chinese price effect is estimated at around 0.40 and is positive and statistically 
significant. This means that Malaysia will drop its price by 4% for every 10% fall in the 
Chinese price. This value is comparable to but slightly smaller than China’s competitive 
effect on Mexico in the USA, which has a value of 0.5.  
 
Table 6.5: Product-Level Regression (Fixed Effects-OLS) 
Dependent Variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 
(1) (2) 
China Price 0.40*** 0.40*** 
 
(0.0047) (0.0049) 
Interaction(price*share) 
 
-0.0065 
  
(0.013) 
China share 
 
0.073* 
  
(0.04) 
    (Within) 0.188 0.188 
    (W’in excl time FEs) 0.177 0.178 
    (Between) 0.84 0.84 
   (Overall) 0.77 0.78 
N 42784 42784 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Asterisks denote significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*)  
 
The Chinese price effect after controlling for its market shares is still positive and 
statistically significant at around 0.40. The interaction effect (   , however, is not 
statistically significant, so we might infer that the Chinese price effect does not change 
with China’s market share in the Singapore market. This result differs from our study in 
the US market, where we found that the Chinese price effect grew stronger as its market 
shares in the US increased. The partial effect of trade shares is significant at the 10% 
level; however, it has the perverse sign that we did not expect to find. The positive 
effects of Chinese shares suggest that Malaysia’s price will likely rise for those products 
in which China has a larger market share. This is different from the US market, where a 
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higher Chinese market share will tend to lower Mexico’s price. The results suggest that 
China does not have a stronger competitive effect on its rival’s prices as its market 
shares increase; and that China’s increased share in a smaller market like Singapore 
does not seem to constrain Malaysia’s price.  
 
6.2.10  IV Regression Results 
 
 The results above are subject to concerns about endogeneity with Chinese prices 
possibly responding to Malaysian ones. Hence, we make use of instrumental variables 
(IVs) to check our results. The regression results for the IV regression are shown in 
Table 6.6. The Chinese price effects are all statistically significant and range from 0.64 
to 0.72 depending on the instruments used. The Chinese competitive effect rises when 
using IV regression compared to using OLS estimates. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, one explanation is that the IVs correct for errors in observation and hence have 
removed some attenuation bias; alternatively, instrumenting could have reduced the 
sample sizes in a non-random way. 
 
We get to keep more observations when using China’s reported price and the test 
statistics are strong. Using China’s reported price, the Chinese price effect is 0.64, but 
there may be residual doubts about the exogeneity of the instrument in this case. When 
we instrument with Canada’s reported price, the sample sizes are further reduced and 
we get a slightly stronger Chinese price effect of 0.72. Using the Hausman test, the null 
hypothesis is that OLS estimates are efficient; by rejecting the null hypothesis our 
results support the use of IV estimates. The first-stage regression also shows that all the 
regressors have a positive effect on China’s price in the USA. All the remaining 
instruments, which are based on trade data, are significant regressors for predicting the 
Chinese price and have the property of relevance, as indicated by their high first-stage F 
statistics, suggesting that weak instruments are not a problem. 
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Table 6.6: IV Results 
Dependent Variable is Malaysia’s Price 
Price Instrument is: Canada Reported Price China Reported Price 
China Final Price 0.72*** 0.64*** 
 
(0.04) (0.02) 
Hausman 0 0 
   0.051 0.142 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
First Stage Regression 
Instrumental Price 0.25*** 0.39*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
F Statistics F(  1, 27447) =  1656.91 
F(  1, 31471) =  
5982.40 
N 31094 35077 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
*standard errors in parenthesis are robust standard errors 
 
In Appendix 6.3, we report the corresponding equations with China’s share and 
interaction terms, which entails a further loss of observations, because now we need to 
take into account China’s exports in Japan as an added necessary condition. The 
Chinese price effect rises slightly when doing so, but the effect of increasing Chinese 
trade shares in Singapore is not significant to constrain Malaysia’s price. The interaction 
effect is also not significant and is similar to what we obtained for the OLS estimates. 
 
6.2.11 Technology Intensity (OECD) 
 
By categorising products, we assigned a different price effect for each category, as 
indicated by their technological intensity. The technological index by product at the 
HS6 level is obtained from the OECD system, where products are classified according 
to their level of technology intensity: ‘low technology’, ‘medium low technology’, 
‘medium high technology’ and ‘high technology’. We drop the trade shares and the 
interaction term, as the results indicate that they are not significant. 
 
For the simple bivariate regression in Table 6.7, the Chinese price effect has a positive 
and significant effect on Malaysia’s price for each OECD technology intensity sector 
when using the selected instruments; the effect is strongest for the non-industrial and 
low technology sectors when instrumented using Canada’s price. The Chinese price 
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effect becomes smaller with increasing technology intensity. In column (2), the Chinese 
price effect is stronger for the low technology and medium technology sectors when 
instrumented using China’s export price. China’s price influence is no longer significant 
in the high technology sector when instrumented using China’s export price. When 
instrumented using Canada’s price, Chinese price effect decreased with the increasing 
level of technology for each sector. The Chinese price effect seems to be less consistent 
and robust in the higher technology sectors. Most of the higher technology industries 
are associated with MNEs which might have an influence over prices between 
destination markets. We would therefore expect a smaller Chinese price effect for high 
technology sectors. 
 
Table 6.7: IV Regression by Technology Intensity Index (Simple Regression) 
Dependent Variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 (1) (2) 
Instrument is Canada Price China Price 
China Price Effect   
Non-industrial 1.17*** 0.58*** 
 (0.20) (0.16) 
Low Technology 0.83*** 0.60*** 
 (0.026) (0.059) 
Medium Low Technology 0.70*** 0.76*** 
 (0.060) (0.29) 
Medium High Technology 0.50*** -0.17 
 (0.064) (1.06) 
High Technology 0.45*** -0.19 
 (0.17) (0.61) 
N 31094 31821 
R
2
 0.076 0.120 
Hausman 0 0 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
 
 
Another way to differentiate Chinese price effects across sectors is to group products at 
the HS2 digit level, where we classify all the products into 15 different sectors. The 
classification is identical to that done in the previous chapter and the regression results 
are shown in Appendix 6.4. We used just the simple IV regression, as the shares and 
interaction terms give disappointing results. Using the simple IV regression, the Chinese 
price effect is mostly in the right direction and significant for the manufacturing sectors, 
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except for the chemical industry, transport sector and the miscellaneous products 
sector.
7
  
 
6.2.12 Rauch Classification (IV) 
 
 
As discussed for the USA, the Rauch classification is at the SITC4 digit level for three 
different groups of products, namely differentiated, homogeneous and referenced 
products. Rauch defined homogeneous products as those with prices set on the 
organised exchanges; that is, sugar, oil and so on. Goods that do not set their price but 
are assigned a benchmark price were defined as reference priced. Finally, products 
without a reference price and whose price was not set in the exchange market because 
of their inherent features were labelled differentiated. Rauch suggested two definitions, 
a conservative and a liberal one, in order to account for the difference in product 
classification. There are relatively fewer products classified as homogeneous goods 
under the conservative system as compared to the liberal definition. We reported the 
regression results using conservative classification as in Table 6.8. The results show that 
the Chinese price effect is around 0.64 to 0.69 for differentiated products, depending on 
the instruments used; the Chinese price effects are all statistically significant for all 
product groups.  The price elasticity is around 1 for homogeneous products; if China’s 
price falls by 10%, Mexico will drop its by 10% as well. This is as expected as price 
competition is tougher for homogeneous products because there is less room for product 
differentiation; this is similar to what we found in the US market. China’s surge in 
exports is mainly in manufactures and the significance of the Chinese price effect 
support that products from China and Malaysia could be seen as close substitues. Our 
results show that the cheaper Chinese products will constraint the price of other 
competitors, especially for the middle income competitors.  The Hausman test again 
supports the use of IV regression. We also did the regression for the conservative 
classification; the results are very similar, so we do not report them here. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
7
 The Chinese price effect is positive and significant for miscellaneous manufacture products in the USA. 
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Table 6.8: Rauch Classification (Liberal) 
 
Dependent Variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 (1) (2) 
Instrument is Canada Price China Price 
   
(Homogeneous) 1.00*** 0.97*** 
 (0.071) (0.041) 
(Referenced) 0.80*** 0.54*** 
 (0.13) (0.031) 
(Differentiated) 0.69*** 0.64*** 
 (0.026) (0.016) 
Hausman 0 0 
   0.044 0.15 
N 30046 33782 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
 
6.2.13 Established Products 
 
We also divided the sample into the sets of established and unestablished products to 
investigate the possible different price effects between them. Similarly to the study on 
the USA, we consider a product to be established if China exports it for a longer period 
of time; that is, when China exports to the US market consecutively for a period of five 
years. The Chinese price effect for established products is estimated at 0.65 and is 
bigger than the unestablished set of products (0.47). The results (Table 6.9) once again 
show that the Chinese price effect gets weaker as China’s market share increases for 
established products; the interaction term is not significant for unestablished products. 
We would have expected trade shares to have more of an impact on the Chinese price 
effect for those products that entered the market compared to the already more 
established products. This is different in the US market, where China’s shares matter for 
the unestablished products but not for the established products. However, in the 
Singapore market, once again trade shares and interaction term are not significant. 
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Table 6.9: Instrumental Regression for Established Products  
Dependent Variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 Simple Bivariate Regression Full Regression 
 
Established Unestablished Established Unestablished 
Combined 
Instruments 
China Price, 
Canada Price 
China Price, 
Canada Price 
China Price, Canada 
Price and Japan 
Share 
China Price, 
Canada Price and 
Japan Share 
China Final Price 0.65*** 0.34*** 0.71*** 0.10 
 
(0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.25) 
Price*Share 
  
-0.28*** 1.57 
   
(0.09) (1.2) 
China Share 
  
-0.13 -10 
   
(0.58) (10.4) 
Sargan 0.01 0.91 0.01 0.74 
Hausman 0 0.01 0.00 0.26 
   0.11 0.07 0.10 -1.02 
N 22856 3019 20450 2463 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
The regression results for the clean set of products are shown in Table 6.10. We also 
found the Chinese price effect to be statistically significant at around 0.57 for the set of 
clean products. As a reminder, products that have not undergone any HS code changes 
during any of the three revisions are considered clean products, while mixed products 
are those that have undergone at least one HS change. The regression results again show 
that trade shares and interaction term are not significant. 
 
Table 6.10: Clean Products 
Dependent Variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 
Simple Bivariate Regression Full Regression 
Instruments are China price, Canada price China price, Canada and Japan Share 
China Final Price 0.56*** 0.57*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Price*Share 
 
-0.06 
  
(0.09) 
China Share 
 
0.07 
  (0.48) 
Sargan 0.06 0.19 
Hausman 0 0 
   0.11 0.11 
N 20658 19505 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
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6.2.14 Robustness Test 
 
6.2.14.1 First Difference and Long Difference 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, there is also the worry that both China’s and 
Malaysia’s prices might follow a time trend, causing both variables to move together. 
To solve for this problem, we use the first difference method to get rid of the time-
invariant factors, followed by the fixed effects on the first difference to get rid of the 
time trend. The regression results after taking the time trend into account are shown in 
Table 6.11. The results show that the Chinese price effect is around 0.21 to 0.22; the 
effect increases slightly with increases in trade shares. The Chinese price effect is 
slightly smaller than the USA’s (0.32). Using the fixed effects of the first difference, 
Malaysia’s price will tend to fall by 1.9% for every 10% increase in Chinese shares. The 
sign on the interaction term seems to support the hypothesis that the Chinese price 
effect will be stronger when it has a larger market share. Overall, the Chinese price 
effect is smaller compared to its effect in the US market. We also tried IV fixed effects 
regression for the first difference, but the results for the Chinese price effects became 
very large and the signs for the trade shares were in the opposite directions; for this 
reason, we did not include this in our results table. 
 
Table 6.11: First Difference and Fixed Effects of First Difference 
Dependent Variable is first difference of Malaysia’s Price 
 
(1) OLS (2) OLS 
 
First Difference 
Fixed Effects of First 
Difference 
fd.china_FinalPrice 0.22*** 0.21*** 
 
(0.0057) (0.0061) 
fd.interaction 0.049*** 0.066*** 
 
(0.017) (0.019) 
fd.China share -0.14*** -0.19*** 
 
(0.050) (0.054) 
   33977 33977 
N 0.048 0.047 
*fd stands for first difference 
 
Similarly, the long difference regression shows that the Chinese price effect is positive 
and statistically significant at around 0.43 to 0.50 (Table 6.12). The Chinese price effect 
is similar for both the simple bivariate and the full regression. This price effect increases 
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slightly when Chinese shares in Singapore increase, as shown by the long difference 
using lag 16. 
 
Table 6.12: Long Difference 
 
Simple Bivariate Full Regression 
 
Long Difference Long Difference Long Difference Long Difference 
 
(lag 8) (lag 16) (lag 8) (lag 16) 
China Price 0.43*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 0.49*** 
 
(0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.028) 
Interaction 
  
-0.046 0.071 
   
(0.041) (0.077) 
China Share 
  
0.18 0.13 
   
(0.13) (0.22) 
Constant 0.065*** 0.070 0.060*** 0.026 
 
(0.020) (0.043) (0.022) (0.053) 
   
 
3518 1053 3518 1053 
N 0.186 0.255 0.186 0.257 
 
 
 
6.2.14.2 Taking Out Trends in Product Prices 
 
 
In order to take into account general trends in product prices, we controlled for the 
variable      
       
, which is the global export unit price at the product level and is 
included in our IV fixed effect regression. The global export price is obtained net of 
China and Malaysia’s exports to Singapore. For the simple regression following 
Equation (6.7), the Chinese price effects are all still statistically significant, ranging 
from 0.58 to 0.69 (Table 6.13). The global export price has explained part of the 
variation in the Malaysian price. Malaysia reacted positively to the world export price, 
as prices are more or less correlated.  
 
     
            
          
     
        
         
                        (6.7)  
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Table 6.13: Taking Out Trends in Global Prices 
Dependent Variable is Malaysia’s Price 
  (1) (2) 
Instrument is Canada price China price 
      
Predicted China Price 0.69*** 0.58*** 
  (0.041) (0.025) 
Interaction (Pc*Prob Export) -0.16* -0.11 
  (0.086) (0.071) 
China share -0.17 0.27 
  (0.49) (0.40) 
Global Export Price 0.083*** 0.17*** 
  (0.022) (0.013) 
Hausman 0 0 
N 28571 31821 
    0.092 0.188 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
 
 
Similarly to what we did in the USA, we ran separate regressions every product to 
obtain their individual coefficients; each product now has its own slope. The regressions 
were done for products that are common exports for both China and Malaysia and have 
been present for at least eight years. For the simple OLS regression, the average price 
effect is 0.72 (Table 6.14). We get slightly fewer observations when using IV 
regression; the average Chinese price effect is around 0.88. On average, our results 
show that the Chinese price is nonetheless positive and consistent with the overall story. 
 
Table 6.14: Summary Statistics of Chinese Price Coefficient 
  Variable Product Years Mean of Parameter Estimate 
(Chinese Price Effect) 
Std. Error of Mean 
OLS 
Estimates 
For Exports≥ 8 
years 
1078 0.72 0.02 
IV FE 
Estimates 
For Exports≥ 8 
years 
1068 0.88 0.04 
*all estimates are significant at 10% 
 
Next, we plot the Kernel density function and also the normal distribution function 
(Figures 6.7 and 6.8). Kernel density plots are usually a much more effective way to 
view the distribution of a variable, which in our case is the coefficient of Chinese price. 
Similar to the USA, the estimates are concentrated around the mean and have higher 
peaks around the mean compared to the normal distribution. For the Singapore market, 
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our results also show that on average the Chinese price effect has the correct positive 
sign and is consistent with the overall story.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Distribution of Coefficients (OLS) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Distribution of Coefficients (IV) 
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6.3 Potential Competition 
 
Our approach is similar to that in the US market, where we wanted to investigate 
whether the mere presence of China in other markets acts as a constraint on Malaysia’s 
pricing decision, even if China is not actually supplying to Singapore. We get slightly 
more observations for both actual and potential products in the Singapore market 
compared to the USA. By duplicating the equation specification we used for the USA, 
our results shows that China’s presence in other markets does constrain Malaysia’s 
price in Singapore; the effect is slightly larger compared to Mexico in the US market. 
We did not find evidence that China’s competitive effect increases with its probability 
of exporting. Our robustness test using the fixed effects of first difference supports 
China’s potential competitive price effect, but the marginal effect on the probability of 
exporting on China’s price effect is disappointing. Another way to identify potential 
competition from China is the temporal dimension, where we look at Malaysia’s pricing 
before and after China enters. The distribution of the number of products that follow the 
two different price patterns (price competition and price cooperation) seems to be quite 
even between the different sectors once China enters. 
 
6.3.1 Stylised Facts 
 
In actual competition, our sample consists of only the common exports between China 
and Malaysia in the Singapore market. In this section, we will focus on the remainder of 
the product-years that Malaysia exports to Singapore without any Chinese competition. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Chinese price effect is not only for the set of 
products that it exports to Singapore, but also for those products that it has the potential 
to export. We identified the threat of entry if China exports to the ROW, which may 
constrain Malaysia from charging a higher price. This is known as the potential 
competition from China and the model used is similar to that discussed in the USA. As 
China does not export these products to Singapore in the first place, we need to generate 
their predicted prices. We will use our instruments in actual competition as mentioned 
above to generate the predicted Chinese prices for potential products in Singapore. First, 
we will provide some stylised facts on the set of potential products from China. 
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Malaysia exported a total of 12,604 product-years to Singapore without any Chinese 
competition. As seen in Table 6.15, most of the potential competition occurred during 
the early 1990s and the number of products dropped to around only 251 by 2008. This is 
no surprise, considering that China’s exports exploded starting from the early 1990s and 
over time China has started to compete in almost all products. These are the product-
years on which we will work to find the Chinese price effect. There are slightly more 
observations for the set of potential products here as compared to the US market (9662 
observations). 
 
Table 6.15: Potential Products by Heading 
Year Product Headings 
1992 1294 
1993 1257 
1994 1176 
1995 909 
1996 963 
1997 879 
1998 958 
1999 832 
2000 782 
2001 747 
2002 628 
2003 524 
2004 430 
2005 387 
2006 331 
2007 256 
2008 251 
Total 12,604 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are four possible scenarios for potential 
competition and the possible explanations are tabulated in Appendix 6.5. A product can 
be termed a 'potential product' if Malaysia exports to the Singapore market without any 
Chinese competition in a particular period (T). The total number of product headings 
categorised by the different cases is shown in Table 6.16. In Case 1, both countries 
exported the particular product in period T-1, but China stopped exporting while 
Malaysia continued with its exports in Period T. In Case 2, China did not export in 
either period, while Malaysia exported for both periods. In Case 3, neither country 
exported in period (T-1); the product would become a potential product if Malaysia 
started to export in period (T) and China did not. In Case 4, China exported in period T-
1 but not in period T, while Malaysia exported in period T. In Cases 3 and 4, the 
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product would be considered a new export for Malaysia. In Table 6.16, we classify the 
total number of product headings into the four different groups for the period 1992-
2008. Most of the potential products occur because China has yet to enter the market 
and only a small percentage of potential products occur due to China exiting the market; 
this is quite similar to the story we found in the US market. Cases 1 and 4 show the 
number of product headings in potential competition due to China exiting the market. 
We do not have observations for 1992, as our data is for 1992 onwards. 
 
Table 6.16: Product Headings Categorised under Different Cases 
Year Total Case 1 (China Exit) Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 (China Exit) 
1992 1294 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1993 1257 251 769 206 31 
1994 1176 227 712 198 39 
1995 909 221 565 102 21 
1996 963 244 508 172 39 
1997 879 202 511 124 42 
1998 958 263 517 136 42 
1999 832 196 490 113 33 
2000 782 163 429 161 29 
2001 747 202 405 115 25 
2002 628 145 346 116 21 
2003 524 146 269 78 31 
2004 430 103 242 52 33 
2005 387 105 201 59 22 
2006 331 99 161 50 21 
2007 256 79 124 36 17 
2008 251 88 109 28 26 
Total 
 
2734 6358 3040 472 
*Case 1 and Case 3 are products in potential competition which China exited the market in T. 
 
 
The set of potential products are then categorised into the 15 different sectors to further 
understand the sectors in which potential competition is more prevalent. We tabulate 
China’s product headings and also the volume of exports for the set of potential 
products in Table 6.17. China competes in almost everything in the miscellaneous 
manufactures sector (14) and by 2008 there is only one product that Malaysia exports 
without any Chinese competition, with an export value of a mere USD 10,000. 
Similarly, we can see major changes in the leather/fur and wood products sectors, where 
almost all of the competition from China is in actual competition. In addition, by 2008, 
Malaysia exported only 13 product headings in the machinery sector worth only about 
USD 400,000, a sector that has no Chinese influence in the Singapore market. By 2008, 
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the share of potential to total Chinese exports is very small in many of the 
manufacturing sectors like machinery, miscellaneous, transport, textiles and so on. In 
2008, the share of potential to total Malaysian exports to Singapore is more prevalent in 
the animals (0.43), vegetables (0.09) and chemicals (0.19) industries. 
 
Table 6.17: Malaysia’s Export Headings to Singapore by Sector (Potential 
Products) 
 1992 2008 
Sector 
Product 
Headings 
Potential 
(USD 
Millions) 
Total 
(USD 
Millions) 
Share 
(Potential/Total) 
Product 
Headings 
Potential 
(USD 
Millions) 
Total 
(USD 
Millions) 
Share 
(Potential/Total) 
Animals (0) 59 235 349 0.67 40 188 435 0.43 
Vegetables (1) 108 511 661 0.77 48 81.4 881 0.09 
Foodstuffs (2) 61 94 281 0.33 25 8.82 591 0.01 
Minerals (3) 42 16.8 861 0.02 13 6.45 8840 0.00 
Chemicals (4) 220 43.4 174 0.25 52 128 679 0.19 
Plastics (5) 82 237 451 0.53 9 0.93 979 0.00 
LF (6) 10 0.6 18.7 0.03 1 0.01 22.1 0.00 
Wood (7) 83 143 468 0.31 9 0.06 579 0.00 
Textiles (8) 162 75.7 795 0.10 14 0.26 577 0.00 
Footwear (9) 6 6.26 72.4 0.09 1 0.01 42.7 0.00 
Stone (10) 36 6.14 104 0.06 8 50.9 1000 0.05 
Metals (11) 151 75.4 410 0.18 11 10 1950 0.01 
Machinery (12) 158 164 5120 0.03 13 0.41 19400 0.00 
Transport (13) 45 22.3 178 0.13 6 5.19 519 0.01 
Misc (14) 71 40.6 326 0.12 1 0.01 993 0.00 
Total 1294 1670 
  
251 480 
  
 
 
 
In order to assess the influence of China’s presence in the market, we calculated 
Malaysia’s share where there is direct Chinese competition and also its share of non-
Chinese sales. We calculated Malaysia’s market share for each product in the sets of 
actual and potential products and tabulate the results in Table 6.18. Malaysia’s average 
product share was higher for products in potential competition compared to actual 
competition for each year from 1992 to 2008. Malaysia has on average a 24% market 
share in Singapore for products for which there is no Chinese presence (sales), 
compared to only 12% when China competes. Similarly, Mexico's average market share 
is higher for those products where there is no Chinese competition. This does explain 
some of the worries about Chinese exports displacing the exports of many countries, 
especially as Chinese exports continue to grow in terms of both variety and volume. 
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Table 6.18: Malaysia’s Average Product Share 
Year Potential Products Actual Products 
 
Average Product Share Average Product Share 
1992 0.22 0.14 
1993 0.22 0.15 
1994 0.21 0.14 
1995 0.19 0.14 
1996 0.18 0.14 
1997 0.20 0.13 
1998 0.21 0.15 
1999 0.22 0.15 
2000 0.20 0.14 
2001 0.21 0.14 
2002 0.23 0.14 
2003 0.23 0.13 
2004 0.23 0.12 
2005 0.28 0.12 
2006 0.27 0.12 
2007 0.30 0.12 
2008 0.24 0.12 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Index  
 
 
The Balassa index or the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index at the product 
level for China was then constructed for the whole sample set, as we want to capture 
China’s competitiveness between actual and potential products.  
 
The RCA Index is defined as in Equation (6.8): 
      
    
     
  
      
    
   
  
                (6.8) 
 
where     
      measures China's exports to the ROW (excluding Singapore) for each 
product i in period t,   
      is China’s total exports for a given year (excluding 
Singapore),     
    measures ROW total exports (excluding to the Singapore market) for 
product i in period t and   
    measures ROW total exports (excluding Singapore) in a 
given year. This exercise is the same as for the USA, except for the excluded country. 
We take China's exports to the ROW excluding the Singapore market so that the results 
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will not be biased when we are comparing products in actual and potential competition. 
The RCAs for all products for a given year are then averaged and the results are shown 
in Table 6.19. China has a comparative advantage in every year for products in actual 
competition, as reflected by an RCA index greater than 1. China’s average RCA indexes 
are all less than unity in every year for products in potential competition.  
 
Table 6.19: China’s RCA to the ROW for Potential Products 
 
Actual Potential 
Year Average RCA Index Average RCA Index 
1992 2.01 0.59 
1993 1.78 0.47 
1994 1.74 0.50 
1995 1.76 0.50 
1996 1.84 0.54 
1997 1.72 0.45 
1998 1.75 0.50 
1999 1.74 0.39 
2000 1.77 0.51 
2001 1.70 0.60 
2002 1.63 0.45 
2003 1.58 0.43 
2004 1.55 0.41 
2005 1.56 0.57 
2006 1.59 0.58 
2007 1.53 0.54 
2008 1.61 0.48 
Average 1.69 0.50 
 
 
 
We also find China’s average RCA index by averaging products across the different 
sectors; the results are shown in Table 6.20. For the set of products in actual 
competition, China exhibits an average RCA index greater than 1 for all sectors except 
for vegetables (sector 2) and chemicals (sector 5). As for products in potential 
competition, it would be expected that the average RCA index would be less than unity. 
However, there are two sectors, namely textiles and footwear, which have an RCA 
index greater than 1. 
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Table 6.20: China’s RCA Index to the ROW by Sector (1992-2008) 
 
Potential 
 
Actual 
 
Sector 
Product 
Headings 
RCA Index 
Product 
Headings 
RCA Index 
Animals (0) 582 0.71 737 1.18 
Vegetables (1) 1159 0.25 2427 1.69 
Foodstuffs (2) 615 0.37 1648 0.91 
Minerals (3) 444 0.49 789 1.21 
Chemicals (4) 2302 0.39 6276 1.03 
Plastics (5) 589 0.14 2430 0.78 
LF (6) 105 0.52 481 4.51 
Wood (7) 677 0.17 2414 1.19 
Textiles (8) 1317 1.68 7992 3.01 
Footwear (9) 30 2.44 769 5.67 
Stone (10) 330 0.4 2200 1.27 
Metals (11) 1287 0.35 6528 1.24 
Machinery (12) 1416 0.24 9975 1.07 
Transport (13) 394 0.23 938 0.94 
Misc (14) 397 0.78 5218 2.62 
 
 Though Singapore is a liberal country that does not impose MFA quotas on Chinese 
products, nonetheless there are more than 1300 product-years in the textiles industry 
without any Chinese influence in the Singapore market; further investigation shows that 
558 out of these 1317 product-years (42%) have an RCA index greater than 1. We 
found that China did not export 180 out of the 558 product-years to the USA; 304 
product-years are being exported but are subject to US quotas under the MFA; and 
China exported the remaining product-years to the USA without being subject to quotas. 
Thus there are many product headings that China exported to the USA but not to 
Singapore, even though there are no known restrictions on textiles. We also found that 
China has a 19% global market share for the 558 product-years (RCA>1), but only a 
1.9% market share for the other product-years in which it does not have a comparative 
advantage (RCA<1). We infer from all this that as in the US case, China has a 
comparative advantage in these products but does not export to Singapore for specific 
reasons. 
 
To our knowledge, the Singapore market is more liberal and there are no known import 
restrictions on Chinese textiles that we know of. The RCA index is certainly a crude 
way to represent comparative advantage, but there seems to be information in these 
findings. Moreover, textiles and clothing do not seem likely to be very market specific 
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in their design or other characteristics, so there are unlikely to be product reasons for not 
supplying Singapore. We also calculated China’s RCA to just the developed countries 
(OECD high-income countries); however, we could not identify China exporting many 
low-quality textiles to developing countries. The fact that many of these textiles 
products are being exported to OECD high income countries  indicate that these are not 
just low quality products exported to just poorer developing countries. We found that 
China has a comparative advantage to OECD countries for these textile products (1314 
product-years), as indicated by the RCA index of 1.5, but it simply does not export to 
Singapore. Overall, we could not find any specific quotas or barriers that Singapore 
imposes on China for textile products, or any evidence that China exports these 
products (which we assume are low-quality products) only to developing low-income 
countries. Hence we infer that there might be some kind of import restrictions that are 
not known to us. 
 
6.3.3 Probability of Exporting 
 
 
Our assumption is that China’s increased productivity is the exogenous shock that is 
independent of Malaysia’s pricing decisions. However, there is the worry that Chinese 
entry could occur due to the failure of Malaysia to deter entry, hence we may get biases 
in estimating its effects. We need find a control variable that isolates the effect of 
Chinese entry. We thus propose a method to find the probability of China entering the 
market that is independent of Malaysia’s pricing. We derive the probability of China 
exporting to Singapore based on the same model specification as in the US market. We 
use the logit model to find the probability of China exporting each particular product 
year to the Singapore market. The logistic distribution function is derived from the three 
explanatory variables that are identical to the previous exercise in the US market, where 
we use the lagged value of the dependent variable itself       
     , the ratio of the HS6
8
and 
China’s RCA to the ROW index (excluding the Singapore market). Once we have 
obtained the coefficient of   ,    and   , we can find the probability of China exporting 
a product in a given year. The probability of China exporting a product to the Singapore 
market is represented by the specification in Equation (6.9) using the logit model: 
                                                 
 
8
 Similar to the exercise on potential competition in the USA, the               
       is defined as the total number of HS6 sub-
headings under each HS4 classification for each year that China exports to Singapore. Refer to the example given for the USA 
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 (   |    )           
                      
              
                   (6.9) 
 
We calculated the average probability of China exporting as 0.50 for the potential 
products, while the probability of exporting for products in actual competition has an 
average value of 0.88. For the products that China did not export to the Singapore 
market (potential competition), we find that 62% of these product-years have a 
probability of exporting of less than 0.5, while the remaining 38% have a probability of 
more than 0.5 (Table 6.21). As we did for the USA, the probability of 0.5 will be used 
as the benchmark. Those product-years with a value greater than 0.5 will be referred to 
as high probability products, while those with a value less than 0.5 will be referred to as 
low probability. There are still some product-years (4310) that China does not export to 
Singapore, although it has a considerably high chance of exporting.  
 
Table 6.21: Probability Distribution Table (Ordinary Logit) 
 
Count Count Total Count 
 
Prob ≥ 0.5 Prob < 0.5 
 
China Export 45238(93%) 3442(7%) 48680 
China Do Not Export 4310(38%) 7000(62%) 11310 
 
As discussed for the USA, the probability of exporting will be biased upwards for 
products that China exported in the previous period; these are the potential products in 
which China exited the market, as represented by Cases 1 and 4 in Appendix 6.5. We 
categorised our potential sample into two groups according to the different case 
scenarios; one group consist of products where China exited the market (about 3100 
product-years) in the current period, while the other group consisted of products (more 
than 9000 product-years) that China did not export for either period. Similar to the 
pattern in the USA, the average probability of exporting for those products where China 
exited the market is very high at 0.83, while the other group has an average value of 
0.36. In potential competition, we are more interested in Malaysia’s response when 
China tried to enter the market as opposed to those products for which China exited the 
market.  
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6.3.4 Regression Results for Potential Competition 
 
 
In the regression, we are using the full sample in which Chinese prices are present to 
predict for instances where prices are not present. The equation specification used to 
predict the Chinese price in Singapore is similar to in the US case. We have three sets of 
predicted Chinese prices generated by each of our three regressors: sectoral mean, 
Canada reported price and Chinese reported price to the ROW. The Chinese price effect 
on Malaysia can be represented by Equation (6.10): 
 
      
                  
 ̃                             (6.10) 
The term     
 ̃  is the predicted Chinese price, which is generated from the suggested 
regressors; we are trying to generate a set of prices that were not present in the first 
place and for this purpose this is strictly not IV regression. The results in Table 6.22 
show a positive and significant Chinese price for each of the predicted regressors used. 
Our results show that Malaysia will reduce its price by around 0.47%–0.59% for every 
1% drop in predicted Chinese prices. Although China does not export these products to 
the Singapore market, the mere threat of China entering the market will induce Malaysia 
to constrain its price as well. We get more observations when using China reported 
price to the ROW, whereas we are left with just around 3400 observations when using 
Canada reported price. 
 
Table 6.22: Simple Bivariate Regression Results 
Dependent variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 
(1) (2) 
Indicators for Price Canada Price China Export ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.59*** 0.47*** 
 
(0.17) (0.032) 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
   0.028 0.037 
N 3492 10592 
                                         ‘First Stage’: Regression to generate predicted price 
 
China Price 0.25*** 0.39*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
F-Stats (Prob>F) 1656.91 (0.00) 5892.40 (0.00) 
   0.10 0.20 
N 31094 35077 
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Similar to the study in the US market, we added in the interaction term, which is the 
predicted Chinese price and the probability of China exporting, where    measures 
changes in the Chinese price effect with the probability of exporting, which we will call 
the interaction effect of the Chinese price. The specification is shown in Equations 
(6.11) and (6.12). We would expect the Chinese price effect to be stronger if the 
probability of exporting is higher. 
 
      
                    
 ̃            
 ̃          
              (6.11) 
 
where the total Chinese price effect is given by  
 
       
        
        
 ̃
⁄               
                                        (6.12) 
As shown in Table 6.23, the Chinese price effect increases slightly with the interaction 
term; the price effect ranges from 0.56-0.73 depending on the predicted Chinese price. 
The results indicate that the Chinese price effect will fall as the probability of exporting 
increases. Using the China’s export to the ROW to predict Chinese prices, the results 
imply that if China’s probability of exporting to Singapore increases by 10%, the 
Chinese price effect falls from 0.56 to 0.548 (0.56 - 0.012), which is not a large drop but 
has the opposite effect to what we expect. In the US market, there might exist some 
factors like non-tariff barriers that are preventing China from exporting these products; 
Singapore, on the other hand, seems to have a more liberal approach to Chinese imports. 
We also tried to include         
  by itself, but the price effects increased to more than 
unity and, furthermore, the coefficients of the interaction and the probability increased 
as well; again, it has the opposite sign to what we expect. The large coefficient suggests 
multicollinearity probably exists. Multicollinearity will tend to increase the variance; 
the rule of thumb indicates that a variance inflation factor (v.i.f.) greater than 10 
suggests multicollinearity might be present.  We found that the two variables         
 ̃  
        
   and         
  have a v.i.f.  of 30 and 26 respectively; hence we cannot include 
both of them into the specification.  
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Table 6.23: Regression Results with Interaction 
Dependent variable is Malaysia’s Price 
  (1) (2) 
 Indicators for Price Canada Price China Export ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.73*** 0.56*** 
  (0.17) (0.04) 
Interaction (Pc*Prob Export) -0.23*** -0.12*** 
  (0.07) (0.02) 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.033 0.043 
N 3365 9590 
 
 
The probability of exporting will be biased upwards for products in which China exited 
the Singapore market; we drop those product-years in potential competition where 
China exited the market. We lose further observations doing this. The results in Table 
6.24 show that the Chinese price effect is still significant and in the expected direction; 
however, the interaction term is still in the perverse direction. It is surprising that we did 
not get the results we expected for the interaction term, but we feel assured that 
potential pricing exists; the predicted Chinese price acts as a constraint on Malaysia’s 
price even if China has not entered the market. 
 
Table 6.24: Regression Results with Interaction (Entry Cases Only) 
Dependent variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 
(1) (2) 
Indicator for Price Canada Price China Export ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.71*** 0.52*** 
 
(0.25) (0.050) 
Interaction (Pc*Prob Export) 0.17 -0.17** 
 
(0.28) (0.075) 
Bootstrap No No 
   0.047 0.040 
N 1988 6512 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
 
 
6.3.5 Regression by Technology Intensity Sector 
 
 
We classify the potential products into five different sectors as characterised by their 
technology intensity, shown in Appendix 6.6; most of the potential products are in the 
low technology to medium high technology groups. There are only 509 product-years in 
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the high technology sector. The Chinese price effect and its interaction term classified 
according to their different intensity levels are shown in Table 6.25. For the potential 
products, the Chinese price effect is very large in the non-industrial and low technology 
sectors. The Chinese price effect is surprisingly negative when predicted using the 
sectoral mean for the medium to high technology sector. The Chinese price effect does 
not seem to be statistically significant in the medium high technology sector. In general 
we note that the results in this section are getting unstable; we test for multicollinearity 
as many of the individual slopes are insignificant but the overall F test is jointly 
significant. Our results show that that multicollinearity is not an issue here
9
 as variance 
inflation factor (vif) for each of the variables has a v.i.f. of less than 2. The Chinese 
price effect does not seem to be statistically significant in the medium high technology 
sector. 
 
Table 6.25: China Price Effect by OECD Sector 
Dependent variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 
(1) (2) 
Indicators for Price Canada Price China Export ROW 
Predicted Chinese Price ( Non- Industrial) 1.77*** 0.60*** 
 
(0.28) (0.077) 
Predicted Chinese Price ( Low Technology) 1.22*** 0.99*** 
 
(0.25) (0.057) 
Predicted Chinese price (Medium Low Technology) 0.34 0.79*** 
 
(0.39) (0.086) 
Predicted Chinese Price (Medium High Technology) -0.14 -0.025 
 
(0.22) (0.051) 
Predicted Chinese Price (High technology) -0.58 0.097 
 
(0.54) (0.11) 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
F-Stats (Prob>F) 4.91 (0.00) 25.55 (0.00) 
   0.050 0.062 
N 3492 10592 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
9
 According to the rule of thumb, a vif greater than 10 means that multicollinearity might be an issue 
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6.3.6 Robustness Test 
 
 
6.3.6.1 Control for Global Export Price 
 
As prices might be correlated, we also included the global export to take out the trends 
in product price and also be seen as a control for the other competitors’ as a further 
robustness test. The regression results in Table 6.26 are obtained following Equation 
(6.13). The global export price (      
       
) is calculated using the same method as 
specified in Section 6.2.15.2.   
 
      
                    
 ̃            
 ̃          
           
                (6.13) 
 
The Chinese price effect is no longer statistically significant when predicted using 
Canada’s price probably because of the loss of many observations. However we find 
that the Chinese price influence is still statistically significant when predicted using 
China’s export price. The results with the global export price are comparable with the 
regression results as shown in Table 6.23 above. This further justify that the Chinese 
price effect is indeed present in potential competition and the results are not driven by 
other competitors, pricing.  
 
Table 6.26: IV Regression Controlling for Global Export Price 
Dependent variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 (1) (2) 
Indicator for Price Canada Price China Export ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.27 0.43*** 
  (0.17) (0.037) 
Interaction (Pc*Prob Export) -0.21*** -0.11*** 
  (0.066) (0.024) 
Global Export Price 0.56*** 0.32*** 
  (0.040) (0.018) 
N 3365 9590 
R
2
 0.123 0.084 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
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6.3.6.1 Bootstrapping 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, we use the bootstrapping method to correct for 
the standard errors of the generated regressors. The coefficient of the regression is 
unchanged, but the standard errors and inference will be affected. The results in Table 
6.27 show the regression results where we bootstrapped the sample using 100 
replications. The Chinese price effect is statistically significant at 0.47 only when we 
use China’s export to the ROW to predict Chinese prices. As mentioned, bootstrapping 
will tend to generate much larger standard errors, thus making some variables 
insignificant. In the case for the USA, the price effect is no longer significant when 
using bootstrap method. In order to check on the robustness result of Chinese price 
effect in potential competition, we use the bootstrapping method on the fuller regression 
as in Table 6.28. 
 
Table 6.27: Bootstrap for Standard Errors (Simple Regression) 
Dependent variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 (1) (2) 
Indicator for Price Canada Price China Export ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.59 0.47*** 
 
(0.42) (0.11) 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
Bootstrap 100 replications 100 replications 
   0.028 0.037 
N 3492 10592 
 
We also bootstrapped for the standard error for the specification, which included the 
interaction, and the results are shown in Table 6.28. The Chinese price effect is 
significant for both cases after bootstrapping; while for the USA the Chinese price 
effect is no longer significant after bootstrapping. The interaction effect is statistically 
significant but is not in the expected sign which we thought to. 
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Table 6.28: Bootstrap for Standard Errors (with Interaction Term) 
Dependent variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 
(1) (2) 
Indicator for Price Canada Price China Export ROW 
Predicted China Price 0.73** 0.56*** 
 
(0.36) (0.11) 
Interaction (Pc*Prob Export) -0.23*** -0.12*** 
 
(0.072) (0.034) 
Product Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
Bootstrap 100 100 
   3365 9590 
N 0.033 0.043 
 
 
6.3.6.2 First Difference  
 
The first difference followed by fixed effects is a method we have used to get rid of the 
time trend that might have caused prices for both countries to move in the same 
direction. The results for the first difference regression to get rid of the time-invariant 
unobserved effect are shown in Table 6.29. The Chinese price effect is positive and 
statistically significant, and ranges from 0.17 to 0.52 depending on the indicators used 
to predict Chinese price. To get rid of the possible time trend, which is product specific, 
we apply the product fixed effects to their first difference. The Chinese price effect is 
positive and statistically significant when predicted using China’s export price (0.13). 
 
Table 6.29: First Difference and Fixed Effects of First Difference 
Dependent variable is Malaysia’s Price 
 
(1) (2) 
Indicator for Price Canada Price China Export ROW 
First Difference 
Predicted China Price 0.29** 0.17*** 
 
(0.14) (0.036) 
   0.002 0.003 
N 1758 7019 
Fixed Effect of First Difference 
Predicted China Price 0.19 0.13*** 
 
(0.18) (0.042) 
   0.001 0.002 
N 1758 7019 
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6.3.7 Temporal Price Effect 
 
Similar to the US case, we will investigate Malaysia’s price pattern pre and post China 
entry. Before China enters the market, we assume a limit pricing strategy and test for it 
above; once China enters, actual competition occurs where Malaysia and China can 
either cooperate or engage in price competition. Similarly to the USA, we first need to 
define the period of China’s entry for each product. We will treat it as the case that 
China has stopped exporting to the Singapore market for some particular reason if 
exports stopped for three years or more. The implication is that China’s next entry after 
three or more years will be considered the first entry (new entry), defined as period T. If 
China did not export the product for just one or two years, we will treat it as a missing 
value and assume that China has not actually stopped exporting.  
 
Because of the uncertainty of the nature of the product, we make sure that we are 
comparing the unit price for the same products over time (clean sample). We will look 
at Malaysia’s price pattern in the periods T-1 and T-2, two periods before Chinese 
competition actually took place, and also at post Chinese competition for the periods 
T+1 and T+2. In the USA, we found that there are two possible price patterns that can 
occur before and after China’s entry; here we check Malaysia’s behaviour to China’s 
entry. To make products comparable, we need to normalise each product’s price in the 
different period by its own price in period T. We can then compare the logs of the 
normalised prices for all products in the different periods. There are a total of 619 
products where Malaysia’s price is observed for all the five periods that have not 
undergone any HS revision (clean products). Malaysia’s price on average went up in 
period T (China’s first entry) and then went down in the following period (T+1). There 
does not seem to be much of a pattern, as shown in Table 6.30. 
 
Table 6.30: Average Malaysia Price Pattern 
 
Obs Mean Std Error of Mean 
T-2 619 0.01 0.05 
T-1 619 -0.02 0.04 
T 619 0 0.00 
T+1 619 -0.02 0.04 
T+2 619 0.02 0.05 
*Prices are in logairthm 
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We grouped the products into two: products for which Malaysia’s price fell on China’s 
entry and those products that incur an increase in price when China enters. As 
discussed, there might be some kind of mean reversion, as we sort products in period T 
according to whether period T has a price increase or fall, so that on average the former 
group will tend to have positive errors of observation and the latter negative ones. 
Hence after China enters, we expect the former to fall, although again it does not fall 
back to period T-1. Out of the 619 products, there are 298 products where Malaysia’s 
price dropped once China entered the market (T). The average price of these products 
increases slightly in subsequent periods, but we can see a pattern that Malaysia’s prices 
in T+1 and T+2 are still lower compared to its prices pre Chinese entry (Table 6.31). 
The standard error for the mean,     ̅) indicates that the price difference is significant. 
The other group of products also exhibit a pattern, showing a price increase when China 
first enters the market. Malaysia’s price in periods after T has shown a slight drop, but 
is still higher compared to its pre Chinese entry prices.  
 
Table 6.31: Malaysia's Price Pre and Post China Entry (Price Competition vs 
Cooperation) 
 
T-2 T-1 T T+1 T+2 
Price Competition 
(298 Products) 
0.46 (1.09) 0.59 (0.81) 0.00 (0.00) 0.21 (0.99) 0.26 
    ̅) 0.06 0.05 0 0.06 0.07 
      
Cooperation  (321 
Products) 
-0.41 (1.12) -0.59 (0.80) 0.00 (0.00) -0.22 (0.93) -0.20 (1.01) 
    ̅) 0.06 0.04 0 0.05 0.06 
 
 
We categorised the two groups into the different sectors and we wanted to test whether 
the two groups are statistically the same across sectors. For each sector, we averaged the 
probability to export and also China’s RCA. Table 6.32 shows China’s RCA and 
probability of exporting index for its first entry for the restricted sample classified 
according to the different sectors. The probability to export between the 2 groups; the t 
test (p value= 0.11) also failed to reject the null that the two groups have equal 
probability to export. 
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Table 6.32: China's RCA and Probability of Exporting by Sector 
Sector 
Price 
Competition 
RCA Prob Export 
Price 
Cooperation 
RCA Prob Export 
Animals (0) 17 0.15 0.35 15 0.89 0.41 
Vegetables (1) 32 0.2 0.36 36 0.05 0.39 
Foodstuffs (2) 20 0.46 0.44 15 0.26 0.4 
Minerals (3) 7 0.12 0.33 13 0.08 0.35 
Chemicals (4) 60 0.22 0.39 72 0.38 0.43 
Plastics (5) 25 0.11 0.35 31 0.07 0.36 
Wood (7) 4 0.05 0.38 11 0.18 0.4 
Textiles (8) 26 1.32 0.49 27 1.57 0.49 
Stone (10) 5 0.2 0.34 5 0.22 0.44 
Metals (11) 42 0.19 0.37 34 0.18 0.38 
Machinery (12) 45 0.17 0.41 46 0.17 0.43 
Transport (13) 10 0.07 0.29 9 0.36 0.45 
Misc (14) 5 0.07 0.45 7 0.29 0.44 
Total 298 
  
321 
 
0.41 
 
 
The sector that stands out is textiles, which has an RCA greater than 1. We use the Wald 
test to check whether the RCA are similar for the 2 groups (Malaysian firms engaging in 
price competition versus cooperation once China entry); our t test (p value=0.29) fails to 
reject that the 2 samples are statistically different from each other. We also tested for 
RCA equality by sectors and fail to reject that the 2 groups are the same across sectors. 
Similarly we tested for the equality of the 
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Although the products seem to be quite evenly distributed between the two market 
structures, as in Table 6.33, we tested for the proportion between the two groups by 
sectors. We reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions only for minerals (sector 3) 
and wood products (sector 7); implying that for these the two populations are different. 
 
Table 6.33: Testing Proportions 
sector Obs z Score Price cooperation price competition 
  
Pr(|Z| < |z|) (mean) (mean) 
Animal (0) 32 0.62 0.47 0.53 
vegetables (1) 68 0.49 0.53 0.47 
Foodstuff(2) 35 0.23 0.43 0.57 
Mineral (3) 20 0.06 0.65 0.35 
Chemical(4) 132 0.14 0.55 0.45 
Plastics(5) 56 0.26 0.55 0.45 
Wood(7) 15 0.01 0.73 0.27 
Textile(8) 53 0.85 0.59 0.41 
Stone(10) 10 1 0.5 0.5 
Metals(11) 76 0.19 0.45 0.55 
Machine12) 91 0.88 0.51 0.49 
Transport(13) 19 0.75 0.47 0.53 
Missc(14) 12 0.41 0.58 0.42 
Aggregate 619 0.19 0.52 0.48 
 
 
6.4  Comparing Results 
 
In this section we compare some of the results of the Chinese price effect in the USA 
and Singapore. Our main aim in the Singapore chapter is to compare and verify Chinese 
price effects compared to the US market. We conducted several robustness tests as 
discussed above for products in direct competition and found that the Chinese price 
effect is statistically significant in both markets. We provide a comparison of our 
results, looking at the Chinese price effect in the USA and Singapore, in Table 6.34. 
Our results show that the Chinese price effect is statistically significant in both markets 
after controlling for endogeneity in the Chinese price. The Chinese price effect ranges 
from 0.47 (USA) to 0.58 (Singapore). In both markets, the Chinese price effects are a 
270 
 
 
little higher in the IV regressions than the OLS results. One possibility is that the IVs 
correct for errors in observation and hence remove some attenuation bias. The shares 
effects give different results across markets. The influence on product share is not 
significant in the case of Singapore and although it has significant effect in the USA, its 
effect is not as strong as the price effect. We did further robustness test for both the 
established products; again the share effect is not significant for established products in 
both markets while the price effect is present. For the clean products, the Chinese price 
effect is statistically significant for both markets. The fixed effects first difference to get 
rid of the product-specific time trend also provides strong evidence that the Chinese 
price effect exists in both markets. We take the fixed effects of the first difference to get 
rid of the common productivity shocks for the different products; the Chinese price 
effect is still consistent and strong.  
 
To summarise, our results show that share effects are different for each market and that 
they are not as strong and robust as the price effects.  However our starting point was 
that trade shares were not the principal way to approach this question. Rather we were 
primarily concerned with the Chinese price effect, which we see as an alternate to the 
share approach, which has generally found little effect.   
 
Table 6.34: Comparing Results for Actual Competition 
 
USA 
 
Singapore 
 
 
(IV)  
Fixed Effect of First 
Difference 
IV 
Fixed Effect of 
First Difference 
China Final 
Price 
0.47*** 0.32*** 0.58*** 0.21*** 
Share*Price 0.13** 0.46*** -0.11 0.066*** 
China Share --0.42*** -0.81*** 0.27 -0.19*** 
   0.25 
 
0.188 
 
N 34970 
 
31821 
 
*IV estimates are obtained with the global price specification model (using China’s reported price) 
 
We argued that China can influence the price of products that it has yet to export but has 
the potential to export. The Chinese price effect for potential products is statistically 
significant in both markets, as shown in Table 6.35. However the robustness test 
(bootstrapping method) is different between markets.  The price effect still exists after 
for the Singapore market but the Chinese price effect is no longer significant in the US 
market. As mentioned, the standard errors from the regular OLS regression are probably 
271 
 
 
biased downwards because the Chinese price is a predicted rather than an observed and 
known value, but on the other hand, the bootstrapping technique we used to try to 
correct for this may not be wholly reliable in panel data such as this. We found that 
Chinese price effect is present in potential competition but the results are not as robust 
as in actual competition especially after subjecting to bootstrapping method, especially 
in the US market. In the US market, the Chinese price effect is less robust probably due 
to more barriers of entry for potential products which might not be captured in our 
specification and hence that waters down price competition. Singapore on the other 
hand seem to practise a much more liberal approach, which might explain why the price 
effect is more robust. 
 
Table 6.35: Comparing Results for Potential Competition (Controlling for Global 
Price) 
 USA Singapore 
Indicators for 
Price 
Japan 
Price 
China Exports ROW 
(except USA) 
Canada 
Price 
China Export ROW 
(except Singapore) 
Predicted China 
Price 
0.19* 0.23*** 0.27 0.43*** 
   0.029 0.02 0.028 0.037 
N 3966 8469 3492 10592 
 
The results for the temporal price effects are quite similar in both markets, where two 
different groups exist that either follow a cooperation strategy or engage in price 
competition with China. We explained that this might be due to mean reversion. 
However, what is important for the increasing prices in T is that the price in T+1 does 
not fall all the way back to the level in T-1; the explanation is similar for falling prices 
in price competition. 
 
For both markets, we hypothesise that limit pricing occurs even before China enters the 
market. Thus we would expect the incumbent firm to set a price lower price before 
China’s entry; once China enters there is tendency for price to rise once the incumbent 
realised that it could no longer prevent Chinese entry. In the case when the incumbents’ 
price fall after Chinese entry, there might also have the same form of potential 
constraint, although in terms of price rises the inference in fairly strong. Once entry 
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occurs, the firms might engage in a Bertrand like price competition as discussed in 
actual competition. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Our main reason for doing this exercise is to shed additional insight on and test for the 
generality of China’s competitive price effect. We were able to use the results in the 
Singapore market and provide a comparison to the USA market. Over our sample 
period, China exported more product headings to Singapore, although the USA is 
China’s largest export market. Using a data sample of about 31,000 observations 
covering China’s exports to both the USA and Singapore, we found that China’s price 
in the USA relative to Singapore dropped over the period 1992 to 2008. Singapore is 
more liberal in its approach to Chinese products; Singapore has a zero applied tariff for 
Chinese products; and it did not participate in the MFA quota restrictions on China. 
Chinese price competition in Singapore is thus cleaner, in the sense that there are fewer 
restrictions imposed, which might influence the magnitude of the Chinese price effect.  
 
As Singapore is a relatively smaller market and also more open, we wanted to check 
whether China’s price effect would be very different there than in the USA. In actual 
competition, the Chinese price effect is statistically positive and significant, even after 
conducting several robustness tests. We found that Malaysia will reduce its price by 
around 6% to 7% if the Chinese price falls by 10% for products that are in direct 
competition, after controlling for endogeneity. According to the Rauch classification, 
China’s influence is greater for homogeneous products as compared to differentiated 
products which is expected. However China’s exports are mainly manufactures; and our 
results show the significance of China’s price effect in differentiated products. This 
indicates that products from China and Malaysia can be considered as close substitutes 
and the degree of substitution is quite high at around 0.64 to 0.69. China’s price 
influence on Malaysia is more pronounced in the low technology to medium technology 
products. The validity of China’s effect in the higher technology sector produces mixed 
results depending on the instruments used. As discussed, trade in sophisticated products 
usually involves MNCs and hence price competition might be distorted.  
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 We conducted further robustness test to check for the stability of the Chinese price 
effect. We also included the global price to control for the effects of the other 
competitors in the Singapore market; this is perhaps the most convincing results. The 
Chinese price effect is statistically significant around 0.58 to 0.69 while China’s share is 
not statistically significant. Although the influence of China’s product share is also not 
significant in the Singapore market, to study this is not our objective, as we are 
primarily concerned with the Chinese price effect. The use of first difference fixed 
effects to get rid of the product-specific effects further supports the existence of the 
Chinese price effect. Overall, our results points out that the direct Chinese price effect is 
present in Singapore and that it is stronger than the share effect.  
 
For potential competition, we also found that the Chinese price effect is present and the 
different robustness method used supports our case. The cheaper Chinese product will 
increasingly help to contain the prices of the other competitors, especially those in 
lower- and middle-income countries. China’s probability of exporting does not seem to 
have a positive influence on the Chinese price effect, which is similar to what we found 
in the USA. This presents a challenge and raises the possibility that the methods used in 
predicting the probability of exporting (i.e. structural stability) are creating the results, 
although we cannot work out how that might occur.  
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Appendices for Chapter 6 
 
Appendix 6.1: Proportion of China and Malaysia’s Export to Singapore 
 
 
World Import 
China 
Singapore 
Import China 
Proportion 
World 
Imports 
from 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Imports 
from 
Malaysia 
Proportion 
 
(USD Billions) 
(USD 
Billions) 
(Singapore/World) 
(USD 
Billions) 
(USD 
Billions) 
(Malaysia/World) 
1992 130.53 2.25 0.02 43.96 10.61 0.24 
1993 150.82 2.40 0.02 52.48 14.04 0.27 
1994 183.36 2.90 0.02 62.85 16.80 0.27 
1995 221.98 4.05 0.02 79.56 19.26 0.24 
1996 245.28 4.44 0.02 85.49 19.70 0.23 
1997 276.73 5.69 0.02 88.21 19.87 0.23 
1998 279.64 4.86 0.02 80.86 15.70 0.19 
1999 315.69 5.69 0.02 89.67 17.28 0.19 
2000 397.08 7.12 0.02 112.04 22.82 0.20 
2001 410.59 7.21 0.02 104.02 20.09 0.19 
2002 474.80 8.86 0.02 108.91 21.21 0.19 
2003 592.76 11.07 0.02 126.17 21.52 0.17 
2004 776.85 16.19 0.02 149.52 24.95 0.17 
2005 970.38 20.51 0.02 167.83 27.30 0.16 
2006 1171.24 27.21 0.02 190.10 31.09 0.16 
2007 1425.93 31.90 0.02 212.70 34.38 0.16 
2008 1629.75 33.75 0.02 239.06 38.10 0.16 
2009 1370.98 25.92 0.02 188.44 28.35 0.15 
2010 1748.23 33.66 0.02 247.93 36.19 0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
275 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.2: Classification of US Imports from Malaysia by Product Share 
 
 
Total 
Products 
(Malaysia) 
Headings 
% of 
Total 
Headings 
% of 
Total 
Products 
% of 
Total 
Heading
s 
% of 
Total 
  
s<0.10 
 
0.1≤s<0.2 
 
0.2≤s<0.5 
 
s≥0.5 
 
1992 3762 2425 0.64 725 0.19 535 0.14 462 0.12 
1993 3853 2410 0.63 851 0.22 617 0.16 491 0.13 
1994 3923 2533 0.65 838 0.21 611 0.16 468 0.12 
1995 3619 2364 0.65 826 0.23 581 0.16 371 0.10 
1996 3648 2395 0.66 805 0.22 596 0.16 351 0.10 
1997 3627 2384 0.66 798 0.22 571 0.16 350 0.10 
1998 3609 2253 0.62 846 0.23 651 0.18 401 0.11 
1999 3672 2261 0.62 916 0.25 681 0.19 402 0.11 
2000 3879 2476 0.64 950 0.24 710 0.18 396 0.10 
2001 3845 2459 0.64 908 0.24 714 0.19 392 0.10 
2002 3863 2461 0.64 916 0.24 739 0.19 397 0.10 
2003 3807 2495 0.66 863 0.23 681 0.18 323 0.08 
2004 3801 2525 0.66 842 0.22 660 0.17 314 0.08 
2005 3831 2540 0.66 820 0.21 685 0.18 316 0.08 
2006 3797 2571 0.68 774 0.20 661 0.17 301 0.08 
2007 3628 2469 0.68 707 0.19 626 0.17 285 0.08 
2008 3589 2482 0.69 663 0.18 600 0.17 262 0.07 
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Appendix 6.3: Instrumental regression - Full Equation 
 
Price Instrument is: Sector Means Canada Reported Price China Reported Price 
China Final Price 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 
 
(0.066) (0.030) (0.020) 
Price*Share -0.065 -0.16* -0.13* 
 
(0.13) (0.088) (0.072) 
China Share -0.034 -0.25 0.22 
 
(0.53) (0.49) (0.41) 
Hausman 0 0 0 
   0.126 0.056 0.147 
First Stage 
 
 
Instrumental Price 0.31*** 0.24*** 0.38*** 
 
(0.016) (0.0071) (0.0060) 
Instrumental Price*Share 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 
 
(0.0086) (0.0066) (0.0050) 
Instrumental Share 0.051*** 0.072*** 0.16*** 
 
(0.0070) (0.0080) (0.011) 
F Statistics (Instrumental 
Price) 
F(  3, 32700) =138.47 F(  3, 25168) =555.68 F(  3, 28437) =1836.47 
F Statistics (Instrumental 
Price*Share) 
F(  3, 32700) =482.33 F(  3, 25168) =481.13 F(  3, 28437) =875.17 
F Statistics (Instrumental 
Share) 
F(  3, 32700) =177.75 F(  3, 25168) =100.71 F(  3, 28437) =134.41 
N 36410 28571 31821 
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Appendix 6.4: IV Regression by Sector 
 
(1) 
Combined Instruments Sector Mean, Canada 
Animals (0) 0.60*** 
 
(0.06) 
Vegetables (1) 0.63*** 
 
(0.17) 
Foodstuffs (2) 0.74*** 
 
(0.080) 
Minerals (3) 0.18* 
 
(0.097) 
Chemicals (4) 0.047 
 
(0.061) 
Plastics (5) 0.58*** 
 
(0.14) 
LF (6) 1.13*** 
 
(0.12) 
Wood (7) 1.04*** 
 
(0.028) 
Textiles (8) 0.79*** 
 
(0.016) 
Footwear (9) 0.68*** 
 
(0.051) 
Stone (10) 0.80*** 
 
(0.073) 
Metals (11) 0.76*** 
 
(0.046) 
Machinery (12) 0.42*** 
 
(0.037) 
Transport (13) 0.18 
 
(0.17) 
Misc (14) 0.20 
 
(0.19) 
Sargan 5.9e-15 
Hausman 0 
   0.17 
Product Fixed Effect Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes 
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Appendix 6.5: Different Scenarios for How a Potential Product Can Occur 
 
 
Period T-1 Period T 
  
Case 1 China Exports China Stopped Export Malaysia Existing Product 
China 
Exit 
 
Malaysia Exports Malaysia Exports 
  
Case 2 China Does Not Export China Does Not Export Malaysia Existing Product 
 
 
Malaysia Exports Malaysia Exports 
  
Case 3 China Does Not Export China Does Not Export Malaysia New Product 
 
 
Malaysia Does Not 
Export 
Malaysia Exports 
  
Case 4 China Exports China Does Not Export Malaysia New Product 
China 
Exit 
 
Malaysia Does Not 
Exports 
Malaysia Exports 
  
 
 
Appendix 6.6: Product Headings by OECD Classified Sector 
 
 
OECD Sectors Product-Years 
Non-industrial 1 1,853 
Low Technology 2 3,669 
Medium Low Technology 3 2,001 
Medium High Technology 4 4,572 
High Technology 5 509 
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 Conclusion  7.
 
 
This thesis seeks to identify whether China did indeed export deflation globally, given 
the fact that it exports almost every product available on the market. As China’s exports 
become more competitive as a result of productivity improvements, their prices will 
tend to influence the prices of competitors. China does not have a large enough direct 
impact on the price indices of the developed countries to explain any material 
downward pressure on their prices because of its relatively small share in their total 
absorption of goods and services; hence the Chinese price effect must rely on the 
competitive pressure that China exerted on other manufacturing producers’ prices. We 
use a model akin to Bertrand competition among heterogeneous products to represent 
this interaction. In this model two producers strictly influence each others’ prices, but 
we argue that causation may fairly reliably presumed to flow from Chinese prices to 
other prices. Our empirical model uses commodity fixed effects to allow for time-
invariant differences between commodities (difference in units) and year fixed effects to 
allow for general factors which could have affected Mexico’s prices in the US market 
(the exchange rate, inflation rate, the US demand etc.) 
 
For both destination markets, we choose middle income developing countries where 
their exports can be seen as closer substitutes to Chinese exports. Our study focuses on 
the Chinese price effect in a large market (the USA) and applies the same methodology 
to a relatively smaller market (Singapore). Our main reason for doing the Singapore 
exercise is to provide additional insight on and test for the generality of China’s 
competitive price effect.  In the case of the US market, tariff preferences were given to 
Mexico and there was also some form of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB) imposed on China. 
Singapore is a relatively more liberalised economy, with zero applied tariffs  and fewer 
restrictions on Chinese products, the Chinese competitive influence is cleaner in the 
sense that it is isolated from external factors (trade restrictions) influencing prices. 
Our work is predicated on the view that Chinese competition occurs largely in terms of 
prices, driven by rapidly increasing productivity and scale in Chinese industry as 
producers started to catch up technologically with middle-income countries and 
absorbed large amounts of surplus labour from the hinterland and financial capital from 
the rest of the world. This export shock is quite independent of anything pertaining to 
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other individual markets. With this in mind we can start to identify causal links from 
China to other suppliers using instrumental variables to capture these productivity 
shocks. The most natural instrument for Chinese export prices would be production 
conditions at home; that is, Chinese productivity level at the product level. The 
limitations of this approach, however, are that the available productivity data are 
nowhere near as finely defined as our trade data; hence we actually have to turn to a 
series of instruments based on international trade data – mostly China’s exports to 
markets other than the one we are studying. The reliance on trade data is what drives 
our use of data at the 6-digit level of the Harmonised Trade System Nomenclature – it is 
the finest level of disaggregation that is internationally comparable.  
 
Our main result is that the direct price effect of Chinese competition is present and is 
stronger than the share effect; it applies to both the US and Singapore markets. The 
direct price effect of China is statistically significant after being subjected to several 
robustness tests; for example, after taking out global trends in price, heterogeneity in 
groups and the IV test for endogeneity. Using IV to control for the endogeneity of 
Chinese prices, our results suggest that a 10% reduction in China’s price will cause a 
4% to 8% drop in the price level of its rivals. The direct Chinese price effect dropped to 
around 2%-3% when using the first difference fixed effect model, which eliminated the 
product-specific time trend; however it was still significant. We also proposed a ‘clean’ 
sample set which is free of the classification issues associated with the HS revision. The 
results again show that the Chinese price effect is significant and robust. 
 
Our sample is an unbalanced sample where products may drop in and out of the export 
basket; hence we created a balanced sample set to similar products over time. We 
conducted various test for the established products; the price effect is robust and stable. 
The result also support and is consistent with the theory on the greater degree of 
substitutability between homogeneous products (Rauch Classification) as compared to 
differentiated products like manufactures. The price effect is present and robust for the 
different sectors and also by technology intensity. In the US market, we found that the 
Chinese price effect is strongest for the low technology and medium low technology 
sector; this is consistent with the fact that Chinese exports are mainly concentrated in 
these sectors.  
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We acknowledge the limitations of a Bertrand duopoly model and included the global 
unit price to control for other major exporter prices and also to eliminate the general 
trends in prices. The Chinese price effect is still statistically significant and robust in 
both Singapore (0.58 to 0.69) and the USA (0.30 to 0.47); although the degree of price 
competition drops slightly as the global price has explained part of the variation in 
price. This is perhaps the most convincing results as it proves that the robustness of 
China’s price effect which is isolated from price trends and also the effect of the other 
major competitors. Although our results also show quite similar impacts of Mexico on 
China’s prices; we argue because of endogeneity, it is hard to find suitable instruments 
for Mexico’s’ prices and hence the estimates will be biased. 
 
 
We conducted various test to examine the price and share effects and found that the 
share effects are not as robust as the price effects.  Although the effect of shares and the 
interaction term do have the expected signs, they sometimes fail to provide significant 
effects. Again we emphasise that our thesis is primarily concerned with the Chinese 
price effect, which is an alternative to the share approach, which has generally found 
little effect.   
In actual competition we are estimating the Chinese competitive effects based on the 
products which have survived; we are looking at how the variation in Chinese prices 
affects the other competitors.  One of the limitations of evaluating the direct price 
competition between products is that it does not take into account of the products which 
exited the market because they could not keep up with the Chinese competitive pricing.  
On one hand this could underestimate the Chinese price effect because firms which are 
not competitive enough are dropped. On the other hand studies have shown that exited 
firms are usually small firms and are therefore less efficient, their exit could lead to a 
reallocation of resources thereby increasing the overall efficiency in the competing 
countries like Mexico and Malaysia.   
 
China’s abundant labour supply and expanding skills bases imply massive productive 
potential, especially if China continues to invest heavily in R&D and technological 
transfers. China’s export basket has developed gradually from low cost products to the 
more sophisticated products through product diversification and product upgrading, its 
effects is not just constrained to the low and middle income countries. Winters and 
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Yusuf (2007) argued that as China continue to grow and move up the production ladder, 
the middle and higher income countries might have to worry about their comparative 
advantage being taken over by China, while still exerting its influence on lower income 
countries. China is massive with an abundant reserve of relatively cheap labour, it might 
still be able to engage and compete in low cost manufactures even though it has now 
ventured into more sophisticated manufactures.  
 
In order to attain sustainable growth, China would need to improve on innovation and 
continue to invest heavily in R&D rather than depending on its relative labour surplus. 
Schott (2008) has also attributed Chinese products to be getting more sophisticated over 
time, given their relatively low level of income; however there is still the perceived 
quality gap between Chinese products and the developed countries. Although it might 
have appeared that China has shifted its production to more sophisticated products, 
processing trade accounted for a large percentage of China’s export in this sector. Fu et al. 
(2012) stressed that this may lead to an underestimate changes in the changes in the unit 
value that is added in China. Furthermore we note that there should be a caution on 
finding the price elasticity especially for sophisticated products as these are usually 
controlled by the same institutions located in different countries.  
 
The other part of China’s competitive effect will have arisen from its ‘potential 
competition’ from products that China does not yet supply to the US market. Overall, 
we also find significant price effects for products in potential competition – products 
which China does not currently export to the USA but potentially could do so (because 
they already export them elsewhere). For the USA, we found that the magnitude of the 
potential price effect ranges from 3% to 5% for every 10% decline in Chinese prices. 
One of the main obstacles for investigating potential competition is to attain the 
predicted Chinese price, since as products are not exported in the first place we are 
looking at ‘invisible’ prices. We have to estimate these from the prices of China’s 
exports of the same product to other markets. As with actual competition there are 
worries about endogeneity - not that Mexico’s price in the USA influences China’s 
price of exports to other markets, but that Chinese entry to the US market might be 
related to Mexican prices. We deal with this by estimating the probability of China 
exporting a particular product that is independent of Mexico's pricing decision. Slightly 
surprisingly this probability appears to play no role in China’s price effects in potential 
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competition. This may reflect a problem in estimating the probability of exporting, but it 
is not clear to us precisely how that might be. Furthermore the Chinese price effect is no 
longer significant when bootstrapped from the standard errors. Thus we have to be more 
modest about these results than those on actual competition, which seem more robust. 
On the other hand, we believe that this is the first attempt to identify such potential 
competition effects in global international trade. (Schiff and Chang, 2003, treat potential 
competition but in the context of regional trading arrangements.)  
 
Turning to the temporal dimension, we try to identify the effects of Chinese entry into 
the US market on the temporal pattern of Mexican prices. The results show that firms 
will engage in either price competition or cooperation with China when China first 
enters the market. Our theory assumes limit pricing before entry and we might expect to 
see a price increase once entry occurs; cooperative pricing with China once the 
incumbent realised that it could no longer prevent Chinese entry. In the case when the 
incumbents’ price falls after Chinese entry, we postulate that there might have existed 
some form of potential constraint on Chinese entry so that once it is removed; the rush 
of Chinese competition overwhelms the Mexican incumbents.  
 
Overall, our main contribution is that we have managed to determine that the Chinese 
price effect is positive and is robust in both direct and potential competition. As China’s 
exports becomes more competitive brought about by its increasing productivity, China 
will help to contain the other producers’ price and hence help to stabilise price. Hence 
as long as the China’s productivity level relative to costs continues to rise, we would 
expect China to supress inflation. One of the necessary conditions for China exporting 
deflation is its competitive price effect on other manufacturing producers’ prices; we 
tested for this and have found support for this condition.  
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